The article Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan highlights the challenges that a United States operation to eradicate the Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces in Afghanistan experienced in March, 2001. The author, Richard Kugler, indicates that Anaconda’s primary threats emanated from a poorly armed militia, underestimation of the enemy, unstable chain of command, and use of weak “friendly forces” that retreated when the United States army needed help the most. The seven principles of mission command envelop competence, mutual trust, shared understanding, commander’s intent, mission orders, disciplined initiative, and risk acceptance. Overall, Operation Anaconda failed to achieve more than half of the seven conventions listed above, with the initiative having massive irregularities that compelled the urgent interference of the Air Force, even though airstrikes were initially unplanned for during creation of the plan.
Analysis of the Seven Mission Principles in Association with Operation Anaconda
Competence
The competence principal indicates that a mission should comprise excellent teamwork, setting of realistic goals and use of professional taskforce to ensure successful achievement of intended outcomes. Operation Anaconda embodied severe incompetence, as highlighted by Commander General Tommy Franks, who had fruitfully engineered other missions in Afghanistan, such as Operation Enduring Freedom in Iraq that had resulted in the defeat of terrorist forces in the mentioned country. For instance, Franks pointed out that the United States’ militia failed to assess the dangers posed by Shahikot Valley, which was surrounded by crevasses, caves, and ridges, and generally inaccessible terrain ( Kugler, n.d.) . The U.S. militia had over-relied on the Afghanistan militia to invade Shahikot and arrest the Al-Al-Qaida and Taliban, disregarding the fact that the terrorists might have heavy machine guns, artillery pieces, and grenades. The flaw resulted in the wounding of more than 50 American soldiers, hasty retreat of friendly soldiers, and the near-defeat of the United States’ army.
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Mutual Trust
The mutual trust principal mandates that troupes in a mission trust each other, for effective coordination of activities and ultimate securing of anticipated victory ( Finney & Klug, 2016) . Operation Anaconda lacked the component highlighted above, as evinced in General Hangbecks’ inability to order for airstrike help when overwhelmed by the Al-Qaida and Taliban and a limited troop capacity of 10,000 soldiers, which implied that the United States’ government did not trust him enough to accord him the position to direct the Air Force when he was overpowered.
Shared Understanding
The shared understanding principle compels mission team members to have a common knowledge of the targeted issue and how to solve it ( Field, 2019) . Operation Anaconda lacked a shared understanding, as evidenced by the differential perceptions concerning the estimated Al-Qaida and Taliban troop numbers, under-estimation of terrorists’ operations in Shahikot Valley, and the roles of the friendly allies. The estimated troop numbers constantly fluctuated, with General Hangbeck suggesting there could be between 100 and 1000 terror troops, and the friendly forces providing separate estimates of 200 to 300 terrorists, and intelligence officers estimating an 800-1000 Afghan civilians on the valley. However, in the end, information from General Hangbeck, the United States’ intelligence, and allies were wrong, with the real numbers of Al-Qaida and Taliban militia amounting to between 700 to 1000 terrorists. The murky estimation of target rebels almost propelled the total failure of Operation Anaconda , and compelled the extension of the operation from 3 days to 17 days.
Commander’s Intent
The commander’s intent principle dictates that the mission general should have a concise and clear idea of how an intended task will be achieved ( Pruitt, 2017) . Operation Anaconda was headed by a general that lacked critical information on how the United States planned to engender the end of Al-Qaida and Taliban forces in Afghanistan, having been assigned to a different mission in Uzbekistan initially before being compelled to head the operation mentioned above. The General’s lack of a concise plan resulted in the overpowering of the Mountain Task that was lightly armed with mortars, rifles, and machine guns instead of heavy artillery that should ideally be used in operations such as Anaconda .
Mission Orders
The mission orders’ principle constitutes a verbal or written communication conveyed from commanders to soldiers. Mission orders must encase administration, mission, logistics, execution, and signs and signals. Operation Anacond a almost failed because the General who headed the mission did not have sufficient information concerning the arming and arrangement of soldiers. Therefore, Hangbeck could not communicate mission orders clearly because of insufficient data concerning the five major tenets of the aforementioned five primary tenets.
Disciplined Initiative
The disciplined initiative principle mandates that mission teams should adhere to communicated orders, and be flexible enough to adapt in the case of a change in weather, enemy’s action plan, terrain, and logistics ( Townsend, Crissman, & McCoy, 2019) . Operation Anaconda successfully embodied the mission rule mentioned above successfully, because the deployed troops launched attacks on Al-Qaida and Taliban even without enough armaments, as directed by General Hangbeck. However, the friendly allied forces disregarded the disciplined initiative principal by abandoning the United States’ army when it realized that the Al-Qaida and Taliban were more heavily armed than anticipated.
Risk Acceptance
The risk acceptance principle indicates that mission commanders should adequately analyze risks involved in an initiative to avoid the excessive demise of soldier. Operation Anaconda failed in observing risk acceptance because General Hangbeck had inadequate information concerning its execution, prompting the underestimation of enemy strength and militia skills. Eventually, the General had to request for urgent need for the plan to succeed, but the United States had already subjected 8 of its soldiers to vulnerable conditions that resulted in their deaths.
References
Field, C. (2019, December 4). Connecting good soldiering and mission command . The Cove. https://cove.army.gov.au/article/connecting-good-soldiering-and-mission-command
Finney, N. K., & Klug, J. P. (2016). Mission command in the 21st century: Empowering to win in a complex world (1st ed.). https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/Primer-on-Urban-Operation/Documents/mission-command-in-the-21st-century.pdf. https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/Primer-on-Urban-Operation/Documents/mission-command-in-the-21st-century.pdf
Kugler, R. (n.d.). Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan:A case study of adaptation in battle. Center for Technology and National Security Policy , 1-24.
Pruitt, B. K. (2017). Principles of Mission Command Applied to Civil Military Relationships. United States Army , 1-42. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1039897.pdf
Townsend, S., Crissman, D., & McCoy, K. (2019). Reinvigorating the Army’s Approach to Mission Command. https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/Army-Press-Online-Journal/documents/2019/Townsend-online.pdf
