Confronting Terrorism: What Every American Needs to Know

Confronting terrorism is a concept that involves studying how terrorist organizations operate and implementing appropriate interventions to prevent their attacks. A general evaluation of how different terrorist organizations operate and the motivators of terrorism is the initial step towards confronting terrorism. This paper will also specifically evaluate the terrorism end stages of the Islamic State Khurasan Province (ISKP), a group that poses a serious threat to the security of the United States. Appropriate socioeconomic approaches of how to end hostilities with this terrorist group will be examined. Common interventions such as military actions and the increase of police powers have not been effective and have resulted in severe retaliation and violation of civil liberties. For the United States to end hostilities with a terrorist group such as ISKP, strategies including establishing a coordinated intelligence network, incentivizing countries most affected, and seeking an agreement with the group will be more effective than direct use of force. 

Review of the Main International Terrorist Groups 

International terrorist organizations targeting United States foreign agencies and citizens abroad remain the biggest terrorism threats to the country. Currently, the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, ISIL, and smaller affiliated groups of these organizations are the leading terrorist organizations that threaten the security of American citizens overseas. These three non-state groups have claimed responsibility for several terror attacks on United States embassies, foreign military bases, and citizens. Analysis of terrorist groups involves studying the results of their activities and their impact. The ideological model that the group uses as its motivation for recruiting and conducting attacks is also another significant dimension that must be evaluated. 

Domestic terrorist groups also exist within the United States, though with limited activities and impact on security. Political and racial ideologies dominate the nature of the domestic terrorist organization in the United States (Post, 2015). The Ku Klux Klan, Aryan Nations, and other white supremacist groups continue to pose a domestic threat to the United States, according to the FBI. These groups may not have the capacity to carry out significant attacks like international terrorist groups, but they are a constant danger to the lives of citizens. Domestic terrorist groups usually use mass shootings and individual murders as their main form of attack. 

Review of Causes and Motivators of Terrorism 

There are three main prevalent causes of terrorism that explain the motivation and perceived grievances of terrorist groups. These causes are psychological perspective, ideological perspective, and strategic. 

Psychological Perspective 

Personal psychological reasons are a cause of terrorism that inspires hate and a desire to demonstrate power by an individual or group. For example, the Unabomber attacker that sent bomb letters to various individuals between 1978 and 1995 was perceived to have been suffering from a psychological disorder. Many acts of terror by individuals have been attributed to underlying psychological problems suffered by the perpetrator. In addition, some individuals who join large terrorist groups have been presumed to be motivated by extreme hate or sociopathic behaviors. However, criminal psychologists suggest that most people who engage in acts of terrorism do so out of seeking attention and a sadist mindset, not the ideological goal. 

Ideological Perspective 

The concept of ideological-based terrorism has been one of the most known motivators of terrorism, especially within the past 20 years since the New York attack on September 11, 2001. Ideology refers to beliefs or principles which a group supports and seeks to make popular. Ideology includes religious doctrines, political principles, and philosophical beliefs. Al-Qaeda, ISIL, and the Taliban, with their affiliate groups, subscribe to radical Islamic ideology. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Japanese Red Army are examples of politically ideological terrorist groups. Many of these ideological groups take advantage of people's personal beliefs to recruit them into these groups and use violence as a justification to achieve their goals. The Taliban is the only ideological terrorist group that managed to acquire power in recent history when they controlled Afghanistan between 1996 and 2001. 

Strategic Perspective 

Some political groups may turn to radical acts of terrorism after failed attempts to have political objectives achieved. These groups temporarily resort to acts of violence and terrorism to seek the government's attention in power. Terrorism in this aspect is a logical strategy towards legitimate and perceived grievances. Historically, political parties seeking independence have had to turn terrorism to push their agenda. Hezbollah is an example of a political group that has resorted to violent acts of terror to pursue its agenda. Some states also sponsor terrorist groups for strategic reasons. For example, a few terrorist groups in the Middle East are sponsored by the Iranian government. The Libyan government also sponsored the terrorist attack on the Pan Am plane in 1988 for regional strategic reasons. 

Organizational Structure of Islamic State Khurasan Province (ISKP) 

The group poses a threat to the United States foreign embassies, especially in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. ISKP is affiliated to the now dormant ISIL with its operations mainly in the historical region known as Greater Khorasan. The group's ideological alignment is similar to those of ISIL, which supports the formation of an Islamic Caliphate in the area. The recruitment strategy for ISKP includes seeking already radicalized unsatisfied members of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. 

ISKP organizational structure includes four levels of leadership, with the top being governed by the emir. The commanders are the second in the leadership hierarchy and mainly control the military arm of the organization. Deputy commanders and local leaders are the other leadership associated with the group. Currently, ISKP is under the leadership of Shahab al-Muhajir. The goal of the group is to have an Islamic caliphate within the Middle East region. According to the group, the United States is the main obstacle to achieving its goals and its main target for terror attacks. The group has attacked targets that were ideologically connected to the United States government with the Afghanistan and Pakistan region; however, they can launch an attack in the United States mainland, posing a serious threat. 

Having been founded in 2015, the group has existed for six years but has risen to dominance in a region where more powerful groups like Al-Qaeda failed to prevail against the Taliban. Despite this relatively short term, the group has been responsible for over 100 attacks with high casualties. In 2019, the ISKP was responsible for 11% of all deaths in Afghanistan alone. Despite the diminishing dominance of its parent group, ISIL, ISKP has recorded an increased number of recruits with a membership of 10,000 in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Their attacks are well planned and sophisticated, often involving suicide bombs or assault rifle attacks on public areas. The group has been known to launch psychological attacks to cause increased resentment in times when instability exists. The guerrilla tactics used by the group make it a major threat with overzealous followers who volunteer to take part in suicide bombing missions. 

The financial revenue stream for the group is mainly from contributions from sympathizers and illegal taxation. Ransom from kidnapping and illegal mining have also significantly contributed to the group's financial revenue in the past. The Taliban has been the group's main rival in the region for sources of income and political control, with the United States and Afghan governments cooperating with the Taliban to end ISKP's increasing dominance and threat. ISKP's main mode of attack has been bombing highly populated social places intending to get high causalities. 

Strategies the U.S. Can Use to End ISKP's Terrorism 

Terrorist organizations are categorized using six rubric categories that analyze lifespan and attaining goals (Harmon, 2011). Based on this mechanism, ISKP would fall under the rubric category of mid-term lifespan with limited success in evaluating terrorist organizations. The group's flexibility and resilience have demonstrated the ability to tackle large government counter-terrorist attacks. ISKP's organizational structure makes it difficult to track and identify a feature that has enabled the group to survive multidimensional attacks from both the Taliban and the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan. The group has existed for a relatively short time but has conducted several successful attacks to accomplish their aim of getting a high number of casualties. Though the group has never achieved its caliphate goal, they have fought for it in a ruthless approach that has made the United States government increase focus on the group. Their decentralized organizational structure has enabled the group to thrive even after the arrest or execution of its top leadership. Based on these facts, ending ISKP terrorism activities would involve five stages. 

The first stage involves establishing a Globalized intelligence operation that can be adopted by the United States government in ending ISKP. Globalized intelligence involves coordinated efforts to share intelligence between countries to improve defense or security (Olson-Raymer, 2003). Through coordinated intelligence, the United States can learn about its activity with its region of operation and anticipate attacks. The decentralized nature of the organization has made it difficult to counter the group's activities. However, a coordinated intelligence effort will improve the understanding of the group's mode of operations. The collective intelligence will also identify the group's sources of revenue and implement ways to discontinue the stream of income. 

The second stage should be the disaggregation of ISKP from its parent group, ISIL, and other small groups affiliated as an effective strategy to contain the dominance of the group. Isolating the ISKP from other groups will reduce its influence and make interventions used to fight the group more effectively (Ellis, 2011). In addition, ISKP gets a significant amount of revenue from ISIL; therefore, disaggregation limits the resources at its disposal. Disaggregation can be implemented by identifying and destroying communication channels between the group and its affiliates. The movement of new recruits from foreign countries can also be identified and halted by using a globalized intelligence network. This strategy will also slow down the rapid recruiting rates of the group by restricting its regional accessibility. 

The third stage involves the United States funding, training, and equipping the Pakistan and Afghanistan governments to fight ISKP. Since these two countries bear the moral responsibility of ISKP terrorist activities, they should be incentivized to prevent the group's activities or pressured not actively assist group members. Though the group considers the United States as its main enemy, casualties from attacks by ISKP have been suffered mostly by citizens of these two countries. However, their governments are not well equipped and trained to effectively prevent attacks by the group. Therefore, the United States, in its efforts to apply expended deterrence, should engage these two countries in expended deterrence measures against the group. 

The fourth stage involves forming an alliance with the Taliban, which the United States views as a moderate terrorist group compared to ISKP. The ISKP is more radical since it conducts indiscriminate and frequent attacks with no clear political or ideological grievances. In an unusual relationship, the United States government can use the Taliban, ISKP's fierce rivals, to defeat the group. This approach could also bear positive outcomes in ending hostilities with the Taliban and agreeing on how to settle some of the moderate demands of the group. 

The fifth and final stage involves engaging the leadership of ISKP in negating with the Afghanistan and Pakistan governments. The United States' policy to refuse negotiations with terrorist organizations has not proven to be pragmatic over the years. Agreeing to address the moderate and genuine grievances of the ISKP group can be a more effective approach. The ISKP would have diminished influence and capability at this stage, making them more susceptible to settlement on a win-win resolution. An example of an agreement between the government and a terrorist organization is the peace treaty between Russia and Al-Qaeda-linked Chechen separatist forces. This stage, if successful, will mark an end to hostilities between ISKP and Afghanistan, Pakistan, and United States. 

Potential Effectiveness of Normal Police Response to Criminal Action 

Responses used by law enforcement against criminal action involve prevention, defense, and toleration. Prevention by using technology to identify potential catastrophes, including terrorist attacks by an organization such as ISKP, is not efficient . The cost of that kind of technology is too high in financial resources and political capital. Defense against terror attacks using the desired advanced technology requires that the technology be perfect and avoid destructive consequences (Colby, 2008). It is impossible to achieve this level of perfection for any kind of defense technology used by police in response to crime. On the other hand, toleration as an element of police response evaluates the benefits versus the costs of a particular aspect of society and determines if it is efficient. Through such a response, terror attacks cannot be tolerated and therefore render the response ineffective. 

The police also rely on positive incentives such as conformity and morality as a natural mechanism to deter criminal activity. Through this element, it is assumed that most people want to be obedient to the law. However, most individuals who participate in terrorism activities are motivated by a psychological need to cause suffering in others and are not deterred through a positive incentive approach (Colby, 2008). Deterrence mechanisms used by the police are likely to be ineffective against terror groups like ISKP, as observed by their willingness to commit suicide in their attacks. These approaches may be effective against non-terror-related criminal actions but would prove ineffective and impractical against terrorist groups. Therefore, it is imperative that alternative methods be examined and implemented against terrorist attacks. 

More Comprehensive Socioeconomic Strategies 

Other more comprehensive socioeconomic strategies that could be effective against terrorism fall under the expended deterrence concept. These strategies include concept directing the weight of preventing terror attacks to parties with more moral responsibility and ability against specific terrorist activities (Colby, 2008). These strategies involve issuing threats and providing incentives to these parties according to their involvement in the terror activities. Issuing sanctions against countries that state sponsor terrorist organizations will limit the resources and ability of the terrorist groups, effectively deterring them from conducting successful attacks. The moral responsibility of stopping an attack lies with the parties that would be most affected by it. Such parties should be incentivized to prevent terrorism by employing mechanisms to fight terrorist groups. Governments of countries where terrorist groups conduct their activities should be funded and equipped to fight these groups locally. 

Another expended deterrence strategy is capture, detention, and pressurizing of individuals who fund, support, or sympathize with the ISKP organization. It is also important to analyze the impact and effectiveness of employing a socioeconomic strategy against terrorism. The threat of attack should be credible, and the implications of the measure have a higher benefit-to-cost ratio. In evaluating these strategies in the case of ISKP, it is evident that they would achieve a more increased deterrence against the group compared to the negative outcomes. The previously neutral governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan who have a higher moral responsibility will become hostile towards ISKP and work towards ending the group's dominance and prevalence. 

Military Action 

The use of the military to fight and prevent terrorism both domestically and internationally has attracted many controversies, especially on the infringement of civil liberties. After the September 11 attacks, the United States military was deployed in Iraq to fight state-sponsored terrorism of the Saddam Hussein regime, which was accused of producing weapons of mass destruction to commit terror attacks (Olson-Raymer, 2003). The United States military was also deployed in Afghanistan to fight the Taliban. In addition, the military has also been used to fight ISIL in Iraq and Syria. However, the use of the military is not a new action, as previous instances of domestic terrorism have made the American government use the military to protect the interest of America. An example of such a case includes the order by President Lincoln in the 1860s to use military courts to try and sentence civilians of questionable loyalty. Also, after September 11, the government passed laws that allowed military tribunals to be used to try international criminals. 

The use of military action against international terrorism is often tied to the American neoconservative tactics and agendas. The impact and outcome of military campaigns against acts of terrorism have not often been desirable (Miller, 2009). Many observers have lamented the lack of proportionality and violation of human rights that this approach is associated with. After invasions by the United States military, the destabilization of Iraq and Afghanistan are examples of why military action is not an appropriate strategy against terrorism. Though terrorism is a catastrophe that causes death and harm to many people, military action tends to cause more of these outcomes. Based on this observation, it is evident that military action has a higher cost compared with expected benefits. 

Unlike conventional warfare, where rules of engagement are likely to be observed by warring parties, military action against terrorist organizations often descends into complete anarchy. Facing more superior weapons and strategies of their enemy, terrorists may resort to dubious means of attacking civilians, mistreating prisoners, and refuse to adhere to terms of negotiations (Schuller & Grant, 2002). These retaliation attacks in a bid to match the superiority of their opponent result in high casualties. 

Additional Police Powers or Legislative Measures 

In preventing terrorism, additional powers to law enforcement are not needed. Any measures against terrorism should be analyzed for benefits and cost. Though terrorism must be prevented, it should not be dealt with at the expense of civil liberties. Scholars agree that the use of violence against civilians by previous United States governments has been useful in protecting the citizens. However, such acts also violated individual rights and caused severe negative repercussions in innocent people's lives. In trying to identify communist supporters during the Cold War and the Vietnam War, the United States government accorded law enforcement additional powers, which they used to kidnap, threaten, and even murder civilians without due process. 

For democracy to be defended, all efforts to provide additional powers to law enforcement should be avoided. After September 11 attack, the government enacted legislation that violated the privacy and freedom of citizens in a bid to identify and prevent terrorist actions (Olson-Raymer, 2003). Unfortunately, this act has been used for other purposes, causing serious harm to individuals. Counterterrorism should not be justification for such violation of basic human rights. Instead, appropriate means of preventing terrorism should be used, such as negotiating with the terrorist organization to ensure hostilities end. Social-economic strategies like incentivizing and threatening those with higher moral responsibilities have also proven effective and should be encouraged. 

Increasing government powers to enhance security is not worth it since it may fulfill some objectives of the terrorist. The overall goal of individuals and groups who engage in terrorism is to cause harm and suffering in whatever way. The suffering on citizens caused by limited liberty may be perceived by the terrorist group as an achievement even if they fail in their direct attacks. To avoid submitting to the objective of the terrorist groups, more effective strategies should be implemented. Democracy and liberty can only be upheld if the powers of the government over its citizens are minimal. 

Thus, the terrorism prevention socioeconomic strategy that reduces hostility between the terrorist group and the government is implemented without disproportionate force and reduced civil liberties. As this paper illustrates, the threat against ISKP continues to pose a danger to United States embassies and interests in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Rather than use military action, the paper proposes issuing incentives and threats to parties that bear higher moral responsibility. The paper also refutes the claim that increased police powers and legislation are worth the cause of protecting citizens against terrorism. 

Thus, ending terrorism involves applying strategies that include establishing a coordinated intelligence network, incentivizing countries most affected, and seeking an agreement with the terror group. This paper evaluated the structure and mode of operation of the main international terrorist organizations. Five stages that can be used to end the terrorism activities of the ISKP include a coordinated intelligence, incentivizing countries that are mostly affected by ISKP's attacks, and involving more moderate terrorist groups like the Taliban in the measures against ISKP. The paper also illustrates why military action or increasing law enforcement powers as interventions against terrorism are ineffective and violate civil liberties. 

References 

Colby, E. A. (2008). Expanded Deterrence: Broadening the Threat of Retaliation. Policy Review , 43–59. 

Ellis, M. J. (2011). Disaggregating Legal Strategies in the War on Terror. The Yale Law Journal , 121 (237), 237–250. 

Harmon, C. C. (2011). How Terrorist Groups End: Studies of the Twentieth Century. Connections: The Quarterly Journal , 1812-1098 , 43–84. https://doi.org/10.11610/connections.10.2.03 

Miller, R. A. (2009). Confronting Global Terrorism and American Neoconservatism: The Framework of a Liberal Grand Strategy. By Tom Farer. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. American Journal of International Law , 103 (4), 796–800. https://doi.org/10.1017/s000293000016004x 

Olson-Raymer, G. (2003). Confronting Terrorism in The Post-September 11 Th World: An Interdisciplinary Academic Discussion. Humboldt Journal of Social Relations , 27 (2), 1–16. 

Post, J. M. (2015). Terrorism and Right-Wing Extremism: The Changing Face of Terrorism and Political Violence in the 21st Century: The Virtual Community of Hatred. International Journal of Group Psychotherapy , 65 (2), 242–271. https://doi.org/10.1521/ijgp.2015.65.2.242 

Schuller, F. C., & Grant, T. D. (2002). Terror: Measuring the Cost, Calculating the Response. Current History , 101 (654), 184–186. https://doi.org/10.1525/curh.2002.101.654.184