Hurricane Katrina is the vast destructive natural disaster that ever happened in the United States. It led to more than $170 billion in damage, and its economic effect was estimated to be more than $200 billion. The disaster took place on August 29, 2005, and it covered approximately 95,000 square miles and the storm surge crested at 28 feet. The maximum speed for hurricane-force winds was about 20 to 30 nautical miles, and the effects were the evacuation of 75% of the 800 handled oil places in the Gulf of Mexico. Hurricane Katrina displaced 800,000 people, and about 75,000 residents returned only to find their houses destroyed. The death toll of the natural disaster was 1800 individuals, and most were mainly older people (Deryugina, Kawano, & Levitt, 2018). Many people were also reported missing. The main problem was pointed to the government because it failed to double-check the new flood walls built between the 1990s and 2000s. Michael Brown was the FEMA director during the period. The single decision that he made during the disaster is to block the emergency supplies delivery that the Methodist Hospital in New Orleans ordered. FEMA did not allow medical providers to provide essential services at the emergency facilities because their names were not in federal databases. For instance, in Chalmette, healthcare providers were instructed to operate in an emergency facility at New Orleans airports, but they were not allowed to help because they were not registered. During evacuations, Michael Brown blocked out of the flights that were ready to offer assistance. The enabling structure that leads to decisions carried out by Michael Brown revolves around communication breakdown. From many reports, there was a complete breakdown in communication that prevented command and control and control. It made situational awareness harder because multiple agencies could not reach each other due to inadequate system interoperability and equipment failures. Although FEMA had enough funds to carry out an effective emergency response, indecision made Michael Brown slow and confused. FEMA was waiting for Louisiana to make decisions about recovery missions. On the other hand, Louisiana blamed FEMA for agreeing with a contractor, which is why there was confusion in multiple areas. Many constraining factors made Michael Brown such a decision. First, there was confusion because most of the vital government officials were not proactive. They gave false information to residents, and its workers were not sufficiently trained. From multiple reports, it argued that FEMA had a high degree of unfamiliarity with the functions and duties that are highlighted in the National Incident Management System and National Response Plan. This unpreparedness led to overall confusion over command structures, deployment and mission assignment (Scott & Howitt, 2006). Michael Brown had appointed most political people aligned to his ideals, who had minimal disaster experiences. Another constraining structure that made Michael Brown act the way he did is due to supply failures. Few emergency equipment were stationed before the disaster, but it was inadequate. Many places needed urgent assistance, such as New Orleans Superdome, but it took days to receive medical supplies. FEMA also wasted a massive quantity of supplies; for instance, they took millions of ice to hold facilities in town that were far from the Gulf Coast. More than $90 million of unused ice was thrown after the hurricane, and more than 20,000 mobile homes that cost $800 million homes remained unused (Howitt & Scott, 2008). It was due to poor planning Michael Brown did not make the best decision during the period of such a substantial natural disaster. Michael Brown did not follow the plan that stated that a particular arrangement would evacuate people who can transport themselves. Instead of sending buses to evacuate people who could not make out on themselves, residents in New Orleans were instructed to go to Superdome and Convention Center, where there was no emergency supplies and security. Michael Brown also did not request assistance promptly, and Michael Brown could have been more proactive. Michael Brown could have provided a clear framework and communication in the process of disaster response. He could have adopted an efficient decentralization from top to a down command. He could have reduced centralization and complexities, which is usually a significant problem during disaster response. Instead of waiting for decision-making from the governor of Louisiana, he could have been proactive in organizing the quickest means of evacuation procedures. Another alternative decision that Brown could have made is to request timely help from the government and volunteers. Multiple uncertainties hampered FEMA due to bureaucratic functions and duties. Brown could have bypassed the guidelines and provide a clear goal and directive during the disaster. He could have period practice and knowledge in the framework, which could have helped coordinate and highlight general elements of the disaster response (Scott & Howitt, 2006). Brown could have made a supportive operating plan to integrate with other national guidelines of disaster response. The main reason why Michael Brown did not select the alternative mentioned above is that he was incompetent. In the middle of the disaster, Michael Brown was busy sending joking e-mails such as, "Can I quit now? Can I go home?" He also did not know about the storm's plight and the residents because he knew nothing about the whole procedure during an interview with reporters. He also lacked preparedness because the agency official was more aligned to political matters than emergency response.
References
Deryugina, T., Kawano, L., & Levitt, S. (2018). The economic impact of Hurricane Katrina on its victims: Evidence from individual tax returns. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 10 (2), 202-233. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20160307
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Howitt, A. M., & Scott, E. (2008). Hurricane Katrina (A): Preparing for "the big one" in New Orleans: Abridged. Harvard Kennedy School
Scott, E., & Howitt, A. (2006). Hurricane Katrina: Responding to an "ultra-catastrophe" in New Orleans. B . Harvard Kennedy School.
