The infamous 9/11 attack on the US soil informed the country’s resolve to deal with terrorists by taking the battle to Afghanistan, the enemy's territory. Operation Anaconda which was the first major war on terror was a way of the US asserting that it had all it deals with the enemies who were disrupting the global peace. This operation would surely test the US military readiness to join with other forces in dealing with a common enemy. However, the US underrated the Taliban and Al-Qaida militia since the onset, a mistake that threatened the safety of its troops. The Shahi Khot valley which provided the enemies with refuge owing to its rugged train was the last battlefront that the US had to conquer. In a bid to take this valley from the enemies, the US enlisted the help of the 10 th Mountain Division, 101st Airborne Division, Coalition forces drawn from seven nations, and Special Operations Forces (SOF). The inclusion of various forces meant that Operation Anaconda would test if the US was capable of adopting a multi-level joint approach to battle.
The Shahikot Valley presented significant challenges to both the US and its coalition forces even without focusing on the resistance that the enemies yielded. At a height of 7,500 feet and surrounded by natural caves, high ridgelines, and limited access, the valley provides the enemies with formidable protection. Despite the dangers that the valley posed, heads of varied forces assumed that there would be less than 200 fighters who would be located in the villages. It is for this reason that they focused on minimizing preparatory airstrikes but instead focused more on ground strikes. According to Kugler (2007), the reason for championing ground attacks was based on Tora Bora operations where preparatory airstrikes had hampered the collection of intelligence on Taliban and Al-Qaida positions. Thus, the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) suggested that they conduct only a few pre-sweep airstrikes before engaging the forces in ground movements. As a result, the CJTF Mountain had much confidence since they believed that there had more strength relative to their enemy.
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The decision to face the enemy without first establishing their number and their weaponry was based on a lack of intelligence. While US SOF had sent reconnaissance teams to explore the valley, they did not manage to get a definitive picture. Instead, they judged the valley from its outward appearances before concluding that they only detected small clusters of people meaning that the valley was largely unoccupied. Unbeknownst to the US SOF, the enemies had retreated to the caves and crevasses. The lack of enough and reliable intelligence points to a military agency that relied on its past combats with the Al-Qaida and Taliban forces. According to Kugler et al. (2009), the enemy forces were not in a position to put up resistance, especially when they perceived that they were under overwhelming firepower. This assumption misled the US officials to underestimate their enemy’s numbers, weaponry, tactics, and location. There was a consensus that the enemy forces would opt to flee from the valley after being overwhelmed or negotiate a surrender.
Operation Anaconda was based on the tenet of the snake by that name which constricts its enemy by coiling itself around until it crushes its victim. In practice, the US military planners preconceived that they would surround the Shahikot Valley with various concentric rings of forces to block the enemy’s entrance and exit. While this plan was practical given the altitude and conceived the idea of surrounding the Shahikot Valley with a layer of forces, it was based on presumptions. The first hitch of this plan was that the friendly Afghan soldiers who would arrest enemy fighters following the ambush were ordered to retreat to Carwazi following a heavy enemy fire. This setback meant that the Task Force Hammer was left exposed and as a result, one US soldier died while another was wounded. Furthermore, the Afghani troops losing three troops with 14 others injured on the first day, thus setting the stage for more losses. This incident forced the US military planners to send six AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, two of which were badly damaged. Mirrlees (2014) asserts that these incidences coupled with a multi-headed command structure complicated the US response to grown threats from underestimated enemy forces. For instance, requests for strike sorties by ground units would be passed to Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC) or Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC). The lack of a clear command structure resulted in delays and frustrations which in turn paved the way for the enemy to outnumber the US forces. Nonetheless, in the end, the leaders agreed to permit strikes against all enemy targets thus forcing them to flee and after 17 days the US emerged as winners.
Conclusion
Operation Anaconda just as the name suggests was aimed at ensuring that all the enemy forces that were affiliated with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda had no chance for escape. The battle which was to be fought in the Shahikot valley though was based on assumptions as gaining reliable intelligence was untenable. The main constraint was the rugged terrain, which featured mountain ranges with high peaks, natural caves, crevasses, and cold foggy weather. As a result, the US military managers relied on scanty information which meant that they underestimated the enemies’ weaponry, number, and skills. The battle which had been slated for three days lasted for 17 days with the US forces losing 8 military personnel a further 50 were wounded. However, despite the initial challenges, the operation was a huge success as it demonstrated that the US was capable of adapting to difficult challenges. At the same time, Operation Anaconda became a basis for future combats with the emphasis being on joint networked operations between ground and air forces, rather than relying upon lightly armed ground forces.
References
Kugler, R. L. (2007). Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan: A case study of adaptation in battle. Center for Technology and National Security Policy.
Kugler, R. L., Baranick, M., & Binnendijk, H. (2009). Operation Anaconda: Lessons for joint operations. Center for Technology and National Security Policy/National Defense University.
Mirrlees, T. (2014). Medal of Honor: Operation Anaconda: Playing the war in Afghanistan. Democratic Communication, 26(2), 84-106.
