The technology in war though efficacious has imposed the risk of extinction to mankind. Of these attacks is the helicopter attack. Various countries, including the US, have attained a lot of success from the effective use of helicopter attacks (Petrescu, et al. 2017). However, when coordination with the ground support is cut, success greatly deteriorates. However with effective doctrines that clearly stipulates how commanders on the ground can incorporate the effective use of helicopter attacks, then the results are very rewarding (Cox, 2018). A great example is the US war on Vietnam where effective doctrines such as that of James Gavin and Howze Board enhanced a swift coordination of air and ground attacks. Unfortunately, of late, the development of new doctrines has been lagging behind. What exacerbates the issue is that the environment is evolving and what could have been effective a decade ago is no longer of the essence.
Problem
The problem is that there lacks a clear doctrine for the development of missions for attacks that can clearly stipulate how commanders can incorporate helicopter attacks to suit the ground scheme. This is because it took over 18 years to produce an update on operations for the division-level pertaining to helicopter attack as compared to FM 3-90.6’s five-year update (Lindsay, 2015). The advancements in technology and territorialism for Air Force organizations have transformed the role and airframe played by attack helicopters in relation to fulfilling their missions on an exploration of deep attack, air escort, anti-tank, and direct support for fire (Lindsay, 2015). Meaning that the doctrines pertaining to helicopter attacks are well off thanks to the effects of World Terror that threatens to unleash war.
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Significance of the Problem
When the US army was deployed in Afghanistan and later in Iraq over a decade ago, there have been consistent changes in the doctrines used in terms of thought, manpower and organization of the army to enhance the generation of force (Lindsay, 2015). Just a decade after the invasion, more than 1.5 million soldiers had been deployed to these countries. The organization of the attacks was also restructured from an arms division that worked in unison to a force of modular brigade. On the matter of thought, new manuals stipulating the doctrine were supplied to cater to the evolving situation in these two countries (Cox, 2018). These changes made it imperative that commanders in the division level be brought up to date with the changes in doctrines, specifically those pertaining to helicopter attack, failure to which the swift coordination of ground and air attack would be impossible.
Development of Alternative Actions
There are two possible methods for solving this menace; either by adopting doctrines that whose operations could efficacy division and corps support or by restructuring the doctrines so that commanders in the ground can link helicopter and ground attacks (Lindsay, 2015). For the former, involves transforming the ground assault to be in line with the current doctrines for helicopter attacks. The first advantage of enhancing corps and division doctrines is that it would enable the ground assault to adapt to the changes that have transpired over time thus offloading the tasks by helicopter attacks. Another advantage is that it would lessen the costs of helicopter attacks that are often deployed. Despite this, however, the disadvantages could be dire. One of these disadvantages is the ineffective transition between helicopter attacks and the ground troops that could retard the efficiency of planned attacks. Another is that the threat to the lives of ground battalion could be worsened as they lack effective helicopter cover.
On the other hand the restructuring helicopter attack doctrines would enhance the communication between helicopter attacks and commanders on the ground. In addition to this, attacks would be more successful as air support would be enhanced. In spite of this, there are few disadvantages. One is that a swift system would mean more use of helicopter attacks that could inflate the costs of executing an attack. Another is that development of effective techniques would create and overdependence on helicopter attacks that could be used as a bait by enemy nations. However, the option for transforming division and corps is that it has been in constant transformation in recent years for at least intervals of five years. The later involves reforming the doctrines for helicopter attacks to be in line with the ground assault whereby commanders will have a more hands-on approach.
Recommendations
As ascertained by Lindsay (2015), excellence in helicopter attacks can only be achieved if the doctrines have adapted in accordance with the situation at hand. The conditions for attacks that were effective during the war in Vietnam are no longer effective and it becomes vital that new ones be developed (Cox, 2018). Therefore the branch of aviation needs to restructure its doctrine for an accurate description of how commanders can swiftly collaborate ground and helicopter attacks. To achieve this, the historical concepts of operations like the one used by James Gavin and Howze Board need to be revisited (Lindsay, 2015). From this, then effective doctrines may be developed to enhance the abilities of commanders on the ground.
References
Cox, M. (2018, October 10). Army to See Designs of Future Attack-Recon Helicopters in December. Retrieved November 28, 2018, from https://www.military.com/dodbuzz/2018/10/10/army-see-designs-future-attack-recon-helicopters-december.html
Lindsay, D. T. (2015). US Army Attack Aviation in a Decisive Action Environment: History, Doctrine, and a Need for Doctrinal Refinement. US Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth United States.
Petrescu, R. V., Aversa, R., Akash, B., Corchado, J., Berto, F., Apicella, A., & Petrescu, F. I. (2017). About helicopters.
