The book ‘ After Hegemony ,’ by Robert O. Keohane, is a comprehensive analysis of cooperation among the developed capitalist countries. Keohane seeks to answer a pressing question of whether the decline in the dominance of a single power can diminish cooperation. He refutes the notion that the fall of hegemony weakens cooperation by examining the international regimes and their evolution in the world political economy. According to him, the regimes are not just mere substitutes for world government but devices that assist the progress of decentralized cooperation.
Keohane begins by analyzing the organization of cooperation in a global political economy when shared interests exist. The sole purpose of the analysis is to determine the conditions under which the common interests would result in cooperation. However, he says that the existence of the mutual interests among the states is not sufficient to guarantee harmony. He, therefore, identifies the eminent reasons for such failures. According to Keohane, cooperation emerges from a pattern of discord or potential dissension. Despite the existence of common interests, it requires progressive attempts to change policies to meet the needs of others. He accepts the realist assumption that the universal environment is anarchic because it lacks a domineering government.
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The author argues that the interests of the people are malleable and that interdependence develops a tendency of cooperation. The decline of American hegemony accelerated the U.S engrossment in the world economy. It is at this instance that the realists predicted that the diffuse national power would undermine the ability of the states to administer the order. On the other hand, the institutionalists predicted that the interdependence would inspire a greater urge for policy coordination. Keohane agrees that the states are rationally self-centered, but the realism’s pessimism is not justified in all situations. He insists that regimes are essential.
In the book, Keohane explains that institutions do not adjust the behavior of the states by strictly establishing rules. They change the context under which the states make their decisions based on self-interests. According to him, institutionalism modifies realism by distributing power, shared interests, and prevailing practices and expectations. It discloses the continuation of regimes after the disappearance of the initial favorable conditions. He insists on the distinction between the development and maintenance of regimes. Cooperation after hegemony is pertinent to the fact that the maintenance of existing regimes is less demanding compared to their creation. The creation of the international regimes depends on the presence of complementary interests regardless of the existence a hegemon. The regimes are sets of implicit and explicit norms, principles, decision-making processes, and rules. They help to coordinate behavior. However, rational states that would primarily gain from cooperation fail to coordinate their activities. Keohane reaches out to this problem by arguing that states are rational egoists and that they can mutually benefit from cooperation but at the same time have incentives not to cooperate and acquire more. He describes the situation in relation to the game theory by using the Prisoner Dilemma game.
In Chapter 6, Keohane seeks to explain the function of international regimes. He uses the Coase theorem to describe the possible fall in coordination if certain conditions are not met. According to him, an inverted Coase theorem would be more suitable compared to the I.R. The regimes are, therefore, perceived to be greater than the ad hoc agreements because they are delicate and can be easily modified. The patterns of the regimes increase the price of reneging on responsibilities and reduce the cost of operating within its frameworks. As a supplement to the Prisoner Dilemma game, Keohane describes the market failure theory, which refers to the absence of agreements aimed at benefiting all parties. Moral hazards, asymmetrical information, and irresponsibility are some of the sources of market failure. Through the reduction of uncertainty, international regimes promote cooperation.
The author concludes by focusing on bounded rationality, which is the notion that individuals cannot process all information to make perfectly rational decisions, therefore, increasing the possibility of cooperation.
