Introduction
Post-war reconstruction mainly focuses on state-building to form a stable, accountable, and transparent central government that is based on rules. Afghanistan is currently undergoing post-war reconstruction in which global powers are helping the country’s reconstruction efforts following the U.S led intervention in 2001. The core of the program is state-building. The program is comprehensive as it also entails numerous aspects that focus on the social, economic, and political modernization of Afghanistan. The program also relies on external support to ensure its effectiveness. The shifting aspects of the program such as security and politics, however, influence the capacity, mission, structure, and size of the Afghan security forces. The Afghan security forces, also called the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces, comprise of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP). The ANA comprises of the ANA Corps, Afghan Air Forces, Special Mission Wing, ANA Special Operations Command, and the counterterrorism forces. The ANP comprises of the Afghan Uniformed Police, Afghan Anti-Crime Police, Afghan Border Police, Public Security Police, Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan, and the General Command of Police Special Units (GAO, 2018). While the design of these forces is adequate, the forces face numerous challenges. For instance, there is the issue of the lack of coordination across the different units that make-up the Afghanistan security forces. These challenges greatly affect their ability, mission, structure, and size. Other factors such as inadequate intelligence ability, airpower, and logistics undermine the operational position and combat efficiency of the forces. The support from the United States to these forces mainly focuses on advising the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense regarding strategic or national matters. The U.S also offers operational support at ANDSF corps or zone headquarters. Advisors help in enhancing the capabilities of institutions focusing on functional areas such as resource management; oversight, accountability, transparency; force development; rule of law and governance; command and control operations; operational logistics and sustainment; gender mainstreaming and integration, strategic communications, and intelligence. Support also comes in the form of tactical support through embedding advisors within ANDSF units to offer continuous tactical operational assistance. Tactical level advisors also support the specialized forces of the ANDSF through assisting, advising, and training personnel. The U.S also offers financial assistance for equipment purchase including training on using and maintaining the equipment (GAO, 2018).
The current paper examines the extent to which the Afghanistan security forces rely on the United States for support. The paper argues that given the various political, operational, and logistical challenges, the Afghanistan security forces greatly depend on the United States for operational and financial assistance to ensure their effectiveness.
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The Extent to Which Afghan Security Forces Rely on U.S Support
It is vital first to understand how countries develop dependency relationships with other countries. Regarding the issue of the association between developed countries and developing countries, the involvement of developing countries in international relations traps them in dependency relations to developed countries. In international relations, dependency entails a state in which a powerful country dominates a weak country without annexing it officially (Handelman & Brynen, 2019). The powerful country controls some of the affairs of the weak states such as security including both the military and internal security apparatuses while giving it autonomy over local matters such as infrastructure, health, and education.
The United States' support for Afghanistan is based the suggestion that the spread of democracies contributes to a peaceful world. The support is also based on the post-war reconstruction program. Post-war reconstruction mainly attempts to engage in state-building to establish a central and effective country that obeys the common law, and is accountable and transparent (Guttal, 2005). Afghanistan is currently undergoing post-war re-construction following years of war that damaged its structures. Post-war reconstruction in the country is part of a greater modernization program based on a comprehensive plan that focuses on social, economic, and political modernization with the assistance of external countries (Suhrke, 2007). Peace in the context of post-war reconstruction requires institutionalized practices or new institutions to achieve the proposed changes (Guttal, 2005). Development is usually a long term and complex process (Sen, 2014), but in this context, it is combined with reconstruction. Reconstruction is a short term process with quantifiable outcomes that can be evaluated within a specific funding cycle (Suhrke, 2007). Afghanistan is a developing country and lags further due to a long period of war (Sen, 2014). The existing model in Afghanistan is mainly about development, even though it represents the model that global powers favor in post-war states. The model is based on liberal peace idea that supports different development objectives such as pluralist and liberal democracy, open and market-based economy, respect for human rights; and strong institutions that foster accountability, transparency and the rule of law (Handelman & Brynen, 2019). Implementing the model necessitates external funding and support.
Modern post-war reconstruction is parallel to the modernization model that the 19th and 20th-century non-colonized countries implemented (Diamond, 1998). The main objective of both programs is a comprehensive plan based on external funding from a powerful country. The only difference is that the past programs were under national control while the current programs such as in Afghanistan are under external control. The main objective of the current program is to liberalize parts of society and strengthen the entire country (Suhrke, 2007). Studies show that violence and war drive state formation globally as the new country must deal with people in power and resistant groups. Suspending and unequally dividing benefits to support the demands of change in such a country undermines the legitimacy of the country (Handelman & Brynen, 2019). Besides, the risks related to proper control of the country and political contention increase due to an attempt to strengthen the central power that in turn may lead to instability. Moreover, the new proposed changes such as new social values, lead to new social identities, which further complicates the change process (Barbara, 2008). Combining the process with a comprehensive plan that has a deadline for specific achievements leads to conflicts as rebels, opponents, and other groups clash to promote or protect their interests. In this context a strong security force is required to ensure progress.
Afghanistan needs a strong security force combined with a wide domestic political coalition to support a comprehensive modernization program (Weigand, 2013). Factors such as the presence of an insurgency and the limited nature of the existing counter-insurgency operations adversely affect the program. The required support to ensure the effectiveness of Afghan security forces in fighting the insurgency has led to the development of dependence structures that are extensively based on external U.S. support. The support is essential given that tension in the country may emerge due to the imported aspect of modernization such as imported institutions. These institutions may focus on ineffective development components that result in dysfunctional or unanticipated outcomes (Handelman & Brynen, 2019). The meaning of this is that Afghanistan must rely on the United States forces for support to ensure stability. The Afghan security forces, the main pillar of state-building and the broader modernization plan heavily depend on funds and forces from the United States. The level of dependence is illustrated by the number of U.S forces in the country and the cost of training and equipping the country’s forces (FAS, 2019, SIGAR, 2019). The dominant rebel group fights both the program including the presence of foreign forces and the authorities. The country still must deal with worsening security issues, slow institution building, and corruption, which significantly affects the external support it receives. The central government has failed to control the entire country due to the presence of different tribal and military players in the countryside. In turn, this has resulted in the need for more support from the U.S.
While the Afghanistan security forces are attempting to become effective, they have not achieved positive progress so far due to various challenges. The support for the Afghan security forces is based on the Security Sector Reform (SSR) program launched in 2002 under the military reform pillar supported by the United States (Sedra, 2007). The forces face the issue of force generation and retention given the high attrition rate within their ranks (Jalali, 2016). These rates make it difficult to create a professional force. Factors such as refusing reenlistment, being absent without leave, desertion, and combat casualties cause high attrition rates (Jalali, 2016). Desertion occurs mainly due to regular deployment in combat without leave or training rotations, lack of or misunderstanding of leave regulations, payment issues (delayed payment or low payment), absence of casualty care, poor working and living conditions, and poor leadership (Jalali, 2016). Attrition adversely affects force generation, deployment, rest and recovery of combat forces. Illiteracy also affects professional training of recruits given that most recruits are illiterate while educated ones fail to volunteer to serve in the security forces.
The Afghan security forces also lack competent leadership in critical positions at their various levels. Factors such as inadequate appointment and promotion system lead to this deficiency. For instance, political influence for ethnic patronage and balance, corruption and bribery, political favoritism, and nepotism all affect appointments at senior levels. The command and control system also has gaps caused by inadequate supervision and accountability, a multilayered command chain, an absence of clear horizontal and vertical functional associations, and overlapping functions (Jalali, 2016). In turn, this reduces the capacity, effectiveness, and sustainability of the Afghan security forces. Gaps also exist in the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance domain due to uneven intelligence institutions in the Afghan security forces, absence of professional ability, inadequate coordination between various elements, and an inability to operationalize the collected intelligence in a coordinated and timely manner (Jalali, 2016). For instance, the Afghan security forces have different intelligence entities such as the Ministry of the interior directorate of police intelligence, Afghan national army general staff intelligence directorate, and the assistance of defense for intelligence. The different institutions emerged at different periods for different objectives and support conflicting political inclinations. They also acquired their training through different means and techniques, which means that they have unevenly developed and adopted various professional cultures (Jalali, 2016). The Afghan security forces also lack clarity regarding labor division and intelligence sharing and lack intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance equipment.
Another weak area of the Afghan security forces is the insufficient air support and mobility that makes it challenging to quickly reinforce combat troops, engage in airborne battles against the enemy, deliver supplies to different posts, evacuate wounded soldiers to healthcare facilities, or retrieve dead servicemen. In turn, this adversely affects the flexibility of security forces to act quickly against the enemy. The United States fills these gaps by providing air support to the forces. While these forces can protect strategic centers and secure elections, they still need determined training, advice, and assistance; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support to ensure they perform effectively (Jalali, 2016). The meaning of this is that Afghan security forces are still ineffective and must rely on U.S support in the form of funds, training, direct combat support, air support, and assist personnel.
The police in Afghanistan also have only a limited number of effective elite paramilitary forces. Besides, the majority of the local and national police do not have the capacity to operate as a paramilitary force effectively. The police forces are also inadequately structured and corrupt, making them ineffective in ensuring security in the country (Tsetsos, 2019).
Given the numerous challenges that the Afghan security forces face, the country values the importance of support from the United States as indicated by the approved Strategic Partnership Agreement with the U.S in 2012 (Аzhad, 2016). The provisions of the agreement entail enhancing training of Afghan forces, offering a long-term model for security and defense collaboration, the commitment of the United States to support Afghanistan’s security for 10 years, and the commitment by the United States to seek financial assistance annually through Congress to support the Afghan Security forces (Аzhad, 2016). Besides, the agreement designated Afghanistan to be a non-NATO ally, which further enhances U.S support to the country through supplies, training, and financing. The agreement depicts the United States’ long term commitment to support the Afghan security forces financially and operationally. The support to the Afghan security forces is just part of a comprehensive plan of the agreement that covers other aspects such as economic and social development, and the need for the country to reinforce government oversight, transparency, and accountability while protecting human rights.
There is also a limited U.S military presence in the country to offer support to Afghan security forces. Based on reports, nearly 14,000 military personnel belonging to the United States served in Afghanistan as of June 2019 being part of the sentinel operation freedom mission in the country. Among the 14,000 U.S military personnel, nearly 8,475 were assigned to assist, advice, and train Afghan security forces. The remainder of the personnel engages in training the Afghan Special Forces, conducting counterterror and air operations, or support roles (SIGAR, 2019). The United States also assists the Afghanistan security forces operationally. For instance, the top leadership of the U.S forces in Afghanistan launched a new operational design for its mission in the country in June 2019. The new model aims at streamlining the U.S operations in Afghanistan through synchronizing its counterterrorism abilities with Afghan security forces’ operations and with a focus on assisting, advising, and training efforts (Tsetsos, 2019). The objective of the model is to increase the tactical initiative of both forces while placing pressure on the insurgents to compel them to choose meaningful negotiations.
Existing data shows that the Afghan security forces also significantly depend on the United States financially. While there is no official publication regarding cost estimates of the war in Afghanistan to demonstrate the included costs and their allocation, the U.S Department of Defense data demonstrates that the total cost of the entire war was $755.7 billion. In turn, this represents a substantial level of funding for the entire time since 2002 to 2019, even though it is vital to examine the figures analytically. For example, the annual expenses reduced to $19 billion in 2019 from $111 billion in 2012. A portion of the $ 19 billion in 2019 also covered the payment for United States presence and forces. Nearly 0.68 billion dollars was directed towards supporting the Afghan security forces (SIGAR, 2019). The United States also established a five year literacy program in 2009 with a cost of about $200 million to educate all the recruits until the first-grade reading level and half of them until the third-grade level (Jalali, 2016). By the end of that period, nevertheless, nearly half of the personnel could not read. It is apparent that the afghan security forces rely heavily on the United States for support both financially and operationally.
Conclusion
Countries develop dependency relationships with other countries based on their economic status. Weak countries are trapped in dependency relations with powerful or wealthy countries as they engage in international relations. Wealthy countries then control several affairs of the weak countries, particularly security in form of both operational and financial support. The United States supports Afghanistan to promote peace. The support is based on the post-war reconstruction program that focuses on state-building to create a central government. In Afghanistan, post-war reconstruction also focuses on modernization as it entails a comprehensive program for social, economic, and political modernization. External support is crucial to ensure the effectiveness of the program. Creating institutionalized practices ensures peace, which is the focus of the comprehensive program. Afghanistan being a developing country must develop gradually. The development, however, is combined with the short term reconstruction in the country. The objective of the post-war reconstruction is development of the country. The program reflects the liberal peace post-war development model that relies on external support. The program, nevertheless, creates conflicts between different opposing groups because of the new changes that may lead to new social identities. In this context, a strong security force is needed to support the program. The ineffectiveness of the Afghan security forces creates the need for external assistance, which in turn creates dependence structures that are substantially based on support from the United States since security is the main pillar of state-building. The Afghan forces face numerous challenges both financially and operationally, which compels them to depend on forces and funds from the United States. The level of their dependence is demonstrated by the existence of United States forces in the country and the cost that the United States incurs to train, advice, assist, and equip the Afghan security forces.
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