While trying to come up with an explanation regarding the basis of existence of one’s self, Dennett advances the physicalist approach that suggest that an account to natural phenomena can only be ascertained by adducing physical facts to logically prove them (Dennett, 1991, p. 2). To this extent, one can only account of self by adducing relevant and logical facts to support the same. This is buttressed by Descartes philosophical advancement that ‘I think and therefore I am’ to elaborate the position, that by virtue of the fact that the self can be reasoned out, then it exists (Dennett, 1991, p. 3). However, this advancement is marred by the fact that it might not sufficiently explain the concept behind individuals with multiple personality disorder. An example is given of a person who denies a particular account of what they did claiming words might have spewed out of their mouths yet they themselves did not say them (Dennett, 1991, p. 4).
On the other hand, Giles in the ‘no-self’ theory that postulates that, due to the complexity that comes with explaining the concept of the self in addition to many assumptions made, the self is non-existent and therefore infinite (Giles, 1997, p. 175). This appears to be a weaker position compared to Dennett’s advancement, which takes a more logical and rational approach. It would suffice to say that Dennett’s account from a philosophical perspective is more logical. The rationality it depicts by relating the existence of self to available facts makes the account even more credible, as it can be reasoned out. Being founded on Rene Descartes theory makes it advantageous to the extent that it is based on rationality and attributed to physical facts that one in their own self can examine. The theory may only be disadvantageous to the extent that it suggests that one’s identity may be singled out as an item or items.
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On the other hand, Giles approach exploits the weaknesses in Dennett’s account by ruling out existence of self, due to many assumptions that may be made in a quest to accounting for the same. It is however disadvantageous to the extent that it doesn’t give a substantive account of self and does not manifest such rationality as Dennett’s account does.
References
Dennett, D. C. (1989). The origins of selves. Cogito, 3(3) , 163-173.
