Introduction
Over the recent past, there has been a significant exacerbation of discord and rivalry among the Middle East countries, especially between Qatar and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) ( Bilgin, 2018) . In particular, the Arab Spring that commenced in 2010 due to oppressive regimes and poor standards of living shifted the region’s dynamics significantly. Arab Spring triggered a series of societal movements in the Middle East, involving pro-democracy uprisings and strong activism. Subsequently, the event affected the relation between KSA and Qatar and exacerbated a profound rivalry and power struggle between Doha and Riyadh as each country attempted to utilize this revolution to foster its influence within the Arab world ( Bilgin, 2018) . Essentially, KSA endeavored to impose its policies on Qatar, while on the other hand Qatari authority pursued its interest and adopted its own foreign policies at the expense of KSA’s interest, thus, resulting in a prolonged standoff between the two nations. Subsequently, in June 2017, a prolonged war of words between these two countries exploded into open diplomatic warfare, leading into a serious diplomacy crisis between Qatar and its counterparts in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) that incorporates Kuwait, KSA, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Oman, and Bahrain ( Bilgin, 2018) . Therefore, this paper will explore the content of the diplomacy crisis, the cause of the crisis, and the concept of realism as exhibited by both sides in the crisis.
Qatar’s Diplomacy Crisis
This dispute began on June 15 th , 2017, when numerous countries in the GCC led by KSI and UAE terminated diplomatic ties with Qatar, on the grounds that Qatar was fostering instability in the Gulf region ( Asisian, 2018) . This move entailed the suspension of both sea, air, and road transport from Qatar to any of these countries that incorporated Egypt, Yemen, and Bahrain as well. This crisis was triggered by a profound claim that Qatar was supporting radical militant Islamist groups like ISIS and Muslim Brotherhoods, who were not only vocal in the region but also threatened the region's security and stability, besides other main great violations to the international agreement among the GCC members ( Asisian, 2018) . Notably, besides transport disruption from Qatar, the UAE and KSI gave Qatar's diplomats a maximum of two days to vacate from countries, Qatari citizens were not authorized to enter the UAE or cross borders to the country, Qatari visitors and nations were given up to 2 weeks to vacate from UAE, UAE nationals were prohibited from staying in or traveling to Qatar, and Qatari responded by asking her citizens visiting or living in the UAE within the stipulated time ( Asisian, 2018) .
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Three days after the termination of diplomatic ties and the blockade executed by its counterparts in the Arab world, Qatar vowed not to capitulate the liberty of its international policy. Two weeks later, Qatar was given up to 10 days to adhere to a 13-point list of ultimatums presented by KSI to end the crisis ( Asisian, 2018). These conditions dwelled majorly on the closure of the Aljazeera news network, cutting ties with Turkey and Iran as regional threats, ceasing support for Muslim Brotherhood and other terrorist groups, closing the Turkish military base in Qatar, ceasing support for anti-GCC political activists, and ceasing exercise of soft power that triggered instability in KSI ( Asisian, 2018) . However, a week later after Qatar was issued with the demands, Crown Prince, Sheikh Mohammed announced his disregard for all those demands through the country's foreign minister but agreed to engage in dialogue under appropriate conditions. Moreover, Qatar denied any relations with terrorist groups and termed the allegations as malicious and baseless ( Asisian, 2018) . In a rejoinder, KSI-led allies in a joint statement accused Qatar of frustrating all attempts to resolve the discord and stated that Qatar was intending to continue its malicious policy with a motive of undermining the security and stability of the Gulf, and they all vowed to take appropriate economic, political, and legal measures to suppress Qatar ( Asisian, 2018) . Over one year later, the issues are yet to be resolved.
Cause of the Diplomacy Crisis
The diplomacy crisis was triggered by numerous contentious issues. First , the basic prolonged cause of the crisis between KSI-led allies and Qatar’s government emanated from Doha’s financing and backing of politically active and often violent Islamist groups, including Al Qaeda, Daesh, Muslim Brotherhood, and ISIS, spreading their violent ideology in the Middle East, and resultantly, violating the 2014 agreement signed by all GCC members to fight terrorism in the region ( Bilgin, 2018) . Resultantly, KSI, UAE and other members of GCC felt threatened by the probable influx of secretive organizations, political activism, and extreme religious-based attitudes posed by these groups. Despite the objections exhibited by the Saudi and its allies in the GCC, and the simple fact that it is militarily and politically weaker, Qatar did not cease its support for its Islamist allies, and for numerous reasons, such as genuine ideological affinity, drive to foster its influence by having the capability to engage with these extremist groups on behalf of the international community, the urge to change its status quo as a weaker country in the region, and challenging the rule of traditional KSI allies, Qatar has remained steadfast in its ideological agenda ( Bilgin, 2018) . Moreover, Qatar was accused of using the government-operated media house Al-Jazeera to foster the agenda of the Muslim Brotherhood in the entire Arab region and frequently criticize leaders in Abu Dhabi, Riyadh, and Cairo, hence, greatly destabilizing regional relations. For instance, Qatar’s belligerent media coverage of the KSI in 2002 led Saudi to recall its ambassador from Doha for at least six years before he was reinstated. Yet again in 2014, KSI alongside Bahrain, and the UAE recalled their ambassadors from Doha following the criticism by Qatar-based and Muslim Brotherhood-associated ( Bilgin, 2018).
In addition, Qatar’s accommodating stance towards Iran, a country that is considered by KSI and UAE, other Sunni-majority countries in the Gulf as to great threat to the region society provoked the initiation of the crisis as it violated the GCC’s International agreement to shun any bilateral relations with Iran ( Bilgin, 2018) . Further, Qatar violated the agreement and even went further to vote against the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution calling on Iran to stop its nuclear advancement plan and sign a bilateral counter-terrorism agreement with the U.N ( Bilgin, 2018) . In addition, the Emir of Qatar exceptionally called to congratulate Iranian President Rouhani on his successful re-election, hence, irritating most of its Gulf allies who endeavors to maintain the Gulf’s discord with Iran ( Asisian, 2018). Furthermore, Qatar’s government provoked KSI and its allies in the gulf when it approved the payment of $700 to Kata'ib al-Hezbollah, the Iranian-supported Shia militia based in Iraqi, in trade for the liberty of Qatar’s royal family members held captive in Iraq ( Solomon, 2017) . Besides, in May 2017, Qatar's Emir was accused of criticizing the belligerent rhetoric of KSI, UAE, and the U.S. towards Iran, provoking serious condemnation in the entire Arab world and triggering Qatar's diplomacy crisis.
Additionally, the Arab Spring placed the orientation and governance of numerous the Middle East states up for grabs and lead to a remarkable competition among most of the Sunni monarchies, Islamists, and Iran ( Asisian, 2018) . Essentially, instead of combining efforts among the states opposed to the ISIS and Assad regime and creating a cohesive streamlined opposition force, the rivalry between Qatar and KSI propelled them to back divergent and rival groups in Syria. For instance, KSI backed Jaysh al-Islam, while Qatar, on the other hand, backed a rival group, Faylaq al-Rahman ( Asisian, 2018) . This disintegrated efforts fostered the interests of Iran-supported Assad leadership, which only rejoiced to witness rebels shed blood, while at the same juncture exhibiting additional proof for the claim that there was no any united opposition against Iran in the regime. Equally important, when Iran's influence in the region diminished, the rivalry between KSI and Qatar led to heightened instability and violence ( Asisian, 2018) . In another instance, in Libya, KSI backed secular military leaders such as General Hiftar Khalifa, while Qatar supported Mistrata-based Islamist groups, hence, intensifying civil wars in Libya and fostering a workable environment for the expansion of the Islamic State. This resulted in deleterious repercussions for Libya’s neighboring nations, including Egypt and Tunisia.
Another cause for the crisis emanated from President Trump’s visit to KSI which was translated in Saudi, UAE, and Egypt as a go-ahead for them discipline Qatar for backing Islamist groups ( Bilgin, 2018) . During this visit, Trump expressed his unwavering support to KSI and its allies in the Gulf, the center of attention being to contain Iran and eliminating radical Islam. This gesture signaled a sense of assurance that there would be no fallout from the U.S. if the Saudi-led camp took steps to streamline Qatar ( Bilgin, 2018) . Besides, Trump even went ahead to take credit on social media for fostering the regional blockade against Qatar and termed Qatar's leaders as senior financiers of terrorism (Gaouette & Starr, 2017).
KSI’s 13-Points Demands and Its Effects
The KSI's ultimatums are redolent of the story from second century BCE from Vietnam when local king just decided to declare himself emperor ( French, 2017) . In a rejoinder, Wen-Di, the emperor of Han Dynasty responded promptly and indefinitely. When the duo emperor appeared simultaneously that one ought to be destroyed to eliminate rivalry, the book suggested that fighting and not surrendering were not the traits of an individual characterized deeply with humanity ( French, 2017). Notably, this lesson has ideally recurred severally in the current situation in the Middle East. While the KSI has been pursuing different means to not only control the threats posed by Qatar's foreign policy, the country has been seeking various ways to advance her hegemonic power in the Arab world in line with the idea of realism, while Qatar, on the other hand, has been proactive to challenge the Saudi's power. Notably, the 13-point demands that the KSI, UAE, along with other allies have forced upon Qatar is a document of surrender. Ideally, if Qatar agrees to embrace this document, her influence in the region and global level as a key political, military, and economic player will substantially decline to the point of no return. However, this would aid in containing the instability experienced currently in the Persian Gulf.
The Concept of Realism and its Application in Qatar's Diplomatic Crisis
The comprehensive exploration of the current diplomacy war experienced in the Persian Gulf has depicted a clear picture of the application of realism in the Arab world, especially among the key players in this conflict, including the KSI, UAE, and Qatar. Realism entails a set of international relations theories that underscore the role of a state, military muscle, and national interest in the political world ( Bilgin, 2018) . By and large, realism focuses on the perennial role of power and national interest in exhibiting state behaviors ( Bain, 2000) . The classical theory of realism based on the perceptions and ideas of Niccolo Machiavelli, Thucydides, and Thomas Hobbes. Notably, the realism theory became prevalent during the period between World War I and World War II and advanced thereafter through the work of Hans Morgenthau ( Bilgin, 2018) . Fundamentally, according to Hans, the theory of realism based upon numerous principles: politics is rooted upon static human nature that is fundamentally self-interested, self-centered, and self-regarding, politics is a self-governed are of action that is not reducible to morals, and international politics is an arena of competing for country interests that are dynamic in nature ( Williams, 2004) . In addition, Hans suggested that realism dwells on four basic assumptions that the state is primarily a rational actor, the state is a unitary integrated actor in that it is normally perceived by realists to foster a single policy at any given juncture on any particular issue, national security comes at the top of any matters facing a nation, and that nations are the key dominants and most crucial factors in an anarchical international framework when an overarching sovereign jurisdiction is not present ( Williams, 2004).
Primarily, realism posits international politics as might politics. In this regard, international politics is thus an environment of rivalry, disputes, and war among nations. Moreover, according to realists, nations are not equal and there is an international hierarchy of power among nations, and so is the setting in the Arab region ( Jackson and Sørensen, 2016) . The key motives for foreign policies among nations are rooted in state survival and national security. Realists further implied that states pursue an individual interest in the international framework. Notably, as observed in Qatar's diplomacy crisis, variant state interests often precipitates conflict among nations in the world because every nation maintains that there is no higher power that supersedes the liberty of their sovereignty ( Jackson & Sørensen, 2016) . Thus, international relation is a self-capacity environment, where nations must enhance their own security or forge alliances with others as depicted in the unity of nations between KSI, UAE, and other GCC member states against Qatar ( Devetak, Burke, & George, 2007) . Further, Bilgin (2018) insinuated that the realists believe that competition and conflict are core elements in international relations between nations, particularly in the absence of higher power, and when diplomacy fails to resolve an existing rivalry peacefully, the application of war and force becomes the most feasible instrument of solving the existing challenge.
Subsequently, in regard to the assertions of the theory of realism, Qatar's diplomacy crisis can be viewed in various dimensions. First, it embraces a key component of a realists view, that of egoism. The termination of diplomatic relations with Qatar, which is also a key member of GCC exhibited how blocs are characterized by individual player’s national interest or self-centeredness as exhibited by Crown Prince Mohammed Salman of KSI and Sheikh Mohammed of UAE ( Williams, 2004) . Moreover, on the other hand, the prevalence of state interest by an actor’s action has been displayed by Qatar’s violation of numerous international agreement among GCC’s member states. As the terminology was popularized by UAE’S, KSI’s, Egypt’s, and Bahrain’s media, the Anti-Terror Quartet (ATQ) as propounded by its identity was concerned with fostering individual nations against terror attacks. The primary function for the formation of ATQ was not to censure all kinds of terrorism backing, but specifically to contain those that seemingly threatened individual states directly, including Muslim Brotherhood and ISIS. Besides, the emphasis on ceasing support for these terror groups was postulated as a key origin for Qatar's blockade (Wam, 2017).
Also, as postulated in the realist perspective, Qatar’s diplomatic crisis exhibited factors of power struggles, particularly between KSI and Qatar. The rivalry between KSI and Iran has a long history is well-understood in the international relations arena, hence, it takes a very minor role in the emergence of the diplomatic crisis. As suggested in the realism concept, nations are not equal and there is a hierarchy of power in the international arena. Moreover, the concept suggested that higher powers are important in mitigating unrest in a region peacefully ( Bilgin, 2018). Hence, the incorporation of Iran factor in Qatar's diplomacy severance was an avenue for KSI to entirely isolate Iran from the Persian Gulf operations and gain regional hegemony. Besides. The 13-point demands required Qatar to cease any bilateral relations with Iran and follow the course of its allies in the GCC in acknowledging KSI as the region’s leading power. KSI, which is a larger state both geographically and demographically, and with sufficient oil wealth views Qatar as a hindrance in not only the way it related with “region’s threats” such as Iran but also due to its own quest for power and recognition in the Arab world (Asisian, 2018). On the other hand, Qatar is relatively smaller, but a wealthy nation embraces an individualistic foreign stance and uses its government-owned Al-Jazeera to foster its national interests at the expense of the larger GCC community.
Similarly, the KSI-led allies have been pushing Qatar to shun defying and criticizing the regional framework and simply attune to it, and through this perspective convey a signal to other regional insurgents, such as Oman, Turkey, and Kuwait (Sadiq, 2017). In cognizance of this coercion strategy, Qatar is keen to prevent KSI from imposing guardianship and violating its sovereignty, which was exhibited as a key concern in realism. In practicing its absolute liberty, Qatar, which precursory had extensive historical geo-economic connections with Iran because of their mutual gas fields, not only ignored KSI-led demands, but also revived its ties with Iran (Asisian, 2018). Since Qatar has declined to give in to compulsion or lose its autonomy indicates that Qatar considers its national interests first and demands its recognition in the region. On the other hand, the KSI is similarly not willing to compromise its course or share its regional hegemony with Iraq at the expense of gulf’s security. Therefore, since realists suggested that in the international relations states are self-centered and self-regarding and that when diplomacy fails to solve conflicts peacefully war and force applies, this rivalry for power in the Persian Gulf expands room for more conflicts in the future instead of regional cooperation ( French, 2017) .
The realism theory suggested that in international relations, nations must foster their own security, or forge alliances with other countries to enhance their security capabilities ( French, 2017) . This perception is vivid in Qatar's crisis. While the UAE, KSI, GCC members, and the U.S. bloc is seen as a tool to contain Iran and terrorism, Qatar and Iran on the other hand, renewed their diplomatic relations and advancing their relations. This exhibits the principle of balance of power. Qatar has further strengthened its ties with Turkey on the mutual foundation of their vision for Sunni countries of the Arab world. Furthermore, Russian media houses implied the Qatar crisis could be potential opportunities for the emergence of multiple alliances and that Crown Prince Tamim Hamad of Qatar could most probably foster its existing bilateral relations with Russia ( Sudakov, 2017). And therefore, to safeguard the security and stability of the Persian Gulf at large, it is crucial for KSI and its allies in the GCC to prolong the bilateral severances, otherwise Qatar could continue to foster its individualistic interest at the expense of the larger Persian Gulf community and put the region in great threats of insecurity fostering terrorism and triggering instability.
Conclusion
The ignition of the crisis in the Middle East is a great threat to the peace and stability of the region. This conflict has materialized because it was in the individualistic interest of some nations, as opposed to the well-being of the Gulf region. In addition, the struggle for power prevents the states in the Gulf from forging unity and a single course action to tackle existing challenges, and instead expanded the room for more conflicts in the future. Thus, to avoid the application of force and war as the last tools as suggested by realists, the international community should endeavor to encourage both sides to find a common ground for the prevailing challenges. In so doing, this would help in preventing the alteration of dynamics between nations within the Gulf and between states beyond the region.
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