Terrorism is defined by the U.S. Justice Department as violence against persons or property, unlawful use of force to intimidate or coerce a government, the civil population, or any segment in pursuance of political or social objectives. Terrorists’ activities may result in higher levels of psychopathology than what comes after natural disasters such as earthquakes and tsunami, maybe because the terrorists’ actions are preventable and systematically targeted at civilians. For instance, twelve months after bombing Oklahoma in 1995, there were increased reports of a rise in alcohol consumption and smoking, which is a form of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) compared to the modern control community. Another example PTSD was after the terrorists destroyed Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, they displayed characteristics of PTSD three years after the incident. Children are vulnerable to terrorist’s activities. For example, 16% of children and adolescents presented symptoms of PTSD two years after terrorists bombed Oklahoma in spite of the fact that they were never exposed directly and never were their relatives killed in the act.
Mental illness is not related to terrorist behavior. Research indicates that at least most terrorists are not psychopaths; there is neither also no terrorist personality nor an accurate personality of a terrorist otherwise or psychologically. Histories of trauma, child abuse, humiliation, and injustices are the prominent cases in terrorist biographies. However, there is no explanation of the relationship between terrorism and the cases in these biographies.
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Without media coverage, terrorist acts are to no vein because the impact will be confined to the injured immediate victims who are never terrorist attack target audience. Terrorists are interested in the audience than the victims to instill fear in public. Terrorists seek the attention of the media, decision makers, national, and foreign public. Terrorists are selective in their attacks to gain the best media coverage. Terrorists use the media not only to win mass attention but also use the opportunity to publicize their political course and explain the rationale to embark on violence. Media gives terrorists the status similar to regular, accepted, legitimate world leaders. The media works as a medium for terrorists to contract power between terrorists and the entity they are fighting against in an actual conceptual warfare. Media creates an atmosphere of fear and suspicion (Wilkinson 1986). Similarly, the media reaches a greater audience and legitimizes their acts.
The advancement in technology and audience behavior has reduced the effort used by terrorist to utilize the media to a greater influence. The emergence of new media has even made it easier for terrorists to reach the target audience with a more concise message through the use of websites. Today terrorist uses different media apart from printed media to convey their intentions. The internet has changed the official media and is most effective, easier to use, and is much quicker. In fact, the terrorist can take whatever message they so wish the internet and get global attention. The media increases the scope of terrorist propaganda and activities. Publicity helps the group in recruitment using fewer resources (Berman & Latin 2008). In spite of the changes in media and technology, never show any signs of shifting from one type of media use to the next. However, the terrorists embrace newest technology and information to be innovative and make use of up to date technologies. Media forms used by terrorists include audiocassettes, videos, DVDs, popular music, and novels. The above explanation shows that the terrorist uses media to transmit their message, publicity, garner support, recognition, and legitimacy.
Al Qaeda is regarded as the deadliest threat to the U.S. national security by the diplomatic, law enforcement, military, and intelligence communities. The nature of the threat of Al Qaeda has changed though since its inception in the late 1980s. Al Qaeda's common enemy is U.S. because Osama Bin Laden had positioned it as the ideological vanguard of radicalization. Leadership was vital and central to terrorist operation and growth. Al Qaeda was established to become a different organizational entity (Jongman 1988). Osama bin Laden was at the top of the organization serving as the general. Coordinating closely with Laden were Shura Majlis members his council of elders. Changes in Al Qaeda leadership were a move to decentralization because of loss of seasonal leaders through arrest or attrition. Osama was involved in giving ultimate approval for tactical and strategic operative choices. Some leaders had been influential since the Islamic war in Egypt before it merged with Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda has been accommodative, replacing capture and killed leaders, changing functional level and the role of their leaders, and stressing on motivation than strategic leadership.
Another adaptation after leadership losses was decentralization of operational as well as tactical in decision making. Core leadership was out in making decisions, especially about an attack. Field and cell leaders had a foundational understanding of organizational overall strategic goals hence had autonomy in selecting targets, assembling teams, and determining tactical details such as financing and timing. Communication with the main leaders would have compromised the operations as they were hunted. Tactical leaders became inspirational to the group rather than tactical under scrutiny. For instance, on the eve of attacking Iraq Osama called on Muslims from all over the world to join them fight American forces using suicide to attack them.
Cause model
The cause model differentiates causal factors at micro-level from the macro-level and asserts that preconditions for radicalization are macro level factors. The model suggests that to explain why some people are radicalize and others are not, scrutiny of micro-level factors are essential. In studying an individual micro level factors are further subdivided into social and individual factors. Social factors describe individual positions in relations to others. On the other hand, individual factors describe personal processes and circumstances that explain how people differently interpret situations they are in and the manner in which they respond (Crenshaw 1981). The model further differentiates between catalysts that accelerate radicalization process and causes that set the basis for radicalization. The model seeks to get the answer why causal factors at different measurement levels relate to each other and if combined, how these factors they cause radicalization.
A behavioral model of radicalization
Individual radicalization trajectory is observed by visualizing the process as an arc from a formation of radical sympathies to violent actions. The dependent variable is the process followed by individuals who embrace terrorism and not radicalization. A rational thinking should be how than why people become terrorists is psychologically complex, confliction, and mostly unknowable. Hogan John suggests that people should think of pathways to extremism. On the other hand, Randy Borum proposes to use “action scripts” in describing the process of engaging in terrorism.
Behavioral and psychological factors
Emotional or psychological factors lead to detachment from violence. Undergoing negative qualities connected with constant and dedicated belonging such as anxiety, stress, gradual dismantle of the illusion that lured one to recruit in a terrorist organization may develop a negative sentiment towards the group and hence a change in priorities. The priorities may be longing for a social a state which aims at gaining something that the member feel to lack or existed before recruitment happening due to self-questioning. However, following prolonged psychological or social venture as a member from with less return. One can disengage by becoming disillusioned with avenues being chased or some quality functioning strategies or with political gain and the arrogances underpinning them.
Physical factors are externally recognized, and detachment from terrorism is divergent when there is a revolution. Involvement in terrorism is not static or discrete but is continuously shifting process of commitment in a job with the collection of various actions that may seem separate and involve accomplishment of more than a single role at the same time (Krueger & Malečková 2003). Physical disengagement from terrorism may involve fear of security services followed by detention. Forced change to a different role as a result of disobeying orders. If mitigation measures are available, then the member escapes outright execution they are given different roles from the initial ones.
References
Wilkinson, P. (1986). Terrorism and the Liberal State (Vol. 2). London: Macmillan.
Jongman, A. J. (1988). Political Terrorism : A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature. Transaction Publishers.
Crenshaw, M. (1981). The Causes of Terrorism. Comparative Politics, 13(4), 379-399.
Krueger, A. B., & Malečková, J. (2003 ). Education, Poverty, and Terrorism: Is There A Causal Connection? The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17(4), 119-144.
Berman, E., & Latin, D. D. (2008). Religion, Terrorism and Public Goods: Testing The Club Model. Journal of Public Economics, 92(10), 1942-1967.
