Terrorism as a form of violence used to subject targeted people to fear using unlawful means is a mechanism used by certain groups to intimidate the society into accepting certain political, religious, or social ideologies. It has become important for the United States government to study the means and strategies used by these terrorist groups in conducting their attack against society. In recent times the actions of terrorist groups have had significant impacts on the populace because of the frequency of their attacks on sites within or associated with the United States.
The state department outlines characteristics of terrorism as being politically motivated, using violent tactics to cause psychological outcomes on their target deliberately. In studying terrorist groups, it is also critical to reveal the underlying ideology behind their movement. The most dominant ideological constitution of terror groups is radical Islamic ideologies (Koser et al., 2016). The leadership structure and source of funding are other crucial factors to study in evaluating terror groups carefully. Finally, a description of a terror group's capabilities in terms of weapons and tactics used in operation is also relevant in analyzing operations of the group.
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This paper will analyze the Islamic State Khurasan Province (ISKP) as the terror group most likely to attack the United States' mainland hypothetically. As the parent group, the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL), is experiencing diminished dominance in its region of operations, ISKP is emerging as a deadly group that is advancing the ideologies of ISIL (Istrabadi et al., 2018). The group founding is traced in 2015 in Afghanistan and Pakistan but has since stretched its dominance in India and Iran. This region was historically known as Greater Khorasan. The formation of the group resulted from traces of disgruntled members of Islamist militant groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan. These individuals were mainly inspired by the quick achievements of the ISIL group in Iraq and Syria and used that to pledge allegiance to the leader of ISIL. Most of the defections were from members of the most dominant jihadist organizations such as Al Qaeda and the Taliban.
The group's leadership structure consists of four tiers of leadership hierarchy. At the top, emirs govern the group, followed by commanders, deputy commanders, and local leaders, respectively (Khan, 2019). Notable important leaders of the group include its first emir Hafiz Khan Saeed and Qari Hekmat, who led early military attacks. Most of the group's known leaders are have either been killed or captured with the current leadership under Shahab al-Muhajir. ISKP goals were based on the Islamic philosophy of Unitarianism "muwahhidun” which professed unity with God (Istrabadi et al., 2018). The group advocates for all Muslims to unite under the ISIL caliphate and fight against polytheism, presumably present in other religions of the world. The main enemy target of ISKP is America and its government.
Other prominent ideologies of the group include “Salafi tukfirism," which considers Islam pure righteousness and regards Muslims who do not live on these terms as rejects of Islam (Istrabadi et al., 2018). The group's wider objective aligns with the agendas of its parent group, ISIL, which aims to form an Islamic caliphate region where Islam will be the only dominant religious view. The myth of Greater Khorasan province, which describes a period in the region where non-Arab people practiced Islam as the only religion, has become important recruitment propaganda for the group (Martin, 2016, p. 274).
The group has established a steady stream of revenue from its popularity to gain in the region. Members and sympathizers are known to contribute to the group to fund its activities regularly. Illegally taxing locals has been another source of its funds and other dubious means of revenue collection like illegal mining of lapis lazuli mineral and ransom. ISKP parent organization ISIL has also been channeling a significant amount of funds that it acquires from its oil wells in Iraq. However, the group faced stiff competition for its revenue source in illegal mining with the older Taliban terrorist organization (Qassem, 2016). Due to the group's rising influence, the United States has teamed up with the Afghan government to attack mining sites to weaken the group. In this campaign, the United States has found an unlikely ally with the Taliban (Ibrahimi & Akbarzadeh, 2019). These military campaigns against the group have led to the loss of about 1600 of its members.
Historically, the group has claimed to be responsible for over one hundred attacks, with the highest number of attacks happening during 2018. It is estimated that ISKP was responsible for a significant 11% of all Afghanistan deaths during 2019 (UNAMA, 2019). An analysis of the claimed attacks reveals that the group mostly uses suicide bombers who attack highly populated social areas in cities within Afghanistan and Pakistan. Apart from a few Shiite gatherings, ISKP has not been known to target any specific political or social group in their attacks but rather focus on the general public to have high causality numbers and cause public fear.
The group’s largest attack was on the 13th of July 2016, where 131 people lost their lives after a suicide bombing claimed by the group in a political gathering in Pakistan (Istrabadi et al., 2018). Other large attacks claimed by the group include a double suicide bombing in Kabul on the 23rd of July 2016, the deadliest attack in the city in 15 years. ISKP also claimed responsibility for an attack that led to 94 deaths in Quetta, Pakistan, where several suicide bombs accompanied by a mass shooting attack occurred at a hospital.
In terms of terror capability, ISKP is regarded a very dangerous in its attack, particularly since it carries out radical attacks frequently using suicide bombing and mass shooting, which are very difficult to detect and defend against. The United States state department regards the group as more radical than the Taliban and Al Qaeda. These methods are relatively cheap to execute in terms of financial resources. It is unknown how many members are part of the group. However, it is estimated that their numbers range between 3,500 to 4,000 in Afghanistan alone and a total membership of about 10,000 in its operation regions (Khan, 2019). Out of these, an estimated 600 and 800 are combat-trained militants. Despite having faced setbacks in counterterrorism efforts by the United States against its leadership, the group remains very resilient and highly capable of carrying out regular attacks in big cities like Kabul without being detected.
The group's operational capabilities have been regarded as both sophisticated and tactical with well-organized plans. ISKP key strategy involves subversion of a government by taking advantage of already existing resentment to cause instability. As illustrated by its slogan of installing the al-Uqab flag on the White House and frequently calling for attacks on mainland USA, ISKP represents an enduring threat on America (Istrabadi et al., 2018). The diminished, decentralized form of the organization makes it even more dangerous since it's more difficult to identify and target them during military operations geographically. Additionally, the group's aspect to continuously attract new overzealous radicalized members remains a threat factor associated with it. The group uses hand grenades and AK-47 rifles and exploits guerilla tactics as its mode of operation.
A hypothetical attack on mainland United States would likely take very detailed planning and precise knowledge of the target site. In both these concepts, ISKP has previously proven to show relative prowess and talent. Due to its highly advanced security intelligence, an attack on the United States cannot be carried out on a large scale without being detected. There has been no significant foreign terrorist attack on mainland United States since the September 2001 attack on several sites; however, a series of mass shootings have occurred, a sign that such an attack is possible. The attack itself is based on the West Gate Mall Kenya model of terrorism, where a small group attacks a busy but confined social place to cause high casualties and take hostages.
The attack site is Jackson Memorial Hospital, the largest hospital in Miami with a bed capacity of 1,500. This attack site is very similar to previous ISKP targets, for example, the attack at a Kabul hospital in May 2020 that claimed the lives of 24 civilians and the attack at a hospital in Quetta, Pakistan, that claimed the lives of 94 people in July 2016. Hospitals are a suitable soft target for a small but potentially deadly attack given the large population and the relatively unsecure flow of civilians in and out of the hospital (Martin, 2016, p. 273). Miami is also a suitable target city for the attack, given its high population and diversity. The presence of a small group of foreigners in the city would not raise the alarm, and they could easily pass as a tourist exploring the cities rich culture.
The nature of the attack itself would be double suicide bombs accompanied by mass shooting and taking of hostages. These three occurrences would occur in sequential steps starting with the double suicide bombs at the lobby, followed by shooting from the hall entrance and patient wards. Finally, the surviving patients will be taken hostage, with executions conducted at any aggressive retaliation by law enforcement. No survivor is expected from the ISKP members, and it's ultimately a suicide mission. The hostage situation is to psychologically escalates the tension and creates more public attention (Martin, 2016, p. 274). As common with other attacks, Jackson Memorial Hospital's attack aims to cause terror and public mistrust of the government.
The attacking team will be small, composed of six recruited and trained Pakistan, Indian and Indonesian origin but residing in Europe. Members of the team must be well-educated male adults with good mastery of the English language. Every team member should have a clean record with international and domestic law enforcement in residence and origin countries. These team members' recruitment and training should have been carried out using the non-tradition channels to avoid detection. The composition must include an explosives specialist responsible for creating the explosives out of available materials to be used in the attack.
Planning for this attack will take about two years, including the recruitment, training, and funding processes. The planning process itself will involve a minimal number of people and apply simple but effective counterintelligence methods and technologies to avoid identification and detection. The planning team will be composed of a few of the most trusted leaders. Only after determining that no information has leaked to either local or foreign counterintelligence agencies will the militants' deployment be allowed. A blueprint of the hospital targeted and a map of the surrounding area will be thoroughly examined to identify all security loopholes and features.
The team will migrate from Europe individually to different states in the United States over six months using legal and illegal channels. The militants will be disguised under other names and travel documents acquired through forgery, and each will have 20,000 dollars in cash to support their stay in the country. Having been well informed about the United States' geography, they will converge in Miami on the 4th of July. Funding for the operation will have been sourced earlier from donations, ransom, and mining activities in Afghanistan. The money will then be laundered before being channeled to the team members through very well-protected means. The team leader's responsibility is to conduct surveillance at the site, purchase 4 AR-15 rifles, four handguns, and flares in Miami black market for guns.
Attack on the target will happen on the 4th of August at 2 p.m., which has been determined as a time with minimal security. Two of the team members will walk towards the entrance, with one feigning severe illness and the other holding him while carrying the bomb's bag. At the entrance, the one feigning injury will detonate the bomb, causing an explosion and many causalities. The remaining four members will then drive through the entrance in a hired van and throw another bomb towards the lobby. The four militants will then immediately stomp out of the vehicle and open fire indiscriminately while moving towards the inside rooms to look for more casualties. After law enforcement officers start to arrive, hostages will be taken into inner chambers of the hospital and entrances sealed. The hostage situation will last as long as possible, with executions being conducted in retaliation for any efforts to enter the building by law enforcement officers.
ISKP command will be following these activities through western media coverage of the attack. It will quickly take responsibility for it, asking the United States government to completely withdraw its troops from Afghanistan or face similar attacks. The attack will profoundly affect the American public, who will pressure their government to withdraw its forces from the region. There are no expected escapes from the attack, with all the team members recruited and trained as suicide bombers.
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