The concept of cooperation comprises coordinated behavioral patterns designed to suit the independent interests of selfish players in the process, in a manner that could impede interdependence in situations that call for an individual's welfare being dependent on others' behavior. On the international scale, cooperation does not need government or altruism as they are in short supply. Different entities cooperate for the realization of different objectives such as combating global environmental problems or even situations in which firms conspire to create a monopoly in the market that will favor their interests. In essence, international cooperation has never been a good thing primarily when international sanctions target a specific country and cases involving international cartels that harm an ordinary consumer.
It, therefore, implies that that cooperation only comes about as a product of international strategic interactions. Hegemonic powers can help establish international regimes that thrive on some form of patterns of complementary interests (Keohane, 1984). A hegemon often rewards cooperation and punishes non-compliance. Confidence offers a reference point for newer regimes because they have to borrow a leaf from the old regimes. There must be the existence of shared interests for the development of more modern regimes. In most cases, the cooperation in this resolve depends on the extent to which regimes exploit others against the interests of the regimes. Understandably, the existence of regimes creates the standards that will be upheld for the sake of consistency.
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Hegemony per se survives and depends on asymmetrical cooperation that should be maintained at all costs. According to Keohane, regimes could be formed without the necessity of hegemony only in situations that allow for critical conditions to be met and that shared interests to take center-stage. One essential factor though is the fact that it is easier to maintain regimes that creating them and for that fact, it is the specific reason why countries fight so hard to keep their regimes for the sake of future decision-making situations. Cooperation only comes about when there are shared interests (Keohane, 1984).
References
Keohane, R. O. (1984). After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy Princeton. Press, Princeton .
