Introduction
Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are among the growing technologies that could revolutionize warfare and help save many lives in various fields. Nevertheless, they present a serious threat to humanity and various life forms that define the planet. In the nuclear industry, applications of UAVs for various purposes, such as fulfilling operational, environmental, and safety monitoring tasks, are of immeasurable help (Wallace & Loffi, 2015). In recent years, the discovery and the subsequent use of UAVs have been associated with various violations of the privacy of security and public facilities that include different nuclear power plants and secret military facilities (McNeal, 2015). UAV technology has extensive applications and impacts in the area of military competition. The technology enhances the delivery of nuclear bombs and supply chains. It means that the use of drones has far-reaching implications for biological, radiological, chemical, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. It is worth noting that some of the applications are already possible, while others are futuristic (McNeal, 2015). The threat of UAVs as weapons of mass destruction is of great importance since any mishap may constitute an existential threat. Despite the various benefits that the use of UAVs portend to society and humanity at large, the potential threat that their applications and possible misuses as weapons of mass destruction portend should not be discounted.
Challenges in the Use of UAVs as Weapons of Mass Destruction
The weapons of mass destruction encompass three types of armaments, including biological, nuclear, and chemical weapons. Different international treaties prohibit or regulate weapons of mass destruction. In general, chemical and biological weapons are outlawed. From another perspective, the use of nuclear weapons lacks comprehensive regulations and a ban on the same has not yet been attainable in the international scene (Deegan, 2014). In retrospect, no multinational treaty is in place to regulate the use of UAVs as weapons of mass destruction, albeit in the present circumstances. Much as the UAVs constitute a significant part of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), they require an appropriate means of delivery to transport from their areas of storage of deployment to their designated targets to be considered militarily useful (Wallace & Loffi, 2015). It is, therefore, imperative to note that the control of the delivery system is helpful in the reduction of the threat of WMD. Establishing such controls will certainly render the weapons harmless.
Delegate your assignment to our experts and they will do the rest.
The use of UAVs presents a new challenge for the counter-biological and counter-terror weapons community. They can be deployed to disseminate and deliver chemical and biological materials in acts commonly known as agricultural terrorism (Wallace & Loffi, 2015). The recent indigent in which gangs in China used the drones to deliver chemical and biological weapons is a case in point that demonstrates the viability of drones in that regard. Biological weapons (BW) comprise of weaponized agents such as a toxin, a microbe, or a device, and a mechanical system of delivery or dissemination (McNeal, 2015). Various technologically advanced countries such as Russia, China, and America have industrialized biological weapons programs. The production and the development of a delivery mechanism for a biological weapon is a challenge to most rogue developing nations and other non-state actors.
The advent of emerging and existing technologies could make production and the subsequent dissemination of biological weapons faster and easier (Wallace & Loffi, 2015). An example of such means production is the utilization of gene-editing techniques and tools such as Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats (CRISPR). Ill-motivated individuals or criminal groups can use such a technique to modify existing microbes and toxins to increase their lethal or pathologic features. Furthermore, they could be applicable to alter the durability and stability of existing agents to enable extended periods of dispersal and delivery. Closely related to that is the fact that they could be used to create new disruptive agents or pathological disruption.
Application of UAVs presents new challenges to the counter-biological and counter-terror weapons community since they are applicable to deliver and disseminate both chemical and biological weapons in acts known as agricultural terrorism (Wallace & Loffi, 2015). Agricultural terrorism refers to the act of using UAVs to spread chemical or biological agents that are detrimental to human health. A recent example is the latest acts by Chinese gangs who used a drone to spread African swine fever in pig populations (Deegan, 2014). The gangs succeeded in infecting and consequently killing several herds and enabled the spread of the mentioned pathogen in an extensive area across the continent of Asia. It is worth noting that the pathogen did not infect humans but created acute food shortages across the continent and a disruption in the international pork market. Besides, the gangs sponsored avenues of misinformation meant to create public fear about the potential of the disease (McNeal, 2015). The effects of the swine disease forced the farmers to sell the pigs at extremely discounted profits. The gangs positioned themselves, purchased the pigs, and sold them at higher prices to the international market. Such kind of terrorism, apart from creating panic and destruction, leads to serious financial losses while the undeserving people make unimaginable amounts of profits from such a mishap.
The stated case constitutes an act of agricultural terrorism because the act affected the production and distribution of food. It caused the region to incur public health, ecological, and economic instabilities (Wallace & Loffi, 2015). It generated civil unrest, threatened national security, and disrupted the solid financial structures. The blatant act of using UAVs to poison the plant and livestock of a given country or a particular region may lead other states that have not suffered from the infection to close their borders for products from the affected areas. The unaffected countries may impose lace restrictions, total trade lockdown, or sanctions, thereby leading to serious losses in both the local and the international markets ( Wagner , 2014). Most terrorist networks explore agricultural terrorism as a viable means of hurting humanity and human progress (Deegan, 2014). Such acts bring to light the dangers associated with UAVs in delivering biochemical weapons. The fact that most UAVs tend to have long wings means that terrorists can strap anything to them, including biological weapons, and use them to harm people or the economies of other regions, as was the case of China (McNeal, 2015). It is estimated that drones have the propensity of increasing the delivery and dissemination of biological and chemical weapons by a factor of ten.
The use of UAVs will lead to increased proliferation and the subsequent use of weapons of mass destruction (Deegan, 2014). The use of drones reduces the expertise, the cost, and the testing procedures and protocols for the delivery and dissemination of weapons of mass destruction such as missiles, bombs, and apparatus that enable the spray of large areas. The actors may use drones to deliver morbid, lethal biological weapons to large numbers of individuals and livestock living in a particular area (Wallace & Loffi, 2015). Such may be quite lethal if coupled with fear mongering through platforms such as social media. The net effect is the disruption of lifestyles, functionality, and security of not only the affected areas but also various regions across the globe that are privy to that information.
The increased availability and subsequent use of UAVs in different applications tend to improve their potential for malicious use. The main problem with such is that it creates an international norm that presents the use of drones as necessary or as a routine. The use of unmanned vehicles has the propensity of affecting both the tolerance and the threshold for acts of hostility (Deegan, 2014). Therefore, the increased acceptance of the use of UAVs as part of the military arsenal in different countries may spell doom not only for humanity but also to other forms of life, particularly if rogue and undisciplined nations and individuals own them. The case of the Chinese gangs is a perfect example of how groups can turn a noble invention into a destructive weapon, if unguided (McNeal, 2015). International bodies, such as the Technology Control Regime (MTCR), should strive to advance the efforts of partners in ensuring the prevention of potential proliferation of unmanned delivery systems ( Wagner , 2014). The systems can deliver weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.
It is believed that most countries in the Middle East possess Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), meaning that the use of the UAVs may be the most appealing form of delivery. It is imperative to note that the transport of chemical and biological weapons requires a payload of between 50 and 150 kilograms, which is a threshold that a medium-sized UAV can attain. Biologically or chemically equipped UAV has the capability of circling a given target before unloading their payload (Wallace & Loffi, 2015). Until now, it is known that Iraq is the only country that developed UAVs under the leadership of Saddam Hussein for military purposes. The greatest concern for the use of UAVs to deliver and disseminate WMD is typical with rogue nation-states. Besides, terrorist groups also present a formidable threat. The latter, such as Al-Qaeda, have the financial muscle to produce or to acquire UAVs and use them for chemical or biological means. The most significant effects of UAVs are mainly psychological. The thought that a terrorist group possesses WMD and can deliver them at a targeted population without being detected holds civilians hostage.
The use of UAVs in the delivery and dissemination of biological, nuclear, and chemical weapons offers a new option but also serious challenges for conflict and policies, especially in a volatile region like the Middle East (Deegan, 2014). Presently, larger sate powers such as Syria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia have not acquired UAVs through production or importation (Wallace & Loffi, 2015). However, relative peace in the region does not mean stability because the conflict structures may shift in the future. The use of UAVs, which provides for countries the means to go to war without necessarily having to provide soldiers, may make it easier for countries to go to war without much thought. It means that the UAVs can cause more damage without relatively fewer impediments since they do not have to endanger the lives of onboard crewmembers (McNeal, 2015). Therefore, the dependence of UAVs may lead to miscalculations of military and political leaders and could encourage them to go to war even without probable cause. For the stipulated reason, the use of UAVs may even be more destabilizing than when countries that rely on manned aircraft.
Benefits of Use of UAVs as Weapons of Mass Destruction
Despite the mentioned challenges, proper use of UAVs portends greater benefits if countries adhere to the provided guidelines and regulations (Wallace & Loffi, 2015). The use of drones or UAVs offers a significant improvement in the nuclear offense, which constitute the ability to deliver a warhead to a particular target, and the defense, which represents the ability to successfully prevent the delivery and then mitigate the effects of weapons of mass destruction. On the issue of biological and chemical weapons, drone swarms have the propensity of improving both the offense and defense as well. The use of the UAVs in biological and chemical weapons, however, appears to favor the offense more than defense (McNeal, 2015). Such could weaken the norms and policies against the use of UAVs in weapons of mass destruction and encourage proliferation. It is imperative, therefore, for the US national security agencies to act to combat the threats posed and to take advantage of the opportunities that the use of UVAs as weapons of mass destruction poses.
The current models of UAVs can communicate with one another, setting them aside from a group of conventional, individual drones (Wallace & Loffi, 2015). Communication permits contemporary UAVs to adjust their behavior and respond to real-time information. It means that the drones are capable of changing an intended course of action based on real-time information provided by the command center. UAVs that are fitted with environmental sensors and cameras can identify potential targets, defenses, and environmental hazards and then relay the same information to the rest of the swarm (McNeal, 2015). The swarm may then avoid the identified hazards by maneuvering, or it may strike the indeed target with high precision. The capability to collect real-time information makes UAVs well suited for use as weapons of mass destruction.
Recommendations
The use of UAVs requires proper regulations and adherence to the same to mitigate the challenges and ensure maximum benefits (Wallace & Loffi, 2015). The first measure is to curb the improper use of UAVs, particularly for the delivery and dissemination of WMD. The first step should strict arms control. It is worth noting that the existing regulations covering the use of UAVs, in most cases, do not apply to the Middle East. For instance, the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty between the US and Russia places restrictions on unmanned nuclear cruise missiles and manned strategic bombers (McNeal, 2015). It is worth noting that the Pentagon, in its definition of UAV, excluded the unmanned cruise missiles. The treaty stipulates that Russia and the USA must notify each other of any new nuclear carriers.
Countries that can produce weapons of mass destruction or the means of propulsion and delivery, such as UAVs, should be part of international treaties. Some of the useful treaties in this regard include the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty that demands that nations that are producing nuclear weapons should only export to other countries that meet the provisions of the International Atomic Energy Agency (Wallace & Loffi, 2015). Creating a central agency such as the Australia Group, which checks the relevance of the chemical and biological weapons before export, is necessary for ensuring that rogue groups to not acquired them. Additionally, empowering committees such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee would be helpful in monitoring and coordinating the export of international nuclear weapons. In essence, the current measures put in place are useful but not sufficient.
The fact that some treaties and measures control nuclear proliferation is not sufficient in controlling the possible misuse of UAVs (Wallace & Loffi, 2015). The control of the delivery services would be useful. Towards this end, proper application of the provisions of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is relevant because it has close to 40 members that include Ukraine and Russia, which means that its membership is not only Western countries. Astonishingly, nuclear exporters such as North Korea, India, Israel, China, Iran, and Pakistan are not members (Deegan, 2014). Increasing the membership of such an organization would help to ensure the tracking and control of the propulsion. Tracking and control ensure they do not get into the wrong hands, such as in the hands of terrorist and rogue nations (McNeal, 2015). To limit the spread of the means of propulsion of WMD, the MTCR restricts the export of UAVs and ballistic missiles.
The next viable step would be to put stricter measures on the export of UAVs and WMD. The objective of export controls is to prevent or regulate the transfer of military-related products, technologies, knowledge, or production equipment to other countries. Unlike arms control treaties, export control regimes are mainly political in nature, implying that they are not legally binding (Wallace & Loffi, 2015). That mainly relies on political goodwill. Every independent nation has the liberty to decide to purchase or sell. Some international treaties demand export controls like some of the pre-requisite conditions. For example, the International Atomic Energy Agency requires the exertion of certain safeguards before the purchase or sale of WMD. The main concerns of such controls are the possible proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the importance of the transfer mechanism, such as the potential of the delivery system, for instance, the UAVs (McNeal, 2015). Furthermore, export control should encompass proper assessment of the end-use of the transfer that should include the assurances of purchasing states that they would avoid the misuse of WMD and their propulsion mechanism such as the UAVs, under any circumstances. Finally, the export controls should ensure that the transacting nations disclose the objectives and the capabilities of the space programs and the missiles of the recipient state.
Norm building will also help to encourage export control arrangements for UAVs. It is vital to strengthen norm building in conjunction with export controls to ensure better outcomes in the purchase and the subsequent use of UAVs (Carreiro, 2014). The most relevant code in this regard is the Hague Code of conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC) (Mozaffari et al., 2016). The code is particularly useful because it requires states to declare their space rockets and missiles' policies and regulations. Moreover, it requires the states to give notice of testing their missiles and rocket beforehand. It is a formidable guide because it has close to two hundred members. It is worth noting that it has no members from the Middle East (Deegan, 2014). The next step should be to use the right channels to bring countries from the Middle East to sign the code. Its aim is not to ban the purchase or use of ballistic missiles but to ensure that the members show maximum restraint in various aspects of ballistic development, testing, or use. Adopting fundamental rules of transparency is of great significance. The provision of guidance is necessary for nations to understand and consequently adhere to such codes.
Conclusion
The use of small UAVs presents a serious threat to humanity and various life forms that define the planet. In the nuclear industry, the use of UAVs for various purposes, such as fulfilling operational, environmental, and safety monitoring tasks, is of great help. The discovery and the subsequent use of UAVs have been credited for various violations of the privacy of security and public facilities that include different nuclear power plants and secret military facilities. The use of UAVs presents a new challenge for the counter-biological and counter-terror weapons community. They can be deployed to disseminate and deliver chemical and biological materials in acts commonly known as agricultural terrorism. There is a need for proper regulations and adherence to the same to mitigate the challenges and ensure maximum benefits. The control of the delivery services through export control, treaties, and stipulated codes would be useful.
References
Carreiro, P. J. (2014). U.S. Patent No. 8,708,285 . Washington, DC: U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.
Deegan, M. J. (2014). Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Legitimate Weapon Systems or Unlawful Angels of Death. Pace Int'l L. Rev. , 26 , 249-274.
McNeal, G. S. (2015). Unmanned aerial system threats: exploring security implications and mitigation technologies. Available at SSRN 2741820 . Retrieved from https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2741820_code512279.pdf?abstractid=2741820&mirid=1
Mozaffari, M., Saad, W., Bennis, M., & Debbah, M. (2016). Efficient deployment of multiple unmanned aerial vehicles for optimal wireless coverage. IEEE Communications Letters , 20 (8), 1647-1650.
Wagner, M. (2014). The dehumanization of international humanitarian law: legal, ethical, and political implications of autonomous weapon systems. Vand. J. Transnat'l L ., 47, 1371.
Wallace, R. J., & Loffi, J. M. (2015). Examining unmanned aerial system threats & defenses: A conceptual analysis. International Journal of Aviation, Aeronautics, and Aerospace , 2 (4), 1-52.
