Introduction
According to the National Research Council (2014), there are approximately 100 nuclear reactor power plants in about 62 sites in 31 States within the United States (U.S). These plants are regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Following the nuclear reactor plant disaster in 1979 at Three Mile Island, the NRC now requires that every site must have a disaster recovery plan. This plan must include both an on-site and an off-site emergency response plan. The disaster recovery plan is aimed at protecting the plant workers and members of the public against exposure to radiation in case of a nuclear reactor accident or terrorist attack. An accident or terrorist attack at a nuclear reactor plant may cause the release of radioactive materials. This may lead to external exposure due to the plume and materials, or internal exposure resulting from inhalation or ingestion of radioactive materials ( National Research Council , 2014).
The offsite response typically consists of evacuation, sheltering in situ , the use of potassium iodide (KI), food interdictions and other protective measures. The NRC identifies two types of Emergency Planning Zones (EPZ) around nuclear reactor sites. These include a region for protection from plume exposure which is approximately 10 miles (16 Km) radius and a region for protection from ingestion, which is about 50 miles (80Km) radius. The NRC further defines EPZ as “the areas for which planning is recommended to ensure that effective and prompt actions are undertaken to protect the public in the event of an accident” or terrorist attack for the purposes of this recovery plan. The size and shape of these EPZs depend on the layout of the site, geography, political boundaries, and anthropological factors such as land use. The inner EPZ requires that evacuation arrangements, sheltering, and use of KI are in place to protect populations from radiation exposure. The outer EPZ, on the other hand, requires that certain restrictions are put in place to offer protection against exposure from potential ingestion of radioactive materials. These restrictions cover the consumption of contaminated food and water or land use.
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This document draws its mandate from and is prepared pursuant to the guidelines as provided for in the National Response Framework (NRF) (United States Department of Homeland Security, 2013). The NRF is a critical component document and tool of the national preparedness system which derives its mandate from the ‘presidential policy directive (PPD) 8: national preparedness'. This presidential policy directive aims to strengthen security and resilience in the U.S by ensuring that there exists a structure responsible for threat mitigation and preparation against threats of great risk to the nation. The five mission areas defined in this directive include prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery. This document is prepared according to the nationwide template as provided for in the National Incident Management System (NIMS) (United States Department of Homeland Security, 2008).
The objective of the Disaster Recovery Plan
This plan will be used in the event of a significant accident or terrorist attack on the nuclear reactor plant site causing the release of radioactive materials, which can cause exposure to the surrounding populations. The main objective of this recovery plan is to describe the key recovery steps to be undertaken during and after the disaster to ensure that the communities are protected from the exposure to radioactive materials and that critical services offered by the nearby airport are not disrupted.
Potential Hazards and their Likelihood of Becoming Actual Threats
Since the start of the ‘nuclear age’ approximately 60 years ago, about four major nuclear accidents have been documented. The documented cause of the four, except the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant, was either due to mechanical or human errors. Apart from mechanical and human errors, terrorism as a hazard is highly likely. However, a case is yet to be documented ( National Research Council , 2014). The latest nuclear reactor accident was the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. This was set off by a 9.0 magnitude earthquake and the resulting tsunami off the coast of Japan in March 2011. In the United Kingdom (U.K), in 1957, a fire outbreak resulted in a nuclear reactor accident at Windscale. In 1979, mechanical and human errors caused a nuclear reactor accident at Three Mile Island in the U.S. The Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident of 1986 in the former Soviet Union was as a result of a series of human errors that were allowed to occur in the course of a reactor experiment.
The likelihood of accidents at nuclear reactor sites is rare. However, intentional acts of terrorism targeting nuclear reactor sites are highly likely if recent statistics of the increase in terrorism incidents is considered. Also, there is a huge gap in scientific knowledge about nuclear reactor accidents, ironically due to the rarity of this threat, from which to learn from during the design of response measures and risk reduction. This lack of evidence-based science impacts negatively on the preparedness of the nation in response to accidents or terrorist threats. This is particularly with regard to immediate and long-term physical, mental and social impacts in case of an accident. Most importantly, this lack of knowledge is not available to inform the process of designing action guides, training and improvement of communication during a nuclear or radioactive incident.
The potential physical health effects of a disaster include thyroid cancer in children and leukemia and cataracts in clean up workers. These can be eliminated by activating protective actions such as prompt evacuations, sheltering in situ , and control of milk consumption. Social, psychological and behavioral impacts can be widespread and long-lasting ( Felix et al., 2013) . This is because radiation is invisible; a lot of people may be unfamiliar with it; the threat is perceived as open-ended; the potential for long-term contamination; the association of radiation with hidden damage; and the long latency of the anticipated health effects. Other reasons include the special danger a disaster poses to children and pregnant women and the association of radiation with terrifying illnesses or deaths such as those occasioned by cancer.
- Plan Implementation
In the early stage of a nuclear reactor accident, the response should be fast and often takes place in the absence of information related to the accident conditions and prognosis, and with little time to analyze options. Therefore, there is a need to include the testing of the recovery plan into implementation plans. Resilience following a disaster at a nuclear power plant or other radiation emergency risks requires response and recovery that is safe, timely, effective, and organized. Timely decisions and the logic supporting them must also be communicated during the incident. Based on the experience at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Tokyo, Coleman et al. (2013) have recommended a real-time medical decision model for making key health-related decisions that are central in the overall incident management. In this model, on-site decision makers can use high-level scientific, medical, communication, and policy expertise to make decisions. Other key features of this model include ongoing assessment, consultation, adaptation and additional information. This model is compatible with the existing U.S national response framework structure. Further, Shimura et al. (2015) have summarized public health actions in case of exposure of the public to radiation following a nuclear reactor accident based on the lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident.
Roles and Responsibilities
Various actors are responsible for the implementation of a disaster recovery plan following an accident or terrorist attack on a nuclear reactor.
The states and counties which host these plants have the responsibility of preparing radiological emergency response plans. They are also responsible for making decisions and issuing orders for protective actions depending on various factors.
Federal agencies guide state and local governments and coordinate their activities through a joint incident command system. They also offer aid (Hahn, 2014).
Under the Homeland Security Act of 2002, The DHS has the overall responsibility of carrying out the coordination of federal response to a domestic nuclear reactor accident.
The NRC is responsible for monitoring and providing assistance to plant personnel to mitigate the consequences of a nuclear reactor accident.
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has the roles of, prior to an emergency, to provide protective action guidelines so as to assist emergency responders with their recommendations on protective actions. During a response, the EPA supports environmental radiological monitoring and assessment. It is also part of the Advisory Team for Environment, Food, and Health.
The Department of Human Health Services (HHS) is responsible for guiding state and local authorities on the health effects of exposure to radiation in the event of a nuclear reactor accident and the measures of minimizing the adverse physical and psychological health effects of exposure to radiation.
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) participates in the Advisory Team for Environment Food and Health. It also provides laboratory capabilities and Derived Intervention Levels (DILs) for the possible embargo of contaminated foodstuffs.
The Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) coordinates federal environmental radiological monitoring and produces predictive plume models and dose assessments.
The Department of Agriculture (USDA) may assist with the collection and assessment of agricultural samples within the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ to determine the effect of radioactive materials released during a nuclear reactor accident on agriculture.
The Department of Defense (DoD), subject to the approval of the Secretary of Defense, provides Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) in response to requests for assistance during incidents that happen within the U.S.
Individuals, families, and households, although not formally part of the emergency management operations, can play a role by preparing supply kits and plans to take care of themselves and their families as well as neighbors until help arrives.
Communities such as neighborhood watches, advocacy groups, academia, community groups, and associations can be part of emergency recovery plans because they are an avenue through which information can be passed and collective action promoted.
Non-governmental organizations such as voluntary or faith-based organizations play pivotal supporting roles especially those involved or endowed with response capabilities. An example is the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.
Private sector entities such as large, medium and small businesses, commercial and educational institutions as well as industry players may play a role through partnerships.
Off-site Emergency Response
The off-site emergency response will entail;
Declaration of emergency according to the guidelines in the National Response Framework and the protocol outlined in the NIMS.
Issuance of protective actions and orders to activate radiation monitoring stations, the emergency response support system, and exposure estimation using systems such as the System for Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose Information (SPEEDI) which is used during emergencies to predict atmospheric concentrations of radioactive materials, dose rates, and environmental exposures.
Evacuation orders to all residents in the outer EPZ to safer areas further away from the site of the nuclear plant.
Release and distribution of KI in addition to evacuation and shelter-in-place orders. Also, the residents living within the 20-km Restricted Zone will be instructed to take potassium iodide (KI).
Public health activities such as morgue management, food, and drinking water supply protection.
Food interdictions involving monitoring of food and water, and setting regulatory limits for contaminated food and water or provisional regulatory values (PRVs).
Accident recovery actions such as decontamination activities, remediating contaminated areas, which involves cleaning of structure and removal of topsoil.
Decommissioning of the nuclear reactor accident site.
Risk communication.
References
Coleman, C. N., Blumenthal, D. J., Casto, C. A., Alfant, M., Simon, S. L., Remick, A. L., ... & Noska, M. A. (2013). Recovery and resilience after a nuclear power plant disaster: a medical decision model for managing an effective, timely, and balanced response. Disaster medicine and public health preparedness , 7 (2), 136-145.
Felix, E., You, S., Vernberg, E., & Canino, G. (2013). Family influences on the long term post-disaster recovery of Puerto Rican youth. Journal of abnormal child psychology , 41 (1), 111-124.
Hahn, D. (2014). Who should pick up the bill for emergency management-local or federal government?. Journal of business continuity & emergency planning , 8 (1), 8-13.
National Research Council. (2014). The science of responding to a nuclear reactor accident: summary of a symposium . National Academies Press.
Shimura, T., Yamaguchi, I., Terada, H., Robert Svendsen, E., & Kunugita, N. (2015). Public health activities for mitigation of radiation exposures and risk communication challenges after the Fukushima nuclear accident. Journal of radiation research , 56 (3), 422-429.
United States Department of Homeland Security. (2013). National Response Framework, Second Edition. Retrieved from https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1914-25045-1246/final_national_response_framework_20130501.pdf
United States Department of Homeland Security. (2008). National Incident Management System. Retrieved from https://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nims/NIMS_core.pdf
