The Lebanese Shia movement, Hezbollah, has emerged as one of the prominent non-state actors in the Arab Middle East. Considered by the European Union and the United States as a terrorist organization, Hezbollah has in the past three to four decades undergone an extraordinary transformation from a marginal guerrilla movement carrying out sporadic attacks against Israel into a mature, well-organized organization, political party and social movement (Wiegand, 2008). Since the integration process of the 1990s started, the movement has made major political leaps. In the recent 2018 national elections, Hezbollah won a small majority together with its allies in parliament. Effectively, Hezbollah has emerged as a fundamental component of the political structure in Lebanon, further complicating Lebanon’s relations with much of the west. This paper aims to analyze the basis of Hezbollah’s befuddling rise from a relatively marginal entity in Lebanon in the early 1980s into a major militant, social, and political force not just in the country but the broader Middle-East. Attention is directed to the strategies the movement employed in gaining its current foothold. In addition, it is noted that the primary reasons for Hezbollah ascendancy are attributed to its ability to tap into religion, their provision of social services and the tactical maneuvers the organization employs abroad.
Origin of Hezbollah
The specific origin of Hezbollah remains a contested matter amongst Islamic and Middle-Eastern scholars. According to Azani (2009), the year 1978 constituted the decisive moment for the creation of Hezbollah. A number of factors were important in instigating the emergence of Hezbollah at this time with the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1978 being the most striking. The Lebanese sectarian civil war that had erupted in 1975 between Christians and Palestinians had ended after two years with no major change, especially in government structure. Thus, the Lebanese Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) continued to engage in cross-border raids against Israeli military and civilian targets as was the case from 1970. Much of Israeli defense strategy between 1970 and 1978 was to neutralize key threats through strategic retaliatory attacks. The year 1978, however, marked a major shift in Israeli policy as a conservative government came into power in Tel-Aviv. Through operation Litani, the Israeli government militarily intervened in South Lebanon to create a buffer zone between the Northern Israeli border and the Litani River. The death of about 1000 Shia civilians during the operation, however, created strong anti-Israeli sentiment among the Lebanese Shiites who had initially supported the operation with the hope it would drive out the PLO from the region.
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The United Nations Interim Force that sought to help the Lebanese government restore control in the region and ensure Israeli withdrawal from the region soon withdrew after persistent attacks from the PLO. Within these conditions, the Shiites in Lebanon realized that they had to defend themselves in the face of government failure and threat of attacks from other communities. As Worrall, Mabon, & Clubb (2016) asserted, this led to the formation of Hezbollah as a force for the protection and liberation of the Shiite population.
Beyond the Israeli invasion and the security conditions it created, another important factor was the disappearance of Musa al Sadr, the most prominent Shia cleric in South Lebanon at the time (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002). Musa al-Sadr was credited with the Shia social awakening. In the face of declining infrastructure, general living conditions, and massive government corruption, the cleric created a robust community outreach to address the most vital shortcomings in social services. Between 1959 and 1978, Musa al-Sadr credibility amongst the Shia grew considerably. In 1967, he established the Islamic Shiite Higher Council meant to lobby for equal representation of the Shia in government and advance the community’s interests. His party received official recognition in Beirut and was crucial in securing government funding for social aid, irrigation, hospitals, and schools amongst other development projects in the region. Equally significant, he managed to separate the Palestinian struggle in Lebanon from his efforts within the Shia community. While publicly expressing support for the Palestinian cause, he criticized PLO’s attempt to establish a state within a state in Lebanon. By the late 1970s, he had managed to create robust social networks and political influence that would later be utilized for the emergence of Hezbollah (Avon & Khatchadourian, 2012). This happened after his mysterious disappearance in 1978, which left a legacy that was tapped by three groups, the Lebanese Shia, the Iraqi Shia, and Iran. This formed the foreign and domestic basis for the emergence of Hezbollah.
The 1979 Iranian revolution was yet another crucial catalyst for the creation of Hezbollah. The immediate impact of the revolution was a demonstration effect since it showed that an Islamic state governed by sharia law could exist (Seigneurie & Tarek, 1989). Additionally, the new regime in Tehran sought to export the revolution abroad. South Lebanon, with a sizable Shia population and leadership paucity, was a natural candidate. Historical ties between the Lebanese Shia and the New Iranian leadership offered more basis for the successful exportation of the ideals of the Iranian revolution. As Love (2010) contends, these ties proved crucial in providing a sense of inspiration, financial support, and training that would jump-start the nascent Hezbollah and added Lebanon to what supporters’ termed as the umma .
Other social processes also proved pertinent to the emergence of Hezbollah. The migration of thousands of Lebanese Shiites from rural to urban centers was such a process. Fleeing the severe economic and social conditions in rural areas, thousands of Lebanese Shiites sought opportunities in urban parts of the country since the 1950s. Avon & Khatchadourian (2012) note that the slums on the outskirts of cities like Beirut where they settled offered a fertile ground for the growth of social protest movements that would soon serve as a significant base for Hezbollah
Despite these developments, Hezbollah never really crystallized into a well-structured and well-organized movement until 1982 when the second Israeli invasion of Lebanon took place (Love, 2010). The Israeli leadership launched Operation Peace for Galilee on 6 June 1982 with the invasion of South Lebanon. The Shia population was initially supportive of the operation for it sought to drive out the PLO, which they hoped would finally bring long-lasting peace and economic prosperity. The Shia, however, developed a deep suspicion of Israeli intentions in the region for trying to prop up their local rulers. The liberators were soon seen as occupiers. The Israeli interruption of Shia religious rituals served to further anger the Shia community and unify them in their shared hatred for Israelis. These events marked the beginnings of Shia resistance to Israeli presence and the formal beginning of Hezbollah. As the then current secretary general of Hezbollah succinctly captured it “We are a movement born as a reaction to the occupation of part of our country” (Nasrallah & Noe, 2007). Hezbollah, however, continued to operate clandestinely despite huge popular support in South Lebanon. It was not until 1985 that the organization published an open letter-political manifesto detailing its militant political and religious ideology (Gabrielsen, 2013). In many ways, the manifesto signaled its intention to enter Lebanese politics. Nonetheless, for much of the 1980s, Hezbollah remained a closed sectarian and military group riddled with accusations of international terrorist acts, a radical ideological stance and of intentions to illegitimately overhaul the Lebanese political system. Within the Lebanese Shia community, the movement, nevertheless, retained huge popularity.
Since the 1990s, Hezbollah’s popularity and prominence have, however, transcended its original stronghold. After the 1989 Taif accord that brought to an end the fifteen-year civil war, Hezbollah took the highly debated decision in 1992 to participate in the first elections in the post-civil war era. This was a complete U-turn for an organization that had in the much of the 1980s denounced the prevailing political system as sectarian, oppressive and corrupt. In addition, it had dismissed any prospect of posing an opposition from within government (Wiegand, 2008). Hezbollah now called for a peaceful and democratic revolution that would result in an Islamic order. The organization, nonetheless, continued to launch attacks against Israel, and according to the US, remains a major terrorist proxy of Iran. In recent times, Hezbollah has grown in popularity, and by 2018, it commanded a minor majority in the Lebanese parliament. It is the reasons for this meteoric rise to the heights of Lebanese politics and Middle Eastern affairs that this paper turns to.
Social Services
The overwhelming success of Hezbollah can be directly attributed to its use of social (Love, 2010). The effectiveness of social services program can be traced to the fact that Shia areas in Lebanon suffered considerable marginalization for centuries. As Love has rightly observed, under-developed infrastructure in Shia areas was a primary grievance since the occupation of the Ottomans in 1516 to Musa al-Sadr’s arrival in 1959 (2010). Thus, Sadr won huge credibility when he initiated, with the support of Iran, sizable infrastructure improvements that led to the creation of a social service program. He was also instrumental in organizing the Shia community politically and consequently lobbying the Lebanese government for social services funding.
When Hezbollah emerged as a formal organization in 1982 to resist Israeli occupation, it established not just a military and political wing but also a social services wing. The construct of this wing is instructive. To some commentators, it was the fundamental lesson from Sadr’s success in the region for over two decades. To other scholars, as Seigneurie & Tarek (1989) have rightly noted, it was born of an unwritten law of insurgency that neglected, oppressed and economically deprived people revolt. Moreover, it tended to be susceptible to the influences of any agent promising to assuage their suffering.
The social services section of Hezbollah was meant to influence virtually all facets of Lebanese Shia society. The section was initially meant to provide basic social services to the most oppressed but soon morphed into a comprehensive scheme meant to address every grievance and deficiency. Subgroups within the section include the Islamic Health Organization, the Martyr’s Foundation, the Education Division, the Women's Association and the Jihad al-Binaa Development Group. To support such a comprehensive social project scheme, up to half of the organization’s budget goes into social services. Masters & Laub (2014) estimate that Hezbollah’s social and health programs are worth millions of dollars yearly. The authors have also noted that the movement is a major provider of social services, operating schools, hospitals and agricultural services for thousands of Lebanese Shiites.
The reconstruction group is, for instance, involved in addressing critical deficiencies emanating from war damage and employs thousands of Shia Lebanese. Most importantly, the group has on occasion offered these services to non-Shia neighboring communities further improving their image and partisan support. In the area of health, the Islamic Health Organization offers a variety of medical and health services that include medication, food distribution, evacuation of casualties, and clinics. Thanks to Iranian funding and support, the sector has a large and adequately trained staff. The fact that many of the staff attribute their livelihood to Hezbollah has translated into political loyalty. Love (2010) notes that Education is yet another critical sector of the social services program as reflected by an estimated $14 million that went into scholarships and other forms of financial aid.
Although there are difficulties in measuring the effectiveness of the social services program, there is no doubt it engendered a considerable degree of political loyalty and popular support. First, the program in many ways marginalized the role of government and helped cast it as unresponsive to the plight of the Shia community. Second, it helped overcome the competition posed by rival groups like Amal by offering the coveted social services they could not afford. Third, by extending services to neighboring ethnicities, Hezbollah protracted its influence beyond its original stronghold. Lastly, the conflation of social services with religious duty significantly improved Hezbollah’s reputation and acceptability in a predominantly Muslim community.
Religion
Social services, influential as they may be, are inadequate in explaining Hezbollah’s expanded influence. The group’s ideology, including its use and manipulation of religious belief, was an equally important factor. The most authoritative document on Hezbollah’s religious and ideological underpinnings is the Open letter (political manifesto) launched in 1985. The open letter expressed clearly the desire to establish an Islamic government by sharia law in Lebanon. An Islamic state, declared the document, represents ‘ultimate justice’ to which man aspires and the realization of human happiness (Avon & Khatchadourian, 2012). In other words, an Islamic state was presented as a utopia, which the movement was striving to achieve.
The second pillar of the document spoke of Jihad, referring not just to military combat against enemies and confrontation of oppression (lesser Jihad) but also to the struggles against internal enemies of the soul-temptations and insinuations to satanic or evil calls that lead to corruption and straying (greater Jihad). Greater Jihad is said to be more important than lesser Jihad. The war waged by Hezbollah against Israel was thus cast as part of a struggle towards the achievement of a greater ideal establishment of an Islamic state. In Shia Islam, there is a close relationship between martyrdom and jihad. Jihad is said to have the fruits of either martyrdom or victory (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). While the martyr attains martyrdom, the nation and its freedom fighters attain victory. Jihad and Martyrdom, therefore, serve as powerful motivators which galvanize and incentivize the Muslim community to sacrifice and struggle in God’s name. Martyrdom, which is central in Shia religious culture, was thus tapped by Hezbollah not just to generate a sense of bravery and fearlessness but also to mobilize and motivate.
Another use of religion by Hezbollah was in its invocation of the doctrine of wilayat al-faqih, which refers to the guardianship of the jurisprudent or the rule. The individual holding this position, personifying the doctrine, ought to be most learned in sharia and most committed to piety and justice. Wilayat al-faqih’ s authority is seen as a continuation of the prophet’s authority. The supreme leader of Iran is in Shia Islam considered the Wilayat al-faqih. Although it is not explicit that the leaders of Hezbollah always follow the orders of the Ayatollah, they have always claimed that their religious and ideological stance conforms to the opinion and ideas of the Supreme Leader. In brief, therefore, by claiming that its decisions and actions are in line with those of the Ayatollah, who represents the continuation of the Prophet’s rule and that of the Infallible Imams, Hezbollah can claim tremendous religious legitimacy and consequently the support of Shia Muslims.
The salient features of the open letter were also emphatic in there condemnation of the United States and Israel as aggressors. The language of the letter was however in strong religious symbolism, invoking the Quranic notions of oppressors and oppressed. Such conceptual dichotomy of oppressing and oppressed people was part of Hezbollah strategy to invoke a sense of injustice by pointing to what was wrong in society and who ought to shoulder the blame. This led to a call for the unity of the oppressed in their fight against the oppressor. By pointing to the capitalist United States and Israel as the oppressor, Hezbollah was able to galvanize sympathy and support of those opposed to the American world order within and outside the Muslim community. In other words, such rhetoric combined both Marxists and religious slants in a deliberate attempt to appeal to a broader audience. As it has already been seen, Hezbollah invoked Islamic doctrine- Islam’s call to duty- as a basis for its social services program.
Other Sources of Influence
Beyond social programs and religious doctrine, Hezbollah employed other strategies to extend its appeal and influence. At a time when Pan-Islamism and Pan-Arabism were popular, Hezbollah subscribed to the ideologies and declared its support for the unity of Muslims and Arabs. However, as some scholars have rightly noted, Hezbollah’s success can be explained by its ability to adapt to changing circumstances. For instance, the movement was able to transform itself from a guerrilla movement into a major political actor after the signing of the 1989 Taif accords. Having previously dismissed the possibility of working from within government, it now called for a peaceful and democratic revolution that would result in an Islamic state and consequently participated in the 1992 national elections.
Such pragmatism can also be seen in the New Manifesto that Hezbollah released in 2009. In many ways, the document contrasts with the open letter of 1985 in radicalness. For instance, while the 1985 document termed Israel a ‘cancerous gland’( al-ghudda al-sarataniyya ) that must be completely wiped from the face of the earth, the 2009 document stressed that the struggle Hezbollah was involved in was by no means a racial, religious, or ethnic confrontation but rather an act of self-defense against Israeli aggression and occupation. Furthermore, Hezbollah has seemed more willing to distinguish between Jews and Zionist unlike in the past. In 2015, for instance, Jewish but anti-Zionist American intellectuals Noam Chomsky and Norman Finkelstein paid a visit to Hezbollah in Lebanon (Worrall, Mabon, & Clubb, 2016). These revisions are part of tactical retreats by Hezbollah meant to appeal to a wider audience and embody the movement’s ability to adapt to varying political and historical circumstance.
Hezbollah’s success must also be seen within the context of its ability to maintain a strategic alliance with key allies like Syria and Iran. These countries, more so Iran, are vital partners on whom the movement heavily depends. Lastly, Hezbollah has been able to make strategic decisions within the context of international affairs that have brought it to the limelight. For instance, when uprisings erupted in Cairo and Tunisia in 2011, it was not long before Hezbollah expressed its solidarity with the social movements in those countries. Similar responses would characterize its reaction to the revolutionary upheavals that proceeded to take place in Libya, Bahrain, and Yemen (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002). In Yemen, for instance, it demanded an end to the barbaric assault on citizens and expressed concern over violation of legitimate rights of Yemeni people. The movement has been most consistent in its support for Palestinians more so in their struggle against Israel. This has served to portray Hezbollah as a genuine liberation movement.
Conclusion
Hezbollah has in the past few decades emerged from being an Islamic militant organization in South Lebanon engaging in guerrilla warfare against Israel into a major political actor in Lebanese politics. This shift is more startling given that the movement is considered a terrorist organization by much of the West. This paper has sought to establish the factors contributing to this transformation. It has been argued that manipulation of religious doctrine and provision of social services lie at the core of this shift. Beyond these, the paper notes that adaptability, pragmatism, and the ability to maintain relations with strategic allies have played a powerfully important role.
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