Introduction
The United States and Iran have been embroiled one of the longest conflicts in history. Since the U.S.-supported revolution in 1979, Iran and the U.S. have engaged in intentional acts to harm each other such as kidnappings and shooting down planes. Over the years, various confidence building measures (CBM) have been adopted by the two parties and other stakeholders to prevent the conflict from escalating into a war. The conflict between U.S. and Iran has implications on the Middle East region given Iran’s role in the regional geopolitics. The conflict between U.S. and Iran was recently relieved with the signing of the JCPOA deal in 2015, but it is yet to be fully solved. The U.S. can cooperate with regional players like UAE to implement confidence-building measures and hold Iran accountable. UAE is a powerful GCC nation, and despite its problems with Iran, UAE is more likely to tolerate U.S.-Iranian rapprochement for the sake of regional peace.
Nuclear Deal
The nuclear deal which came to be known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was pursued for many years. According to Dalton (2016), the deal brought together China, France, Germany, Russia, U.K., and the United States because the P5+1 was interested in finding a permanent solution to the nuclear issue, which was the main cause of contention between Iran and the U.S.
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The nuclear deal is the greatest confidence building measure because it created parameters on how to handle the source of contention between Iran and the U.S. (Eihhorn & Nephew, 2016). The JCPOA highlighted Iran’s willingness to compromise on its nuclear development with the hope that the U.S. and the international community would lift the economic sanctions that were slowing down its economic development (Blair, 2015). JCPOA is made up of various provisions, with the main provision claiming that Iran would reduce its ability to enrich uranium by two-thirds. With the signing of the JCPOA, Iran agreed that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) would monitor its nuclear development program to ensure that Iran was not enriching more than the agreed nuclear materials.
The deal is an effective CBM because it holds Iran accountable, not just to the U.S., but the regional and international community. Regional nations like the GCC members were worried about nuclear development in Iran. Iran does not get along well with regional nations like Israel, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and UAE. These nations were worried about the unchecked nuclear program as it gave Iran an advantage in case of any military action. Since the signing of the nuclear deal, regional and global stakeholders like China, Russia, and the European nations are interested in preserving the nuclear deal as it is in the best interest for everyone (Dalton, 2016).
The nuclear deal is the best CBM because a change in government cannot change the deal. In the past, the tumultuous U.S.-Iranian relations were determined by the leaders of states, with conservative leaders in place; the conflict escalated while liberals attempted to solve the dispute. President Obama became the first U.S. President to hold a phone conversation with the Iranian President since the U.S. cut off its diplomatic ties with Iran in 1980. Trump has a different approach to international relations in comparison to Obama, and Trump was vocal against the JCPOA, but since the nuclear deal is binding, Trump administration has to be careful about its policies and actions pertaining Iran (Dai, 2017).
US-UAE-KSA relations
The U.S. has maintained friendly ties with UAE and KSA. Sebright (2017) posits that the close relationship between UAE and US focuses on defense and security and trade. The recent visit to the US by the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed showed that Trump is interested in maintaining a friendship with UAE. The relationship was strained during Obama administration, but Trump is interested in rebuilding the relationship because of UAE’s strategic role in the region (Sebright, 2017). UAE is a crucial trade partner to the US, in 2016, US, had a $19- billion trade surplus with UAE, making the third-largest surplus among its international trading partners (Sebright, 2017). UAE is also the largest export market for the US industries, the seven Emirates import a lot of manufactured goods, and they have opened doors for many American job seekers and entrepreneurs.
Aside from the economic ties, UAE and US agree on many political and other challenging issues affecting peace in the Middle East. UAE has challenged Iranian aggression and has supported the fight against the Islamic State, making it a crucial ally to the US. UAE is one of the leading export markets for US arms and weapons; UAE has invested huge amounts of money purchasing weapons from the US to safeguard its interests in the volatile region (Sadjadpour, 2011).
Alternatively, the US-KSA relations have undergone some challenges in the past, but the two nations are still on friendly terms. President Trump has the intent of strengthening US-KSA relations, and Saudi Arabia was the first foreign nation he visited (Blanchard, 2017). The US views KSA as an important regional partner in security and trade hence the continuous partnership despite opposition by some members of Congress. For example, the US and KSA concluded a formal arms sale agreement lasting between 2009 and 2015, whereby the US supplied arms worth $58 billion. There are rising concerns in the Congress regarding KSA’s use of the weapons, and some bills were introduced to prevent the US from certain sensitive weapons to KSA (Blanchard, 2017). Apart from the sales of arms, the US buys oil from KSA. The oil imports from Iran have decreased due to the development of shale petroleum, but the US is still a significant trading partner.
The US and KSA do not agree on many issues, particularly human rights and gender-related issues yet the US has overlooked these issues for strategic security and economic reasons. KSA is against Iran hegemony and has played a role in the fight against ISIS.
How can these Gulf countries cooperate with the US?
At the heart of the Gulf-US relations is the Iranian issue. The Gulf member states mistrust Iran’s Shiite extremist agenda and its desire to dominate the Middle East. Iran is an aggressive nation, and it has gone through serious issues with UAE and KSA in the past. Iran took over some islands which belonged to the UAE while KSA had a conflict with Iran over the Sunni-Shia sectarian conflict that led to the Iran-Iraqi war. Aside from the specific causes of conflicts among KSA, UAE, and Iran, GCC’s is against Iran’s intention of dominating the Middle East. KSA and UAE are global forces to reckon with, and they do not want to be in the shadows of the militant Iran (McInnis, 2016).
The US-Gulf members have met on numerous occasions to discuss ways to handle the Iranian issue. In 2015, the US held a meeting with six GCC members to deliberate on the issue (Laub, 2015). The six GCC members were concerned with the nuclear deal and the US retrenching from the region. The Gulf members wanted assurance from the US that the US would support them in case Iran uses the JCPOA sanctioned nuclear weapons to attack them.
The Gulf nations can continue cooperating with the US to improve its military might. This strategy has been pursued heavily by UAE and KSA; the two nations spend more than six times on defense in comparison to Iran (McInnis, 2016). KSA has promised to develop nuclear power to match Iran’s nuclear power, though this might make the situation worse. KSA and UAE have little reason to worry in case of an Iranian invasion, but the other GCC members have to work on improving their military.
GCC nations can also use economic and political sanctions to get Iran to cooperate. Most GCC countries still maintain friendly relations with Iran, while UAE maintains an economic relationship with Iran. According to Sadjadpour (2011), Iranian small business people have established many businesses in the free trade zones in UAE, in 2009; Iran was the second largest export partner for Sharjah. UAE and KSA can use economic sanctions against Iran to make it a good neighbor. Iran survived the international economic sanctions because it was still trading with regional nations, but if regional powerhouses like UAE and KSA use economic sanctions, then Iran will have no choice but to cooperate. KSA cut its political relations ties with Iran in 2016, and UAE and other GCC members have the option to pursue this drastic measure to force Iran to be a good neighbor.
Does the US have a role in bringing Iran to the ICJ for disputes in the region?
The ICJ was formed to deal with serious crimes such as genocides, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes of aggression when the member nation is incapable of solving the crime internally. Iran is guilty of most of the crimes that are prosecuted in the ICC such as genocides, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes of aggression. Iran occupied three UAE islands; this is viewed as a crime of aggression by the ICJ (Gentile, 2009).
It will be difficult to bring Iran to the ICJ because the US is not a member of the ICJ, while Iran has not ratified the Rome Statute. Iran and the few other nations that have not ratified the Rome Statute are afraid of being held accountable for their criminal actions. According to Asli (2006), the Iranian justice system is yet to be affected by the international standards, and the system is highly corrupt.
For the ICJ to exercise jurisdiction over a crime of aggression committed by a state, the state must have ratified the Rome Statute. However, a nation can be referred to the ICJ by the UN Security Council which is made up of five members and ten temporary members. For the US to refer Iran to ICJ, it must have the support of the other five permanent ICJ members: China, Russia, France, UK, and the US. Additionally, the ICJ has no jurisdiction over crimes committed in territories or states which are not party to the Rome statute. Most GCC and Middle Eastern nations have not ratified the Rome Statute, only Jordan, Djibouti, and Comoros have ratified the Rome statute (Santora, 2015).
How GCC might not be useful in confidence building with Iran
GCC members have expressed their displeasure with Iran. Some of them have worked with the US to check Iran’s activities in the region. While GCC is made up of strong members like UAE, KSA, Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain, the fact that these nations have close trade and cultural ties with Iran puts them in a compromising position when it comes to implementing effective confidence building measures with Iran (Sadjadpour, 2011). UAE is mistrustful of Iran, the two have engaged in a continuous dispute over the territorial claim of the Gulf Islands, but this did not stop political and economic relations between the two nations (Reardon, 2012). KSA recently cut off the diplomatic relations with Iran, while most GCC members enjoy friendly relations with Iran. It is worth noting that Iran's imperialist ambitions threaten smaller Gulf nations, and they are not in a position to enforce confidence-building measures without the support of the larger GCC nations.
Karagiannis (2003) note that with the mistrust among GCC, Iran, and the US, each player has to think carefully about its actions. While GCC distrusts Iran, it does not fully trust the US to have its back when things go ballistic with Iran; hence it attempts to maintain peace with Iran. The US must do more to reassure GCC is it wants its full cooperation.
The GCC is also undergoing a crisis. UAE, KSA, Bahrain, Egypt, and other GCC members have diplomatically isolated Qatar for failing to abide by the GCC rules and objectives (Taneja, 2017). The immediate reason for Qatar’s isolation is the discovery that Qatari government paid over $1 billion to Al Qaeda affiliated group and Iranian Shiite militia as a ransom for the release Qatari royal falconers. The GCC members have termed this act as supporting terrorism, hence the internal problems within GCC. Qatar has defended itself claiming that it did not support terrorism and refuted the allegations, yet GCC members that stopped diplomatic relations with Qatar are yet to respond. GCC needs to resolve the Qatari issue immediately by engaging in talks; otherwise, they will stand no chance against Iran.
Taneja (2017) notes that GCC members had problems with Qatar, and they are using the Qatari royal falconer's ransom issue to end relations with Qatar. Iran has defended Qatar, and it has offered support. Qatar relies on GCC members for 80 of its food imports, and if the GCC keeps isolating Qatar, it will have no choice but to turn to nations that are offering support, particularly Iran and Turkey (Chandran, 2017). If the rift continues, Qatar might get out of the GCC, and it will also shift its foreign policies and alliances. Qatar is an ally of the US, and at the same time, the US wants to maintain close ties with other GCC members.
Conclusion
The most effective confident building measure against Iran has to involve regional players, particularly the GCC. UAE and KSA are the two important GCC members that have collaborated with the US for years on security and trade. With proper policies in place, UAE, GCC, and the US have the capability to hold Iran accountable. Nonetheless, GCC is now going through problems with Qatar that could shift alliances in the region shortly. GCC also does not fully trust the US commitment, especially since the US agreed to the Iran nuclear deal. The mistrust between Iran and GCC, and Iran and the US will continue for a while, but none of them will take a drastic measure against the other for fear of escalating the already volatile situation. As Trump continues to pursue better relations with KSA and UAE, Iran must watch out for the implications of the improved relations on the Iran nuclear deal.
References
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