The United States' air carrier operations remain extremely safe following the decline of the accident rates in recent years. Nonetheless, among different factors cited by the National Transportation Safety Board as the major contributing factors to the majority of fatal air carrier accidents, situational unawareness, ineffective decision making, actions and inactions by the flight crew are at the top of the list. The NTSB acts as an independent Federal agency in place to facilitate the promotion of safety in aviation, highway, railroad, pipeline, marine, and hazardous materials. Since its establishment in 1967, the institution optimizes Congress' rights from the Independent Safety Board Act of 1974 as a platform for the investigation of transportation accidents. It does that by determining the probable causes of the accidents while issuing safety recommendations through studying the transportation of safety issues. The institution also explores the safety effectiveness of government agencies in transportation. From this perspective, the board plays a critical role in making public its decisions and actions through accident reports, safety recommendations, safety guides, and statistical reviews, among other things.
One of the accident reports by the NTSB concerns Continental Flight 3407. According to the report, on February 12, 2009, at about 2217 eastern standard time, a Colgan Air, Inc., Bombardier DHC-8-400, N200WQ, operating as the Continental Connection flight 3407, did appear to be on the instrument approach to Buffalo-Niagara International Airport, Buffalo, New York (NTSB, 2009). The airplane would crash into a residence in Clarence Center, New York, about five nautical miles northeast of the airport. During the accident, the two pilots, two flight attendants, and 45 passengers aboard the airplane lost their lives. The accident also killed one person on the ground (NTSB, 2009). The impact forces, as well as post-crash fire, led to the destruction of the airplane. Critically, NTSB's report indicates that the flight did operate under the provisions of the 14 Code of Federal Regulations, part 121. At the time of the accident, the night visual meteorological conditions did prevail. What was the probable cause based on the findings of the National Transportation Safety Board?
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According to the report by the NTSB, there were different probable causes of the accident in question. First, the institution highlights that the captain's inappropriate response to the stick shaker's activation might have been a probable cause of the accident. The cause led to an aerodynamic stall from which the airplane could not recover. The institution highlights that the flight crew's failure to facilitate active monitoring of the airspeed per the rising position of the low-speed cue is one of the contributing factors to the fatal accident (NTSB, 2009). Additionally, the institution's findings did document the failure by the flight crew to follow the sterile cockpit procedures as another contributing factor to the accident. There is also the issue of the failure by the captain to manage the flight effectively. Finally, the institution highlights inadequate procedures by Colgan Air for the airspeed selection and management, when approaching the icing conditions as another contributing factor to the accident. All these issues came into play leading to the loss of lives in this fatal accident in 2009.
From the class, we have had the chance to learn various concepts and issues, which I believe relate to this accident. For example, as evident in the case, various safety issues come into play to determine the probable cause. One of the critical elements is the exploration of the flight crews' performance, mainly when the captain is the flying pilot with the first officer as the non-flying pilot (NTSB, 2009). Besides, there is a need to assess the performance of the non-flying pilot in monitoring and challenging errors by the flying pilot in the course of the flight. The case also depicts the adequacy and error-tolerance in the checklist procedures in the taxi phase of operation. There is also the assessment of the flight crew performance and the crew member experience. The approach is valuable in examining the familiarity of the crewmembers with each other and work-related and rest issues amid other issues such as the flight delays. The case also examines the adequacy of the crew resource management training programs.
Another similarity in the case with the knowledge gained in the unit is the situational awareness and/or decision-making as the causal factors in most of the accidents. For example, in the case analysis, there is a lack of failure by the flight crew to facilitate active monitoring of the airspeed concerning the mounting position of the low-speed cue. Another situational issue is the failure by the flight crew to sterile cockpit procedures, as well as the failure by the captain to manage the flight effectively. The case analysis and report document inappropriate response by the captain to the stick shaker's activation that led to the aerodynamic stall. Consequently, the airplane did not recover from, thus, leading to the loss of lives. These causes indicate the role of situational awareness and decision-making as vital contributors to the accident.
Notably, there have been diverse proposed changes and improvements, which could have been essential in preventing or mitigating another accident of similar nature in the future. According to expert experts, there is usually not just one factor in a crash, and that appears true in accordance with this accident report that killed 50 people, including one person on the ground. In the publication of the final report, the NTSB determined the reason behind the crash. According to the publication, the institution did state that the people working in the cockpit sought to respond to the stall, ultimately the opposite way to their training. Alternatively, following the board, anti-stall training at that time did not meet the necessary demands. The board confirmed Colgan Air's statement on the pilots' failure to respond correctly to the instrument readings. As part of the argument, the NTSB did an argument on the potential implications of the fatigue in contributing to the accident. Nonetheless, there was not sufficient evidence to indicate that fatigue was one reason for the accident's occurrence. Following the accident, there have been diverse chances to improve the flight's safety.
First, there was a plan to transform the way Americans travel. In this aspect, the necessary stakeholders initiated the transformation of specific aviation safety laws. The approach was critical in pushing Congress to ratify PL 111-216, the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010. Critically, this is one of the most influential transformations in place to aid and improve the safety standards of aviation in recent years.
Other than this, there was the integration of enhanced transparency following the new extension act. The FAA (Federal Aviation Administration) focused on establishing the electronic database concerning all the pilot records. The pilots records database (PRD) is invaluable to share pilots’ records that the FAA manages. Air carriers and certificate holders have access to all pilots to inform their decisions on hiring. The PRD provides information on pilots’ medical certificate class, their issuance date, and limitation. The PRD also documents the pilots’ previous employers. It shows the pilots’ accident or incident history should they have any. Based on this initiative, it is essential for the airlines to check or explore these records when they want to hire pilots for their airplanes. FAA is in the process of optimizing this database amid software issues or challenges. Regardless, the new act or change has been a revelation in helping prevent future accidents. The new law demands that the FAA administrator execute annual assessments or reports concerning training and safety in the airlines. The new act has also been essential in pushing airlines to display the correct airline to operate the flight. The approach is highly indispensable concerning the regional carriers while preventing the occurrence of future accidents of a similar nature.
Additionally, as a way of improving aviation safety, there has been a complete change in crew management. The law in place secures more rest time for the crew members. Before the integration of the law, the airlines offered pilots about 8 hour resting period between shifts. In the current context, the airlines must provide 10 hours of rest with about 8 hours of sleep as part of the transformed crew management. It is also necessary for the airlines to present their plans for fatigue risk management to the FAA administrators. Corporations have to only hire pilots with 1.500 flight hours in their resume. Finally, based on the issue of concern, there is the essence requiring pilots to learn about dangerous situations, particularly in the simulators, as opposed to the hypothetical cases or classes (Gingras, Ralston, & Wilkening, 2010). The management of the crew is essential in ensuring that the members have the right knowledge and skills to improve on the safety of how the Americans travel under the guidance of the board. Conclusively, these practices have been in place to oversee the improvement of the safety of aviation while ensuring that we do not have a similar accident like this in the future.
References
Gingras, D., Ralston, J., & Wilkening, C. (2010). Improvement of Stall-Regime Aerodynamics Modeling for Aircraft Training Simulations. In AIAA Modeling and Simulation Technologies Conference (p. 7793).
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) (2009). “ National Transportation Safety Board Aviation Accident Final Report .” Retrieved from https://aircrafticing.grc.nasa.gov/documents/2009_DHC8-400_Clarence_Center_NY_Accident_Final_Report.pdf
