During earlier wars, the United States has always been in a position to resolve international conflicts. The battles in the Old World between Red Indians and whites are an example of a major conflict that existed before World War I. In fact, the small pox epidemic of 1633 and 1634 was the only inhibitor to the war progressing (Millet et al. 2012). The six major battles, including Dunkirk, cannot be omitted from historical accounts of conflict in the USA (Coffman 2000). In almost every region of the world today, the US and her allies have actively managed economic affairs, despite dwindling financial allocations for this task. The nation has a history of supporting free trade and foreign policies that have built institutions that have held disputes at bay. For example, post-war organizations such as the United Nations have advocated for financial and socio-economic institutions to prevent depressions and world wars; but before the war, the United States has had to address internal disputes and conflicts despite being the most reliable county in history. The economic positions of the northern states and the southern states were the determining factors of success during the 1800’s and early 1900’s after the civil war.
The Southern states were not in an economic position to wage a successful war in the early 1900’s. The reason behind this is the changes in slavery and trade interests in agriculture and industry. The anticipated tyranny of the federal government was another reason why the south could not finance a war – a unified currency was essential in the preservation of the union. The south was eager to preserve a religious union, in addition to the prosaic reasons adopted by soldiers. The south also funded only 9 million soldiers, approximately a third of whom were slaves despite having better military leaders such as Jeff Stuart, and Stonewall Jackson.
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In addition to military prowess, the north was also a more extensive scale manufacturer of textiles, shoes, firearms, and iron. The Union also had a better railroad track. These factors affected the likelihood of victory over northern states in addition to the strategic bombing of armies (Shy, 1986). Classism was an inhibitor of achievement on the part of the states of the north, which was not a significant distinction between the confederate armies. The strategy was simple; all that was required was patience to wear down the resolve of the north, similar to the approach used by Washington against the British army (Millett et al. 2012). The south could fight the Union for submission if it so wished. Ulysses S. Grant was unfazed by the number of casualties that he had the potential of creating and weather massive losses. He was a brutal commander, and this was a significant factor in the losses accrued in the south and proceeded to do the same in the battle of Gettysburg.
In concluding, the author of this essay cites the United States military talent and specialized craft as significant contributors to its position as superpower today. Americans are described to have a particular ambivalence towards war, according to Millett and Shy. The profound effects of these abilities have led to the success of America and her allies in World War I and II. The centuries of instability though war contributed to modern day democracy and covenants, bilateral agreements and improved navigation in foreign territories. All nations can indirectly attribute their sustained levels of peace to the USA.
References
Millett, A. R., & Maslowski, P. (2012). For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America from the Revolutionary War Through Today. Free Press.
Shy, J. (1986). For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America. By Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski.(New York: Free Press, 1984. xiv+ 621 pp. Maps, illustrations, tables, notes, bibliographies, and index).
Coffman, E. M. (2000). The Duality of the American Military Tradition: A Commentary. The Journal of Military History , 64 (4), 967.
