David Nisleit, Police Chief for the San Diego Police Department in response to protests around the nation and local community activists, announced the ban of the controversial neck hold known as the carotid restraint (Figueroa, 2020). Since then, there has been no further information provided as to what the San Diego Police Department Officers are using in its stead or the gap that it has placed (if any) in police training. The San Diego Police Departments’ vision is to “strive to advance the highest levels of public safety, trust, and professionalism by strengthening community partnerships through fair and impartial policing while fostering employee enrichment and growth to ensure we remain America’s Finest police department” (www.sandiego.gov), a vision that provides great insight into the Police Chiefs actions and quick response on an issue that has plagued underserved communities for generations, police brutality. This paper is an analytical discussion that supports the banning of the carotid chokehold by the SDPD. However, it points out that the problem is not with the restraining procedure but with the institutional culture and mindset that allowed such events to happen.
Important Facts the Decision Maker must Consider
David Nisleit, the chief of police for the San Diego Police Department, became the primary decision-maker after the killing of George Floyd while in police custody. After being subdued by police officers, Mr Floyd was handcuffed and pinned to the ground by an officer’s knee, resulting in his death from strangulation and asphyxiation. Floyd’s case is not the only victim of the carotid chokehold. According to Aymer (2017), Eric Garner suffered a similar fate while urging the police officers to let him breathe as he was asphyxiated. However, George Floyd’s case gathered momentum and resulted in widespread public outcry as it came at a time when African Americans were protesting against widespread discrimination, especially in the police use of force. Therefore, David Nisleit, among other stakeholders, was pressured into making the decision to ban the use of carotid restraints by the SDPD. Therefore, the first fact a decision-maker must consider is the amount of information they have within the application context and its accuracy.
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The second fact the decision-maker must consider is the optics of the situation. George Floyd’s untimely death came at a particular time where the BlackLivesMatter movement was gaining momentum across the country. Therefore, the fact that Floyd was an African American would colour the perception among the public (Cappelli, 2020). Even if his death was an unintended mistake on the part of the restraining officer, the public (especially supporters of the BlackLivesMatter movement) were more likely to call it the latest example of racially motivated police violence, given America’s history with discrimination along racial lines (Roberts, 2020). If, for instance, Floyd was a white man, most would agree that he would not have been subjected to the carotid chokehold after being handcuffed. The decision-maker must, therefore, consider the different lens through which different stakeholders will view the case and interpret their decision.
Lastly, the decision-maker must consider the type of decision to make that will settle matters. In this case, there are three types of decisions. First, strategic decisions look into the future and set the course of achieving a desired strategic goal (Misni & Lee, 2017). Tactical decisions, on the other hand, determine how things will be done, especially in the short-term (Burns, 2015). Lastly, operational decisions affect the daily activities workers make when dispensing their responsibilities (Biard et al., 2015). The Police Chief’s decision to ban the carotid chokehold was made to settle an emergency situation where different stakeholders were calling for action. Therefore, it is more of a tactical and operational decision. However, if David Nisleit plans to enforce and sustain the decision, it becomes a strategic one. Depending on the objective of the decision-maker, the type of decision becomes important.
Key Legal, Structural, Cultural, and Craft Constraints
From a structural point of view, the decision-maker must select an effective alternative after banning the carotid chokehold. In the absence of a replacement for the procedure, the police officers are neither expected to create new alternatives nor do nothing. Therefore, Nisleit’s controversial decision to ban the carotid restrain would be effective if the police officers and the members of the public are made aware of what replacement has been made (Figueroa, 2020). However, no new information has been released, this reducing public trust into the reforms the SDPD claimed to be making. On the other hand, the police officers might be reluctant to change their mindsets or adapt to any new procedure for applying restraints. According to Crank (2003), institutionalized organizations operate in environments which are complex in terms of organizational culture, rigid values and limited space to change. In light of the cases of police brutality mainly targeting people of colour, the SDPD decided to defy the institutional order that may make it hard to make an independent decision and handled the issue in the best way possible. There are influences in the police unit that often determine the laws made as well as the approach used to handle issues like police brutality.
Besides, banning the carotid chokehold is not enough to ensure compliance, especially in a deeply institutionalized organization like the SDPD. As a result, the decision-maker has to actively monitor compliance with the ban to ensure that its strategic, operational, and tactical objectives are met. Nisliet has yet to disclose the existence of such a monitoring authority or the penalties officers who violate the ban will be subjected to.
These constraints and enabling factors are important in several ways. For instance, the decision made quelled the public outcry about the use of the restraining procedure, thus giving the SDPD room to perform its other duties, which also rely on public cooperation and trust. However, it is Nisleit’s responsibility to ensure that such an event does not happen again. In other words, simply banning the carotid restraint is not enough. He has to monitor compliance with the ban, first by providing a safer alternative. Secondly, the decision-maker must provide training on the new procedure and ensure that it is adapted. However, it is important to consider that the replacement of the carotid restraint will be opposed by the police institution, as it changes the culture.
Therefore, Nisleit must set the context for the ban of the carotid restraints to satisfy all stakeholders. Announcing the ban has managed to settle public. The only remaining part is to convince the SDPD to accept the changes. Simple coercion will not be effective, even when relying on his authority as the police chief. As a result, Nisleit will have to convince the SDPD of the benefits of the ban and get them to comply with the institutional changes that will have to be done to improve public trust and satisfaction with the department.
Relationship between the Dimensions of Structure, Culture, and Craft in the Banning of the Carotid Restraint
On the one hand, the officers have been given the authority to apply the necessary force when restraining a suspect. Furthermore, police chief Nisleit has the authority to ban the procedure in light of its misuse by the department. However, the effectiveness of the decision is hampered by the institution’s culture. Police reforms are a long and difficult process, mainly because the stakeholders are resistant to any cultural changes (Rowe & Macauley, 2019). Furthermore, the problem did not lie with the restraining procedure per se. Instead, it lied with the restraining officer and their colleagues who were insensitive to the potential risks their specific application of force would have on the arrested individual. Floyd’s case was not isolated as he is not the only victim of the carotid chokehold. Yet, the police departments in the country were resistant to consider the evidence-based practice and modify the operational procedures appropriately (Kalyal, 2019).
The cultural resistance to change also has another impact on the craft. To achieve the desired outcomes, Nisleit and other stakeholders will have to find a replacement for the banned restraining procedure. Once found, they will have to train all officers on the use of the procedure. However, not all officers will be accepting of the changes. Therefore, Nisleit will have to set an accountability entity to monitor and punish violations (Bass, 2020). Therefore, the cultural changes will require a deep investment of time and effort on the part of Nisleit and other decision-makers before the results can be observed.
Was is the Right Decision?
Nisleit’s controversial banning of the carotid chokehold was the correct decision to make, but partway. According to Shepherd (2020), the mortality risks of the carotid chokehold were well known, both from research and in previous instances. Regardless, no action had been taken to control the risks. Police officers were still allowed to perform the procedure when arresting individuals. Therefore, banning the restraining procedure was correct in terms of lowering the risks of mortality among the individuals being restrained. It should be noted, however, that the replacement for the banned carotid chokehold could potentially have similar if not greater mortality risks.
Therefore, the decision to ban the carotid chokehold is only partly effective because it does not account for the root problem: the insensitivity of the police officers to the risks. Furthermore, there is no entity of institution that holds the police officers accountable for these oversights (Ewens, 2017). As a result, other factors can come into play. For instance, if the officers are prejudiced against an individual, they are more likely to use force and be insensitive to the risks the applied force has on their victims ( Charbonneau et al., 2017) . It is, therefore, recommended that police chief Nisleit follows up his ban of the carotid chokehold with further regulations that will address the underlying human problem.
This paper analytically discusses the banning of the carotid chokehold by the SDPD. It points out that the problem is not with the restraining procedure but with the institutional culture and mindset that allowed such events to happen. Whatever restraining procedure the SDPD introduces to replace the carotid chokehold; it would be not effective if the underlying problems are not addressed. For instance, if the officers are prejudiced against an individual, they are more likely to use force and be insensitive to the risks the applied force has on their victims. As a result, Nisleit and any other decision-maker must address the prejudice, among other problems.
References
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