It is my opinion that General Frank gave a statement that was a bit reckless given the nature of military operations and the planning that goes into these operations. The general before making the statement had prior knowledge about the plans that he put in place concerning Phase IV of the procedures and the subsequent longer and more complex phases of reconstruction and stabilization. CENTCOM, of which Gen Frank was head, made minimal plans regarding Phase IV and how it was to implement it, thus for him to make a statement indicating the assumed fleeting nature of the phase was very unfortunate. Military communication requires that an Army commander should only give such a specific statement once they have carefully reviewed all the planning and organizational procedures regarding that phase. Since planning and organization for Phase IV were nearly non-existent, it is evident that Gen Franks had not carefully scrutinized the plans for Phase IV and realized they were not satisfactory before going ahead to issue the statement.
Did this line of thinking add to the difficulty of planning for Stability Operations?
The general’s line of thinking affected Stability Operations. The general believed that the transition would be quite short and quick; thus, he did not put much effort into the things that needed to be in place for the stabilization process to occur. Stability operations involve several activities, and thinking and actions of the general severely affected some of these activities. The military divides stability operations into security, humanitarian assistance, economic stabilization, the rule of law, and governance and participation ( Sergeants Major Course, 2019, J609). Gen. Franks believed that the transition period would be brief, thus did not make adequate plans for the provision of security, which is a significant stability function. Security activities would help to consolidate the regional wins over insurgents and protect civilians and property. Still, the rapid transition meant that the commander of V Corps, which was in charge of the stabilization, had to quickly plan how to offer security in the different regions and ultimately had to allow the various regional commanders to come up with their plans of stabilizing their territories and providing protection. It represented a deviation from the prescribed way of a commander coming up with a combatant command strategy as the Department of Defense prescribes in its 2019 Campaign Planning Handbook (Department of Defense, 2019)
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How did this unexpected transition affect personnel requirements for the newly designated CJTF-7?
For joint operations, the military assembles the required personnel from various units, branches, and even countries. The Third Army, which headed the transition phase, transitioned from the services handing over to CJTF-7 in a rather hurried and unplanned manner. Military guidelines dictate that replacement forces or structures must be in place before military personnel transition to other operations, lest they risk reversing all the positive steps the transitioning force makes in the operation (Department of Defense, 2017). CJTF-7 required personnel from the different branches of the military. Still, the transition meant that the branches recalled their staff spread across the country, leaving the newly appointed CJTF-7 commander with minimal choices. To make the situation more challenging, CENTCOM designated the CJTF-7 as the headquarter, needing CJTF-7 to operate at both tactical and operational levels. It wasn't easy because V Corps was initially a tactical unit; thus, it would take some time for the unit to acquire operational efficiencies; they now found themselves requiring (Sergeants Major Course, 2019). Sanchez created new positions and recruited new personnel from different branches. Still, these personnel arrived late due to the logistics involved in redeploying staff whose branches are already transitioning from the area that the CJTF-7 is calling them from. The delayed staffing of the operational sector of the CJTF-7 affected the stabilization process with Sanchez ordering military commanders to micromanage the situations in their various command regions conducting both tactical operations against insurgents and initiating stabilization processes in the areas (Sergeants Major Course, 2019). By the time the required personnel had arrived, and the headquarters was fully operational, lots of delays had already occurred, and the HQ now had the ominous task of aligning the various tactical and operations decisions the regional commanders made.
What would you have done to help assist your commander during this transition to Phase IV?
Transition involves a lot of planning, and in the absence of it, many things could go wrong. Phase IV, which was a transition phase, required extensive consultations and clear communication across all the relevant branches, units, and also levels. To assist in the transition, I would make a clear plan and schedule of which groups I would redeploy, the timeline, and the structures that I have put in place to preserve and build on the work the transitioning personnel does. Through this, I would ensure that I addressed all key issues and left no gaps around. Since the V Corps was more of a tactical unit, I would embark on having operational efficiencies as quickly as possible to enable them to plan and organize their operations efficiently. In the presence of the delays and challenges of dealing with bureaucracies in the transition period, I would advise the commander to create a temporary communications unit which he would task with informing him of the decisions, actions, and progress of the regional commanders. It is very necessary, as seen in the Sergeants Major Course (2017), where the staff regularly inform the commander about happenings in the unit. As he awaits the arrival of the requested personnel, the commander would regularly receive news from the various regions where he would be able to sanction any significant decisions made by the regional commanders to avoid occurrences that would put a strain on the stabilization process.
References
Department of Defense (2017). Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (JP 1 ). Retrieved from https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp1_ch1.pdf
Department of Defense (2019). Campaign Planning Handbook Academic Year 2019 . Retrieved from https://s3.amazonaws.com/essays-customers-files/10_2020-06-22%2019:54:48_Campaign_Planning_Handbook_AY2019_20180214.pdf
Sergeants Major Course. (2019). Transitioning from a Division/Corps (G) Staff to a Joint (J) Staff (J601RA). Retrieved from https://usasma.blackboard.com/bbcswebdav/pid-976759-dt-content-rid-16947643_1/courses/USASMA_SMC-DL_AY19-20_CL46-A/On%20Point%20II_Comabt%20Studies%20Institute%281%29.pdf
Sergeants Major Course. (2019). Planning for Irregular Warfare and Stability Operations (J609RC) . Retrieved from https://usasma.blackboard.com/bbcswebdav/pid-952417-dt-content-rid-16947432_1/courses/USASMA_SMC-DL_AY19-20_CL46-A/Region%20in%20Crisis_Stabilizing%20Mali%20%26%20the%20Sahel.pdf
Sergeants Major Course (2017). Course of Action Development (JP607). Retrieved from file:///D:/Tee/material/JP%203_33%20Joint%20Task%20Force%20HQ%20Extract.pdf
