The Six Principles of Mission Command in ‘Operation Anaconda’

Introduction 

Operation Anaconda is to-date regarded as one of the most few unsuccessful missions in the American army’s history, providing critical lessons to subsequent operations, including the 2003 Iraqi Freedom . It was one of the earliest activities staged against Al-Qaeda and Taliban forces after the famous September 11, 1998, attacks on America Twin Towers. The mission was executed in the early days of March 2002 whereby the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) paramilitary soldiers, in collaboration with pro-government Afghan soldiers, attempted to demolish Taliban and Al-Qaeda militiamen. This well-planned action occurred in the Arma and Shahi-Kot mountains located southeast of Zurmat, Afghanistan. Operation Anaconda was the first extensive mission involving large-scale U.S. conventional soldiers since the 2001 Battle of Tora Bora in the country. For approximately a fortnight, between 2 nd and 16 th March of 2002, a combined 1,700 U.S. soldiers and 1,000 pro-government Afghan troupes fought roughly 1,000 Taliban and Al-Qaeda rebels to gain control of the Shagi-Kot Valley. The terrorist forces fired heavy machine guns and mortars from ridges and caves at American troupes. Even though the U.S. forces approximated killing about 500 Taliban and Al-Qaeda combatants, the journalist noted later that just 23 bodies were discovered from the battlefield. Only eight casualties among the U.S. and the allied troops were recorded, with over 50 wounded (Kugler, 2007).

Even though the Operation Anaconda was not as successful as most critics anticipated, it paved the way for a new era of anti-terrorism, which arguably later led to the killing Osama Bin Laden, one of the notorious leaders of Al-Qaeda thought to have masterminded the September 11 Attacks and a string of other terrorist activities. It is believed that the U.S. forces executed the six fundamental principles of mission command during the operation, a factor that significantly led to the defeat of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces. This paper, therefore, principally aims to highlight some of the application of these six principles for the two-week period the battle lasted, including the building of cohesive teams via mutual trust, the creation of shared understanding, provision of a clear commander's intent, exercise of disciplined initiative, use of mission orders, and acceptance of prudent risk. Most of these elements are in line with the Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-22 (ADRP 6-22) and Field Manual 6-0 (FM 6-0) protocols. These are rules and standards that guide the army and field marshals during the war.

Discussion 

Build Cohesive Teams through Mutual Trust 

One of the many strategies employed by the U.S. troops in countering Al-Qaeda and the Taliban forces was building cohesive and strong teams through mutual trust. According to ADRP-22 (6-7), creating trust is one of the most fundamental principles of any mission command. Trust allows mission command and influence from the top level authority. With extreme levels of trust, all staff members are naturally willing and accepting of control, which is likely to happen in different directions. One of the components of trust is a dependence upon other people, consistency in behavior, and confidence in the capabilities of the others.

According to ADRP-22 (6-7), trusts are only built via exercise shared understanding, mutual respect, as well as encounter of shared experiences. Some other primary contributors to the building of mutual trust include communication, which keeps other team members informed. Developing commitments and establishing expectations can also play a significant role in trust creation. Therefore, in a command mission, it is a prerequisite that commanders and leaders encourage a climate and culture of trust. This is achieved by promoting cooperation, contribution to a group effort, as well as identification and consultation with other members.

As such, there are various ways that the units and leaders tasked with overseeing Operation Anaconda built and encouraged mutual trust among all U.S. forces and teams. Ideally, an operation as complex as Anaconda needed different security departments, which are headed by various commanders, to work collaboratively to destroy the well organized and highly armed Taliban and Al-Qaeda militiamen. According to Kugler (2007), at the point Operation Anaconda was set to start there was no unity of command since the U.S. existence in Afghanistan was not mature fully. This is even though a single commanding officer is usually needed to blend all people and operations into one cohesive unit. During prior battles, the U.S. team was working under various CENTCOM, which was headed by General Franks. It operated as two separate groups: CFLCC, led by lieutenant Mikolashek, and CFACC, commanded by Lieutenant General Moseley Michael. There were also the CIA and the pro-Afghan soldiers, who had different leaders.

However, with Operation Anaconda, it was necessary to build a cohesive team that solely depended on mutual trust. As such, a tactical and general commander was selected to head the U.S. troops in Afghanistan. Generals Mikolashek and Franks settled for MC Hagenbeck Franklin, who was tasked with creating cooperation, effective communication, and mutual trust among all the groups that were to participate in the assault of Shahikot Valley.

Create Shared Understanding 

Creating a shared understanding is one of the most important command principles that is closely related to the first standard above. This occurs when army heads or leaders communicate effectively and invest most of their precious time in translating and sharing crucial information, including intelligence. This requires more than just making orders and commands that followers are required to follow. Some of the most exceptional army commanders and leaders are required to cooperate and interact with their juniors and followers regularly. They are needed to use their position and power to promote commitment to shared goals, rather than just demand for compliance. In the army, generating shared or common understanding implies making sure each member comprehends completely what other team members are doing. This reduces any potential overlaps in activities and responsibilities.

Similarly, there were various instances that commanders and leaders of Operation Anaconda created shared understanding. One of the best examples of shared understanding was expressed three weeks before the Shahikot Valley attack, during the ‘Hammer and Anvil.' According to Kugler (2007), even though there were different groups (the friendly Afghan fighters and the various U.S. factions, including Air force and Ground combatants), all the groups were informed of their tasks, and no overlap was expected. The entire team was briefed and communicated about their responsibilities. ‘Task Force Mountain,' for instance, was supposed to organize a concerted ground ambush. Also, all the generals before the attack agreed on all the plans. Generals Franks and Mikolashek approved the idea on February 17 and 20 respectively. Even all the leaders agreed to General Hagenbeck’s changes of attack dates from February 25 to the rescheduled February 28, which was later pushed to March 2.

Provide a Clear Commander’s Intent 

Commander’s intent refers to a concise and precise expression of the objective of the operation as well as the desired outcome, which is ideally required to concur with the mission. Even though the primary benefit of a commander’s intent is to offer staff members a clear focus, it can as well assist supporting and subordinate commanders to act in unison to the commander's preferred results, without needing further organization or orders. This is necessary even when the results of the operation do not unfold as preplanned. In the army, a commander’s intent also entails a commitment to precision and accuracy of communication as well as identified prioritization. The general purpose of this standard is to make sure that all members are irrevocably and unmistakably on one page.

In Operation Anaconda, the primary commander intended to destroy Taliban and Al-Qaeda militia groups who had occupied Shahikot Valley. This was the guiding command for all forces involved in the operation, including the U.S. forces, the friendly Afghan troops, and the several members of the SOF. For example, Task Force Mountain settled for the name Anaconda, a sizeable deadly snake in the Amazon that coils around its prey and crashing it, for the same commander’s intent to choke and destroy the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. This group was required to surround Valley in several concentric rings, which would ideally prevent the exit and entrance of the enemy. Even after this plan was changed to ‘Hammer and Anvil,’ the intent remained the same.

Exercise Disciplined Initiative 

Discipline is one of the core values and tenets taught or required in the army. According to the Field Manual 6-0 (FM 6-0), exercising a discipline initiative occurs by influencing team members to accept the plan (or feel the sense of responsibility) by keeping professionalism at all occasions. This also requires members to anticipate for the uncertainties or the changing conditions. The entire concept is to develop a mindset or to think that all that matters is obtaining the desired outcome and staying accountable for the result (Department of Army, 2014).

There are various ways the U.S. forces and the friendly Afghan troops exercised disciplined initiatives or plans. One such obvious way is executing the program as it is professionally required. One such professionalism is the decision of the Task Force Mountain to shelve the original Anaconda approach for the “Hammer and Anvil,” one of the most proven and reliable army strategies. Even though the Zia Afghan troops (the hammer) withdraw in day one of the battle, the SOF and U.S. forces still managed to play their role. This withdrawal of the Zia was one of the reasons the Operation Anaconda failed (Kugler, 2007). As a way of remaining accountable to the mission (or exercise of disciplined initiative), the U.S. infantry forces still fought even with this setback for an extended one week.

Use Mission Orders 

A mission order refers to a directive that insists on subordinates or supporting staff members about the desired outcome. However, it is essential to understand that mission orders do not stipulate how to achieve these desired results. According to ADRP 6-22, a successful mission requires all members to genuinely apply or use all directives (mission orders) rather than merely following them (Department of the Army, 2012). Members are required to use these directives as a chance to grow, learn, as well as develop. In simpler terms, each mission is an opportunity for commanders to exercise autonomy and members to train to take and applying it.

There are also various instances during Operation Anaconda that leaders used mission orders to exercise command and autonomy, which other low-ranked soldiers obediently followed. For example, during the initial days of the attack, CAOC and CFACC exercised their authority appropriately by requesting the naval, air force, marine forces to assist the ground Task Force Mountain when several causalities were reported. Kugler (2007) argues that CAS emergency strikes were executed immediately. However, non-emergency strikes delayed for between 25 and 45 minutes to the frustration of ground commanders. Some of the reasons occurred because of verification needs, need to identify proper munitions and choppers, and need to determine egress and ingress routes.

Accept Prudent Risk 

According to the FM 6-0 standards, ‘accept prudent risk’ refers to carefully examining and managing threats (rather than avoiding) while executing right decisions at the same time, including allocating resources that would potentially assist or improve the chances of succeeding in the wake of this risk. Therefore, good army generals, lieutenants, or commanders are usually required to exercise a great deal of careful risk assessment and decision making in times of crises.

During Operation Anaconda, one such perfect example where commanders accepted and exercised prudent risks is when it was evident that aircrafts risked colliding mid-air because the valley was only five miles long. One of the most appropriate solutions was allowing Forward Air Controllers (EFCAs) to collaborate with ground forces to identify the enemy hideouts. By day three, Kugler (2007) argues that CAOC and CFACC surrendered air command to the ground Task Force Mountain team, who were well positioned to identify, confirm, and prioritize the targets. Additional A-10s, Apache attack, and AC-130s choppers also improved the air attack.

Conclusion 

In summary, it can be deduced that even though Operation Anaconda was not as successful as it was intended, the application of the six mission command principles assisted the team in achieving its mission. They include building of cohesive teams via mutual trust, the creation of shared understanding, provision of a clear commander’s intent, exercise of disciplined initiative, use of mission orders, and acceptance of prudent risk, Most of these elements are in line with the Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-22 (ADRP 6-22) and Field Manual 6-0 (FM 6-0) protocols.

References

Department of the Army. (2012). ADRP 6-22: Army leadership. Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 1-104.

Department of the Army. (2014). FM 6-0: Commander and Staff Organization and Operations. Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 1-392.

Kugler, R., (2007). Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan: A case study of adaptation in battle. Case Studies in Defense Transformation Number 5, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Forces Transformation and Resources, 1-25.