Operation Anaconda was conducted from March 2, 2002, in Afghanistan, particularly in the Shahikot valley. It aimed to lure out and kill or capture enemy Taliban and Queda forces. Intelligence had it that Osama Bin Laden, one of the most wanted terrorists following the 9/11 attacks, was among the troops suspected to be hiding in Shahikot valley. Operation Anaconda had been planned to be a light battle followed by an overwhelming victory. Although the Shahikot valley greatly advantaged the enemy troops due to its rough terrain, U.S. troops had the advantage of masses and advanced weaponry, and at some point, the element of surprise. However, perhaps as the most commendable aspect of Operation Anaconda, the initial plan did not pan out as expected, and the leading commanders had to improvise while the troops remained resilient and cooperative, for the battle to be won.
The operation got its name from the large snake of the boa family that kills its prey by constricting itself around it and crushing the prey to death. The initial plan for the operation was supposed to take a similar approach. Operation Anaconda intended to surround the valley in a ring-like manner, with the outer rings comprised of U.S. troops whose main role was to restrict entrance or exit to the valley (Kugler, 2007). The inner rings would be comprised of friendly Afghan troops and a few U.S. troops. Together, the troops would root out the terrorists from the civilians, with the main intention being to capture them rather than to kill them. The operation saw this approach as appropriate since friendly Afghan forces were better positioned to differentiate innocent civilians from hardy terrorists and easily liaise with police officers to arrest and detain them. The plan was supposed to be quick and efficient, and most importantly, ensure that no civilians were harmed in the process.
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The first challenge the operation faced was insufficient intelligence on the population of the valley and the number of armed troops present. U.S. officials recruited Afghan spies to provide human intelligence while also relying on information obtained from questioning captured militants (Kugler, 2007). Friendly Afghan forces were also employed to provide human intelligence, but their ability to blend in was limited due to the increasingly suspicious attitude among enemy troops. Communication interruptions through radio waves and capturing of messengers were also attempted, but the enemy troops were too cautious to let any substantial information slip to the U.S. troops. The special operation forces (SOF) also sent two overhead reconnaissance teams to infiltrate the valley and provide as much information as possible. However, due to the enemies’ exceptional ability to conceal themselves, coupled with the unfriendly terrain of the valley, the teams had very little to report.
Thus, the first mistake in the mission was made. The U.S. troops resorted to estimating the number of enemy troops in the valleys. While they estimated about 200-300 armed fighters and many more civilians were living in the valley, the result turned out to be the exact opposite. Very few civilians were living in the villages, and there were way more armed fighters (Kugler, 2007). Further, while the U.S. troops believed that most of the fighters were living in the villages, it turned out that they were camping in the mountains in preparation for the war. It also turned out the U.S. officials had underestimated the weaponry the enemy had. While they ad expected them to have more light weapons like rifles, it turned out they were equipped with heavy machine guns, artillery weapons, mortals, and even rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) (Kugler, 2007). Their deployment throughout the mountain ridges gave them vantage fields of fire on the battle zones. It also took away the element of surprise the U.S. troops believed they had and instead gave it to the enemy troops.
While the U.S. officials believed the enemy troops would realize they were outnumbered and surrender or try to escape, they were in for a rude shock. This hope was based on an assessment of the Soviet Union’s invasion of the valley in 1980. Although the Soviet troops gave two unsuccessful attempts to the battle, the U.S. officials believed enemy troops would realize that their current weaponry and training were too advanced for them to even stand a chance. However, as was the recurrent mistake in the operation, they had underestimated enemy troops’ willingness to give up the valley. Enemy troops had issued a jihad against U.S. troops invasion on the valley, especially because hundreds of Afghan soldiers were betraying their kinsmen to join hands with the U.S. troops (Kugler, 2007). Since a jihad imposes a religious duty on Muslims to participate in battle, many enemy soldiers had been deployed to the mountains in preparation for the war. As the preparation for the war continued, significant numbers of determined fighters continued to seep into the valley to help defeat the American troops. This inaccuracy of intelligence affected the initial plan for the operation. The battle had been expected to last for up to three days, but it went on for seventeen. More U.S. soldiers than expected were killed and wounded in battle, and several aircraft were destroyed by enemy fire.
The enemy put up fierce resistance, one that caused General Tommy Franks, the central commanding officer of the operation, to label the later victory as absolute but unexpected. It is important to understand the previous battles that had set the stage for Anaconda and how the operation ended up making the same mistake as the previous battle for Tora Bora (Department of the Army, 2019). Afghanistan’s landlocked nature restricted the infusion of large troops of ground forces. Further, due to public opinion, U.S did not want it to seem like it was invading Afghanistan in the 1980s Soviet-style. Thus, the central command resorted to the use of special operation forces that employed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), global positioning system (GPS), and satellite radios to collect intelligence and determination of battlefield positions. The advanced use of technology gave the U.S troops added advantage, but it still relied heavily on friendly Afghan forces to invade the valley in the inner rings and help capture the armed fighters.
In the preceding battle Tora Bora in November 2001, where Osama Bin Laden had been believed to be hiding out, U.S troops relied too heavily on local and untrained Pushtun militia under Hazrud Ali. Although U.S troops performed their part exemplarily, the Pushtun militia failed on their end and thus, failed the mission. The key goal, which was to capture or kill Bin Laden, was not realized, and he and his aides escaped to Pakistan (Kugler, 2007). The media and intelligence forces thoroughly criticized the Tora Bora battle as a wasted opportunity. Although the main failure was due to the inefficiency of the Afghan friendly forces, operation Anaconda would make the same mistake again, this time with troops of local fighters under the warlord Zia Lodin.
Despite the seemingly incompetent nature of the Afghan forces, there was a mutual understanding between them and the U.S troops. Although, in the long run, the understanding did not yield the expected results, it would be biased to let it go unappreciated (Department of the Army, 2019). These too were untrained in coordinated battle, and although the U.S troops tried to train them in the one month or so they had taken to prepare, there were still not ready for battle. As such, as soon as the situation got dire and it dawned on them that the initial plan would not work according to plan, they retreated in large numbers and left the U.S. troops alone, leaving the U.S. officials with the responsibility of regrouping and planning a new strategy.
As aforementioned, the initial plan was to attack in the manner of an anaconda, but the troops changed their plan to a hammer and anvil attack in the time leading to the battle. There was a disciplined initiative in suddenly changing the proposed strategies, one that the soldiers took with respect and unspoken trust for the commander’s intent (Department of the Army, 2019). The central commander had made the decision based on new information concerning the terrain and enemies’ troops, and it seemed better than the rings strategy. Further, due to the insufficient troops he had to work with, the rings strategy would have been highly disadvantaged. The hammer element, which was comprised mostly of U.S troops, was to release heavy fire on the enemy while the anvil, comprised of Afghan troops, restricted their exit from the battlefield.
However, when the enemy resistance proved formidable, the anvil ceded and left the fight entirely to the hammer. The U.S troops in this situation practiced competence, unlike the Afghan forces, as they kept on fighting despite taking heavy fire and causalities in the process. Thinking on his feet, the central commander deployed the U.S air force, although the ground and air troops had not previously coordinated in training as is generally required for such a fight, this being the perfect example of risk acceptance. The central commander took the risk of running an uncoordinated interaction of two different factions of the military, and this confidence interpreted to the victory they celebrated seventeen days later.
As evidenced above, the troops and commanding officers of Operation Anaconda had a seemingly impossible task. Still, they pulled it off by being resilient and putting the five mission principles of mission command into practice.
References
Department of the Army (2019). ADP 6-0 Mission Command: Command and Control of Army
forces. Army Publishing Directorate.
Kugler, R. L. (2007). Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan: a case study of adaptation in battle.
National Defense Univ Washington Dc Center For Technology And National Security Policy .
