The Cuban Missile Crisis (1962): Causes, Consequences & Lessons Learned

The Event 

The Cuban Missile Crisis is a missile scare in a confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States lasted for thirteen days between October 16 and October 28 in 1962 ( Fernandez, 2011). During this particular event, the confrontation was initiated by the fact that the Americans discovered a ballistic missile deployment by the Soviet Union in Cuba. Besides More than 40,000 troops of the Soviets were based in Cuba , and the leader of the Soviet Nikita Khrushchev approved and agreed with the request by Cuba to put nuclear weapons on the island as a way of deterring a future invasion ( Fernandez, 2011). Later, there was an agreement that was reached after a secret meeting between Fidel Castro and Khrushchev. 

Besides, the meeting and subsequent agreement authorized the construction of several missile launches that commenced later during the summer. Later on, the United States oversaw the establishment of a naval blockade to prevent further missiles from gaining access to Cuba. An announcement came from the United States, stating that it was not going to allow the delivery of offensive weapons to Cuba ( Yang, 2002). Further, the United States demanded the dismantlement of the weapons that were already in Cuba before being taken back to the Soviet Union. 

Why the Event is Regarded as an Intelligence Failure 

The event is regarded as an intelligence failure since the intelligence community and decision-makers were not successful in laying the necessary groundwork that would effectively address the Cuban missile crises that eventually occurred. In this respect, some of the decision-makers who failed are cited as including President John F Kennedy and his policy of communism containment ( Scott, 2013). This failure was largely influenced by a prior failure by his administration to use intelligence in reacting to the threats that existed before passing them to his successor. For example, decision-makers failed in making explicit warnings to the public regarding the grave challenges that were likely to arise if the Soviets went ahead to plant offensive weapons in Cuba. 

It is noteworthy that during this particular event, there were no fundamental alterations made to the Soviet policy. The intelligence did not manage to give sufficient estimations in asserting that the activities by the Soviets in Cuba had the primary objective of deterring attack from the Americans, thus denying the opportunity of securing and sustaining a critical ideological victory for the cause of communists. Engrossed in threats from political forces by a stronger communist regime that was taking charge of the Western hemisphere, efforts by the intelligence to consider further estimates were dismissed through the possibility of having an offensive Soviet base (Rossmo, 2006). 

Lack of Critical Thinking that Led to Intelligence Failure 

Different types of critical thinking were absent concerning the intelligence failure experienced during the event that characterized the Cuban Missile Crisis. One of these types of critical thinking is backed by a narrative that conflates outcomes and causes. In this regard, the outcome of the crisis ending without the countries involved experiencing a nuclear confrontation would be critically analyzed and considered as discrediting any arguments supporting intelligence failure (Yang, 2002). Considering that the outcome of the event was linked to the political defeat of Khrushchev, there exists a tendency to critical think that that the efforts made by the United States' intelligence were largely successful. However, it is noteworthy that different perspectives of critical analysis would suggest otherwise. 

Even though there are clear indications to demonstrate that the efforts by the intelligence officials led to the discovery of the missiles that had been planted by the Soviets in Cuba, it is quite clear that the officials were not successful in anticipating the existence of such missiles at the earliest opportunity. The observation by Fernandez (2011) indicates that a warning is not only supposed to present a list of facts, but also expected to anticipate and prevent any danger. In this regard, none of the estimates that were provided by the intelligence officials of the United States managed to sound an alarm warning people to be prepared for the possibility of nuclear missile attacks. Besides, the intelligence information presented fell short of clearly some of the factors that would have led to changes in the intentions of policymakers. 

Critical Thinking Barriers 

The intelligence failure was largely occasioned by the absence of various aspects of critical thinking. In this respect, the key decision-makers and policymakers were not keen on utilizing critical thinking strategies to avoid any situation that would have occasioned the intelligence failure. According to Rossmo (2006), investigative and intelligence failures can be avoided through the creation of managerial awareness of the impending dangers or problems. Besides, other reasons can be used to explain the existing link between the absence of critical thinking and the failure by the officials of the United States intelligence during the event that was characterized by the Cuban Missile Crisis. One of such reasons is that investigative and intelligence failures can be overcome through the consideration of diverse perspectives in the analysis of issues involved while ensuring that intelligence officials are honest and impartial. Where circumstances can permit, it is critical for those in charge of intelligence to defer any decisions to conclude gathering adequate, reliable data and information. 

How this Intelligence Failure Could Have Been Avoided 

It is worth noting that the intelligence failure experienced during the event of the Cuban Missile Crisis could have been avoided. This is because there were several measures that the intelligence officials, policymakers, and decision-makers could have taken at the earliest opportunity. Besides, it was possible for those involved in this matter as strategists to consider the idea of seeking creativity as well as the organization of brainstorming sessions as opposed to reaching a consensus that would be costly at the end (Scott, 2013). This failure could have been avoided by giving sufficient estimations in asserting that the activities by the Soviets in Cuba had the primary objective of deterring attacks from the Americans. For example, the avoidance of intelligence failure would have presented the United States with the opportunity of securing and sustaining a critical ideological victory for their cause and that of communists. It would also have been vital for intelligence officials to acknowledge and consider responding to any criticism, doubt, or objection from their members. 

How the Outcome Could Have Been Different 

The outcome could have been different in the sense that that the intelligence officials would have provided the necessary decision-makers and policymakers with the relevant information in good time for them to act in averting any dangers and fears associated with nuclear missile attacks. The intelligence would have been strategic as opposed to being tactical. The kind of analysis that occurred, in this case, was tactical rather than strategic ( Smith, 2009). In that respect, it was clear thet the intelligence officials from the United States had failed to develop prior strategies that would have allowed them to effectively address the missile scare crisis that was characterized by the confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States. 

References 

Fernandez, S. (2011). Cuban Missile Crisis and Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: A Political 

Perspective after 40 Years. Journal Of American History , 98 (2), 613-615. doi: 

10.1093/jahist/jar301 

Rossmo, D.K. (2006). Criminal Investigative Failures: Avoiding the Pitfalls . FBI Law 

Enforcement Bulletin , 1-8 

Scott, L. (2013). The Cuban missile crisis, 1962: A National Security Archive documents 

reader. International Affairs , 69 (4), 786-786. doi: 10.2307/2620654 

Smith, G. (2009). 13 Days: The Cuban Missile Crisis, October 1962. International Affairs , 

45 (4), 695-696. doi: 10.2307/2613350 

Yang, A. (2002). The Cuban missile crisis, 1962. Government Publications Review , 18 (5), 

562-563. doi: 10.1016/0277-9390(91)90159-u