Several amendments to the US constitution were enacted to help open up and expand the Bill of Rights that American citizens need to enjoy until such a time they are convicted of an offense levelled against them. Any bill presented to parliament must ensure that it does not go contrary to existing laws to avoid confusion during the implementation of such laws. Though some contemporary issues like terrorism pose a challenge to the government, there is a need to ensure that the upholding of the rights of accused persons takes place at all times. These times will include during the arrest, during the trial, and during incarceration. The Sixth Amendment to the US Constitution has made it a right for the accused persons to have fair and public trial, speedy hearing of their cases, and the right to get legal help from counsel.
The proposed Secret Terrorism Trial Bill violates the Sixth Amendment, as it would deny the suspects the right to a public trial. Hong (2017) reports that under this amendment, suspects are supposed to have their cases heard in public before an impartial judge with the help of independent jurors. In addition, there is the presumption of innocence until proven guilty. It, therefore, means that by allowing the secret hearing of some cases, it would imply that there is a predetermined outcome that one is already guilty of terror-related activities. In so doing, it may make it impossible for the accused person to get any fair hearing.
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The Secret Terrorism Trial Bill violates the Sixth Amendment to confront witnesses against an accused person. In Ohio vs. State (1979), the Supreme Court held that the confrontation clause in the Sixth Amendment was to give the accused an opportunity to probe the mind of the witness so that he could remember what may have taken place in the given incidence. The cross-examination of the witness through remote video would not bring out an aspect of face-to-face confrontation as envisioned in the Sixth Amendment.
The government’s overriding need to fight terrorism outweighs the Sixth Amendments of the accused by denying the accused the right to legal counsel. In Gideon vs. Wainwright (1963), the US Supreme Court held that states were supposed to ensure that the accused people got legal representation to help them come up with a strong defence for their cases. The legal representation would ensure that the accused got speedy trials of their cases. In Baker vs. Wingo (1972) , the US Supreme Court held that dragging cases for long violated the requirements of the Sixth Amendment, which advocates for speedy conclusions of cases. The fact that the Secret Trial Bill enumerates “planned acts of terrorism” as grounds for arresting and prosecuting suspected terrorists makes this bill lack clarity. The reason is that the clause is ambiguous and prone to several interpretations. In so doing, innocent people are likely to find themselves behind bars for offenses they may not have committed.
The Sixth Amendment applies to all suspects, irrespective of whether one is a terrorist or not. The reason is that this amendment looks at the rights of the accused person regardless of his offense. In so doing, it is apparent that the Sixth Amendment indicates a minimum threshold of rights available to an accused person.
In conclusion, the Secret Trial Bill is not likely to meet the requirements of the Sixth Amendment, as it does not allow for speedy trials, access to legal aid, and public hearings that would allow for witness confrontation. Once these rights miss during prosecution, there are high chances of miscarriage of justice taking place.
References
Baker vs. Wingo 407 US 514 (1972). Accessed at
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/407/514/
Gideon vs. Wainwright 372 US 335(1963). Accessed at
https://www.britannica.com/event/Gideon-v-Wainwright
Hong, E. (2017). Friend or Foe? The Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause in Post-
Conviction Formal Revocation Proceedings. SMU Law Review, 66 (227) pp 227-275.
Ohio v US 448 US56 (1980). Accessed at https://www.oyez.org/cases/1979/78-756
