The Incident Command System was used extensively during Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana

Abstract 

Hurricane Katrina was the third most destructive and deadly category 5 hurricanes. The hurricane hit the United States in August 2005 and caused catastrophic damage along the Gulf Coast from central Florida to Eastern Texas ("Unified Command and the State-Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina in Mississippi - HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS", 2018). The hurricane caused extreme floods in the city of Louisiana, which caused a massive loss of lives. More than 1,500 people lost their lives in Louisiana alone as a result of Hurricane Katrina while more than 800,000 housing units were destroyed. Hurricane Katrina is considered the most costly of US hurricanes, with an estimated damage of over 31 billion dollars and attracting costs of 160 billion dollars. In Louisiana, a command system was employed to help in the rescue and recovery operations, whose results were both effective to some degree but was affected by a number of inefficiencies. 

Louisiana Hurricane Katrina ICS 

The Incident Command System of the Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana involved an inter-governmental and cross-sectoral network of actors (Moynihan, 2018). Responsibilities were dispersed across three federal field commands (Moynihan, 2018). These are: 

• The Joint Field Office and Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO). The FCO formed a unified command with a state coordinating officer responsible for the coordinating the state and local needs and actions with federal actions (Moynihan, 2018). 

• The Principal Federal Official (PFO). This role was the ears and eyes of the Department of Homeland Security on the ground (Moynihan, 2018). However, the officer could not make any decisions. 

• Joint Task Force Katrina. This command directed the Department of Defense active duty (Moynihan, 2018). 

Role of Incident Commander 

The Incident Command was assigned to two heads, one from the state and one from Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The two chiefs reported jointly to the Federal Commanding Officer (FCO) . The FCO coordinated the actions of the state and federal departments in the rescue and recovery actions. The reason for the creation of two chiefs in the command system was due to lack of a local Incident Commander with sufficient capabilities to field a coherent response in the incidence ("COMMAND AND CONTROL", 2018). As such, it was easy to have the two chiefs in each of the ICS sections, i.e., the state and the Federal Management Agency, but the two were to report to the FCO. 

Mistakes of the Incident Command System 

One of the mistakes of the Incident Command System in Louisiana was the lack of clear communication and situational awareness ("COMMAND AND CONTROL", 2018). This paralyzed standard command and control mechanisms. The federal government lost the ability to make effective communications and as such made the command control ineffective. In addition to poor communication structure, there was no clear directing authority which resulted in players freelancing without seeking to coordinate with the appropriate authorities ("Unified Command and the State-Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina in Mississippi - HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS", 2018) . This resulted to duplication of works and duties between different units while some duties were unattended to. Another mistake was the lack of sufficient and well-trained personnel. The inadequate personnel with little training lacked overall discipline, clear lines of authority and failed to understand the command structure clearly ("Unified Command and the State-Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina in Mississippi - HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS", 2018). The system also lacked sufficient funding which caused a challenge in the coordination of staff. 

Conclusion (How could ICS have been improved?) 

The ICS needed to establish a better mechanism to coordinate the work of local, state and national governments. This includes the unknown, unexpected and even the uninvited private partners taking part in the incident. This means that there should also be clear means to integrate the capabilities of the volunteers to supplement the limited and insufficient workforce. 

Communication is a crucial aspect of any Incident Command System (Moynihan, 2018). The success of the command system depends on how well communication is passed through the different elements of the system. As such, the ICS in the Louisiana Katrina could have been improved by putting in place communication structures sufficient to cover the whole system . This includes expanding the range of radio frequencies to ensure that both the federal government and the state have clear communication. This could have made it possible to create a clear authority line to oversee the Louisiana ICS operations. 

References 

COMMAND AND CONTROL. (2018). Retrieved from http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/katrina/commandandcontrol.pdf 

Moynihan, D. (2018). The Response to Hurricane Katrina. Retrieved from https://irgc.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Hurricane_Katrina_full_case_study_web.pdf 

Unified Command and the State-Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina in Mississippi - HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS. (2018). Retrieved from https://www.hsaj.org/articles/689