The atomic bombs that were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki are credited with ending the Second World War. However, a long standing debate considers the bombs necessary on one side and the existence of alternative options on the other. The main arguments presented regarding this topic is President’s Harry Truman’s justification that he authorized the bombs to save American lives and the long held belief that the deployment was meant to send a message to Russia. This Analysis will look at more arguments presented by different authors on this issue.
Historians Reassess: Did We Need To Drop The Bomb? By Gar Alperovitz
Alperovitz asserts that the common belief that bombing Japan saved American lives, does not justify the decisions as there were several alternative options. He effectively presents his case by highlighting several justifications for the atomic bombs and counter-arguments based on scholarly facts to disprove them. His main premise is that the bombs were unnecessary, and alternative solutions existed and were known to President Truman and his advisors.
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According to this analysis, Japan would have surrendered even without the atomic attack as its militarily was vulnerable due to the shortage of weapons, ammunition, and trained soldiers. The Russian invasion of Manchuria on 9 th August further devastated its defenses by defeating the Kwantung Army. Furthermore, if Russia had entered the war uninterrupted as had been planned, it would have coerced Japanese surrender and reduced the possibility of a November 1 st invasion of Kyushu and subsequent Honshu invasion in March 1946. Furthermore, the Emperor sought peace through Russia as far back as 1944 and Japan would have readily surrendered if their Emperor was retained. Therefore combined, threats of a Soviet attack and assurances to the Emperor were enough to end the war. The delay to give the Emperor assurances postponed surrender so the atomic bombs actually cost lives as fighting was on going pending the November invasion. It is also untrue that Truman failed to alter the surrender terms to uphold the Roosevelt campaign of unconditional surrender as he allowed Japan to keep their emperor after the bombings.
The evidence points to a possibility that the deployment was a diplomatic ploy to strengthen the West against the Soviet Union by securing a victory before Russian involvement. Emotional issues also crowd the question as Japan has a history of brutality so the bombs are viewed as a justified punishment. Furthermore, those that report of a justified attack on Hiroshima are considered authorities on the matter even when the information they give is skewed. Ultimately Americans refuse to confront the truth about Hiroshima for fear that it proves the moral failings she has set herself apart from.
The Biggest Decision: Why We Had to Drop the Atomic Bomb by Robert James Maddox
Maddox counteracts Alperovitz’s position from the previous position as he believes the bombs were necessary to avoid a bloody invasion and facilitate Japan’s surrender and he critics the idea of Truman’s refusal to consider alternatives. His argument is also effective as it presents detailed facts on both sides of the argument and convincingly shows why Truman made the best decision at the time.
Although Japan seemed already beaten by the summer of 1945 due to convectional bombings, blockade, a depleted navy, and the American occupation of Okinawa, Japanese militants were still willing to fight to the death. The death toll at Okinawa foreshadowed the bloodshed of a possible invasion as the Japanese fought without surrender. Japan also had troop of two million, were recruiting irregulars, and conserving aircrafts, which represented a willingness to fight to the end and not surrender. Lesser estimates for possible casualties cannot invalidate Truman’s claims of saving lives as these estimates were educated guesses that only existed among the military, and subsequent Japanese troop build-up in Kyushu rendered them insignificant. Maddox successfully refutes claims made by the likes of Alperovitz that military advisers told Truman that using atomic bomb would be immoral and/ or unnecessary as he finds no persuasive evidence to support this.
Japanese efforts to secure a conditional surrender were ignored as peace feelers showed no proof of authority from the Emperor and were thought to be possible weapons of psychological warfare. Japan was also unlikely to surrender if the monarch was dethroned and the U. S. was unwilling to support an undemocratic regime. Maddox also believes that Truman was bound by his election promise to continue Franklin Roosevelt’s campaign of unconditional surrender. The second bomb which is often seen as unnecessary is justified by the fear that Japanese hard liners would minimize the first explosion as a natural catastrophe which they did. Even after deployment, hard liners wanted leniency and Emperor Hirohito had to intervene to facilitate unconditional surrender. Furthermore, fighting was ongoing ahead of the November 1 st invasion so lives were being lost. Therefore, Truman’s duty to his subordinates and the American people and the information he had at the time meant he had to authorize the bombings.
The Decision to Use the Bombs by P. M. S. Blackett
Blackett presents his argument from the moral perspective of the scientists of the Frank committee who were in charge of creating the atomic bomb. They felt that although the bombs would end the war they would worsen international relations with the Soviet Union, and the only justifiable use of the atomic bomb would be one overriding military necessity, which was non-existent by the summer of 1945. Even if the bombs saved American and Japanese, it is still unclear why there was a hurry to deploy them.
The reasons given to justify the hurry include that Japan peace terms were too lenient and thus not considered seriously so deployment was delayed until Russian negotiations had failed. Blackett agrees with Alperovitz that alternative options exited such as the Allied planned Russian offensive on Manchuria which would have made blockade and bombardment effective at causing Japan to surrender before an invasion. Furthermore, the Emperor had the power to coerce all six members of the Japanese Supreme War Direction Council to consider unconditional surrender.
The belief the possibility of Japanese surrender was uncovered after the war and could not have informed the Allied decision to release the bombs is untrue because the American secretary of war Mr. Henry Stimson knew it when he wrote the justification to drop the bombs. The superiority of the soviet army at the time prompted the hurried release of bombs to avoid the humiliation of the U.S and maintenance of their position as the world power. A plausible alternative existed in testing the bomb and issuing a warning to Japan thus transferring responsibility but the time needed to prepare testing before the Russian involvement in Japan was limited. Moreover, the U.S. must have been aware of the diplomatic implications of bombing Japan just before Russia declared war on her, but no steps were taken to mitigate the aftermath. Another false premise is that the bombings were necessary to justify the spending of 2000 million dollars to congress and the American people, which is false and tactless.
Nevertheless, the bombing was a victory for progressives as it was better than hiding them and stock pilled for eventual war with Russia, but it is unfortunate that the targets were densely populated cities. Ultimately, the Atomic bomb did not end the war but started the Cold War. The saving lives defense is meant to sooth the conscience of those involved but the real reason is the need to retain the world leadership of the U.S against the Soviet Union.
A Post-War Myth: 500,000 U.S. Lives Saved by Barton J Bernstein
Berstein’s argument is focused on an analysis of documents that estimated the number of casualties that any strategy of the war would provide to show that the bombs were not significant in saving lives. However, this argument is flawed as it relies solely on these estimates and does not consider other political or personal motivations that resulted in the decision to drop the atomic bombs on Japan.
Bernstein asserts that the estimate of half a million lives saved was a post war creation because Seven weeks before Hiroshima, the estimate of casualties was 20, 000- 46,000. Furthermore, in previous assaults, the U.S. troops killed more Japanese that did kill them even when the Japanese troops were more. The JWPC report estimated 46,000 deaths with the invasion of both Kyushu and Honshu and if attacks on Kyushu made Japan surrender, the estimate was only 20,000 casualties. Despite the scenario, all battle plan estimates fell below half a million by like 454,000 thus dispelling the idea that the bombs were released to save American lives that would be lost in a possible invasion.
Thank God for the Atom Bomb by Paul Fussell
Paul Fussell’s analysis is a critic of the moral judgment that is passed on the decision to bomb Japan, usually by people who were safely far from the war front and did not feel the real effects of the war. Although it presents an important perspective on the issue, it is more emotional than factual.
Fussell shows the deep commitment that the Japanese had to their Emperor as a major impediment to the end of the war as it meant they would fight to the death. It would therefore take at least a year till Nov 1946 to subdue Japan and the loss of about one million lives would be experienced. Even without the bombings, it required at least two or three more weeks and with allies were being killed dying about 7000 a week, it meant 14000 or 21000 more deaths by end of the war by this estimate. More lives were lost between the Nagasaki bombing and Japanese surrender on 15 th August and the November invasion would still happen if Japanese had not surrendered. The troops that were meant to fight in the invasion were tired of the war and had just come from fighting in Europe so many young people were saved by the bombings. Furthermore, Japan had no civilians as it had resorted to training its entire population including women in combat.
The atomic bomb helped to end the war by allowing the Japanese to withdraw without dishonor as it struck them as a supernatural occurrence. Furthermore, the effects of the nuclear bomb were unknown and a moral judgment based on that was impossible. Furthermore, there was a racist aspect that saw Japanese as subhuman and informed the brutality with which the Allies were willing to deal with them. Fussell asserts people who often say that the atomic bomb was wrong and inhumane were not on the front and they did not know the positive effects of the bombs on the people that fought the war or their families.
Racing to the Finish by Stanley Goldberg
Goldberg’s analysis presents new motives for the deployment of the atomic bombs that have not been presented by any other expert. He acknowledges the two most endorsed reasons; to save American lives and deal with the soviet’s Post war ambitions. However, he believes that these were less significant motives as compared to the following three: Momentum as no one ever said to stop, the protection of the reputation of civilians and powerful people involved in the Manhattan project, and personal ambitions especially of General Leslie Groves. While his arguments are compelling, the possibility that this entire operation was fueled by such personalized motives seems far-fetched especially because the president had the final say about the deployment. These motives may have fueled the making of the atomic bombs but not their deployment.
Conclusion
Alperovitz and Blackett assert that alternatives to the bombings existed and they dispel the notion that the bombs were dropped to save American lives. Bernstein’s analysis also disproves that the bombs would have saved lives as battle plans estimated relatively low casualties. Maddox and Fussell give compelling arguments as to why the bombings were necessary by viewing the situation from the perspective of the information and atmosphere of the time and how this shaped the decision. Goldberg stands alone in his argument that there were other personal motives for the bomb that necessitated the deployment. While all these writers present an important view point, I find Blackett’s argument most compelling because it addresses the important aspect of why there was a hurry to deploy the bomb. Perhaps the bombs did save lives but pretending that that is the reason why they were deployed is naïve. Atomic diplomacy to the Soviet Union was a major driving force for the deployment and saving lives seems to have been the chosen scapegoat to avoid moral judgment and sooth public opinion on the matter.
