Introduction
Russia has advanced its malign influence in eastern Baltics, which includes Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania; hence, raising serious concern among policymakers from NATO, Europe, and Baltic countries. Many of the policymakers argue that Russia's approach towards eastern Baltics serves as an indication of the vulnerabilities that the three countries face from a political, economic, and social perspective. To achieve its intended outcomes, Russia uses "hybrid warfare," which involves using various approaches aimed at destabilizing democratically elected governments region. Grigas (2012) notes that Russia uses covert or deniable activities, supports conventional or nuclear forces, as well as, influences domestic politics in eastern Baltics as part of its approach to maintaining influence. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania border Russia and have a sizable Russian minority populace. Policymakers believe that Russia's advance towards eastern Baltics will involve the minority, with the key objective being to influence its authority and define their policies.
The key issue of concern surrounding Russia’s influence in the Baltics is that it intends to use its position to destabilize the countries and exert its influence on domestic politics. In an attempt to counter the malign influence in eastern Baltics, the United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM) uses Civil Affairs forces as a way of ensuring that the civil populace in the three countries is protected. The forces utilize their three core competencies, which are Civil Affairs Activities (CAA), Military Government Operations (MGO), and Civil Affairs Supported Activities (CASA). Each of these competencies has a set of nested functions, which act as key determinants of the successes that the forces achieve in the region. The functions play a central role in establishing a systematic approach that the SOCOM Enterprise uses deterring Russia’s aggression in the region. This paper examines some of the countermeasures adopted by the SOCOM enterprise in dealing with Russia’s malign influence.
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The Three Core Competencies of Civil Affairs
The three core competencies associated with civil affairs (CA) are Civil Affairs Activities (CAA), Military Government Operations (MGO), and Civil Affairs Supported Activities (CASA). CAA refers to activities that the CA plans, executes, and assesses, which provide a set of unique capabilities to the commander involved in the forces. MGO refers to the underlying operations that the military government, which is the supreme authority exercised by CA forces. On the other hand, CASA refers to the primary functions associated with the CA forces in the planning, coordinating, or synchronizing but do not act as proponents. CA aligns its operations under these core competencies, which advances its ability to organize tasks and systems into a set of executable capabilities. These functions can be executed any time before, during, and in the absence of military operations, which gives CA forces the authority to function.
Civil Affairs Activities (CAA)
To counter Russia’s malign influence in eastern Baltics, the SOCOM Enterprise engages in a vast array of Civil Affairs Activities (CAA), which is one of the competencies that define the enterprise's overall performance. The CAA has five key functions; Civil Reconnaissance, Civil Engagement, Civil Information Management, Civil-Military Operations Center, and Civil Affairs Operations Staff Support (Shlapak& Johnson, 2016). The adoption of these activities as part of the CA forces’ operations in eastern Baltics is intended to establish structured approaches to create an environment that supports freedom for all. Over the years, the United States has established a positive relationship with eastern Baltic countries, which gives it an added advantage while conducting CAA. CA forces offer their support in different areas, each of which is intended to create a positive connection between eastern Baltic countries and the United States to limit Russia's malign influence in the countries.
Russia uses 'hybrid warfare' as it exerts influence in eastern Baltics, which gives it an advantage considering that the combination of strategies effectively achieves overall success outcomes. The first key CAA function noted in the strategic approaches taken to counter Russia's influence is civil reconnaissance. Civil reconnaissance refers to a set of targeted, planned, and coordinated observations and evaluations, which are often specific to one aspect of the environment (Jakniūnaitė, 2016). In this case, CA forces engage in civil reconnaissance in the eastern Baltic region, focusing on Russia's misinformation to destabilize the region. Russia has been noted to use propaganda and misinformation, which it fabricates to exert its influence on other countries, unknowingly. CA forces country the misinformation through civil reconnaissance by verifying and refuting the information, limiting negative information likely to impact the stability of the eastern Baltic countries.
CA forces also play a central role in detecting and monitoring changes in the civil component. In the eastern Baltic region, the civil element considered is the region's peace and stability, considering that each of the countries has positioned itself economically, socially, and politically. Any changes in the civil components suggest that a region's stability is likely to be impacted; hence, it needs to adopt strategic changes depending on the commander’s common operational picture (COP). The second CAA function seen in CA forces’ efforts to counter Russia’s malign influence is civil engagement. Civil engagement refers to the deliberate measures taken to push for interactions with the indigenous populations and institutions (IPI). The sole objective associated with civic engagement is to create a positive relationship between military forces and the civil component. The expected outcome is that this relationship will enhance the commander's understanding of the civil component; thus, legitimizing the missions that the SOCOM Enterprise is undertaking in any region.
In dealing with Russia's influence in eastern Baltics, CA forces use civil engagement by promoting collaboration with the civil component in each of the three countries. For every mission that CA forces undertake, one of the key aspects they consider is how they would collaborate with civilians, which aids in creating a positive relationship. CA forces have also been at the forefront in mitigating the impacts associated with military operations on IPI as part of its civil engagement efforts in easter Baltics (Bergmane, 2020). Russia uses aggression as one of the ways to exert its influence on the eastern Baltic countries, which results in military confrontations in some of the regions.CA forces work with the civil component in the region to minimize underlying impacts associated with military operations. The outcome of such efforts can be seen from the United States’ partnerships with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.
CA forces’ approach to civil engagement can also be viewed based on their ability to resolve conflict in the eastern Baltic countries in a much more effective manner. Conflict resolution is essential when dealing with the civil component of a region because it acts as a form of protection for the civilian populace from possible harm. The United States, through the CA forces, has taken up a strategic approach to identify some of the potential areas where conflicts are likely to arise, which gives the forces the overall capacity to deal with such disputes immediately. Russia uses conflicts to capitalize on its position in the region where it identifies key influencers, which it then uses to promote conflict in each of the eastern Baltic countries. However, conflict resolution approaches taken by CA forces have been effective in protecting the civil component.
Military Government Operations (MGO)
CA forces have also been involved in a vast array of Military Government Operations (MGO), intended to coordinate, liaise, and provide the necessary support to countries involved. In the eastern Baltic region, CA forces consider using MGO as part of their strategic efforts to deal with Russian troops' malign influence. Russia's objective in eastern Baltic countries is to prevent the integration of eastern Baltic countries in the EU and NATO, regardless of whether they are members (Kirilenko&Alexeyev, 2018). Russia uses its maligned influence to promote conflicts in the region, often resulting in instability, considering that the influence impacts the political, social, and economic structure. The Russian minority in the region has played a central role in pushing for adopting strategic policies intended to position Russia’s interest in the region; hence, the need for MGO.
The key objective associated with MGO is to establish and conduct military government until a time when a civilian authority or government has been restored. In most cases, MGO is executed simultaneously to military operations, which gives authority to the operations and their consequences. Additionally, MGO also involves providing support to civil administration to ensure that the administration has the power and authority to avoid external forces. The key function associated with MGO that CA forces utilize as they seek to counter Russia's malign influence in eastern Baltics is support to civil administration (SCA) (Kuczyńska-Zonik, 2017). SCA refers to the assistance accorded to the existing civil structures in a foreign country with the aim being to strengthening government functioning. Russia’s use of aggression has had a significant impact on the eastern Baltic region’s political structure; thus, defining CA forces need to provide SCA as part of its strategic efforts in the region.
CA forces are involved in performing liaison functions that seek to enhance the relationship between military and civilian agencies. The liaison functions create a link between the agencies involved, which serves as a form of support to ensure that the civilian agencies are well equipped to function effectively within the specific environments in which they operate (Esiukova,Chubarenko,& Simon, 2018). In other words, the functions help strengthen the position held by civilian agencies compared to military agencies. These functions are essential in creating a conducive environment that is supportive of the civil component within the eastern Baltics region. For example, CA forces are involved in facilitating engagements between eastern Baltic countries and Russian troops, which have been aggressive in their approach towards the civil component. The liaison functions are intended to create a structured approach through which to ensure that the civilian populace in the region is not exposed to any negative impacts associated with military operations.
On the other hand, CA forces have been involved in monitoring and anticipating future requirements for the IPI while focusing on the functional areas in which the forces operate. The SOCOM Enterprise gives authority to CA forces, which allows them to maximize their functionality to create a standard avenue to ensure that the IPI requirements are met. However, this depends on the overall levels of monitoring and anticipation, which creates a well-defined process through which to ensure that military efforts are practical in the delivery of positive outcomes. The eastern Baltic region has a vast array of IPI requirements intended to push for economic, social, and political development. The United States understands that its empowerment of the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian people will play a central role in maximizing its efforts to reduce Russia’s malign influence in the region.
Civil Affairs Supported Activities (CASA)
The Civil Affairs Supported Activities (CASA) involves functions that enable the Civil affairs to engage in effective operations that help to mitigate Russian influence on the Eastern Baltics. CASA's main objective is to engage in effective planning and coordination processes that reduce threats and vulnerabilities (Tyushka, 2018). Considering the complex nature of the environment, it is necessary to focus on the CASA to ensure that the Eastern Baltics have the ability to deal with Russian influence and different forms of civil vulnerabilities. The two main functions of CASA include foreign assistance and populace and resource control (PRC). Each function has an integral role in defining various concerns that relate to the general well-being of the Eastern Baltics. An in-depth analysis of each function provides vital information that is necessary for determining the role of the Eastern Baltics in overcoming the Russian influence.
Foreign assistance involves civil or military aid provided to foreign nations to enhance development, security, and humanitarian activities. In the Eastern Baltics, the provision of foreign assistance may have a significant role in providing the support that improves the lives of people in society (Raik, 2016). The ability to overcome civil threats and deal with Russian influence requires the Eastern Baltics to capitalize on obtaining foreign assistance from different nations such as the United States. It is necessary to note that the United States capitalizes on providing foreign support to the Eastern Baltics through security cooperation, focusing on the security cooperation plan of the geographic combatant commander. The assistance helps in dealing with security concerns and combat any form of a natural or human-made disaster that may affect the lives of people in the region. Additionally, it is essential to note that the provision of foreign assistance enhances positive relations between the Civil Affairs and the Offices of Defense Cooperation (ODC) in the Eastern Baltics.
The analysis of factors relating to the foreign assistance in the Eastern Baltics requires a proper understanding of the components of the assistance and the processes necessary in developing assistance programs. The civil affairs in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania should focus on engaging in planning, executing, and assessing various aspects relating to civil matters that require foreign support to deal with the Russian backing (Olaniyi&Prause, 2016). Another key aspect of consideration is that Civil affairs forces can evaluate civil component s through planning and execution of activities that provide an opportunity to welcome foreign assistance. Considering the civil and social issues faced by people in the Eastern Baltics, the provision of foreign assistance from the United States helps to deal with such problems and create a conducive environment for all people. The assistance reduces illegal migration from the Eastern Baltics into the European Union countries in search of peace and resources.
The second function involves populace and resource control (PRC), which is vital in enhancing the quality of life of the people living within the Eastern Baltics. The most significant aspect of consideration when dealing with the Russian influence in the Eastern Baltics is the involvement of the military operations. The operations undertaken by the military cannot be disrupted by actions associated with the indigenous populace. It is necessary to note that there are immigrants that enter the Eastern Baltics region with the hope that they would get asylum into the European Union region. The vulnerability of illegal immigrants may create the need for CASA and implemented populace control measures that can detect and deter activities relating to terrorism (Milevski, 2018). The PRC consists of two distinct aspects that involve populace control and resource control, responsible for promoting accountability in the indigenous countries within the Eastern Baltic. Additionally, the two components have an integral role in enhancing security measures and the proper allocation of resources in the region.
The Pillars of ARSOF Capability
The pillars of ARSOF involves key aspects that help in enhancing the quality of life and deal with different forms of vulnerabilities. The most significant aspect of consideration is that the pillars have an integral role in shaping and preventing adverse outcomes when focusing on the stability of a region. In the Eastern Baltics, the pillars of ARSOF capability helps in enabling the CA forces to deal with the Russian influence and ensure that the region overcomes major vulnerabilities and threats associated with civil unrest. The first pillar that is crucial in the Eastern Baltics is the indigenous approach, which is a means that focus on enhancing the stability of the region. The main objective associated with the pillar involves leveraging nascent capability in different populations within the region (US Army JFKSWCS Office of Strategic Communications, 2016). Additionally, proper implementation of key aspects within the pillar helps enhance the transformation of indigenous mass into sufficient combat power.
The second central pillar is precision targeting operations, which involves kinetic and non-kinetic actions(US Army JFKSWCS Office of Strategic Communications, 2016). The situation in the Eastern Baltics regarding the increased civil unrest and the need for intelligence requires precision targeting operations. It is necessary to consider the challenges faced by the Eastern Baltics that include political sensitivity and unrest that create a loophole for Russian influence to dominate and impact on major operations. The main objective of the pillar is to create physical and psychological effects that could be used in the process of collapsing human and physical networks(US Army JFKSWCS Office of Strategic Communications, 2016). Another pillar that is necessary to consider involves crisis response, which is required for enhancing the quality of responses provided in emergencies. Considering the vulnerabilities of the Eastern Baltics, there is a dire need to employ the ARSOF to enhance the effective operation and to ensure that the countries within the eastern Baltic region overcome challenges relating to civil unrest and poor governance.
The course of Action and Conclusion
The most significant factor to consider is that the civil-military support element (CMSE) in the eastern Baltics are positioned to enhance the interests of the United States. The CMSE creates a situation that focuses on the integration of Eastern Baltics into NATO and the EU without proper consideration of their interest and the consequences of the move. Firstly, the CMSEs need to engage in various operations that seek to update the common operating picture (COP) regarding major security concerns and civil vulnerabilities experienced by individuals in the region. The need to conduct effective operations within the Eastern Baltics region helps to facilitate proper decision-making regarding the measures that could be implemented to limit Russia's involvement in matters concerning security and overall wellness of the Eastern Baltics region. Additionally, it is essential to note that the CMSEs play an integral role in improving the military and government operations in the countries within the Eastern Baltics.
Another critical aspect to consider involves the ability to concentrate on soft power, which is an important aspect that provides the ability to cooperate rather than coerce. The fact that the Russian influence on the Eastern Baltics has dire consequences, it is necessary to focus on measures that could reduce the adverse effects on the well-being of the countries. Some of the critical aspects that are necessary to consider the implementation of the pillars of ARSOF capability and the core competencies that counter the Russian influence in society. The use of soft power may help ensure that the Eastern Baltics engage in proper decision making as an important factor that promotes effectiveness in major operations regarding the enhancement of civil engagement.
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