National Association of Manufacturers V. Department Of Defense

The issue that was at question, in this case, was as to whether the federal district courts made a mistake when it held that it had jurisdictions as prescribed under the 33 U.S. C 1369(b) (1) concerning the rules expressed under the Clean Water Act enumerated by the statutes. The original jurisdiction of the case was at the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The case presented the Supreme Court with an opportunity to determine whether the Clean Water Act granted a broadened jurisdiction to the Courts of Appeal. In understanding the case, it is critical to invoke the Administrative Procedure Act, which asserts that the actions of agencies can be judicially reviewed by the federal district courts unless differently provided by the Congressional statute. A provision (Section 1369 (b)) of the Clean Water Act stipulates the classes of agency actions that are exclusively and originally reviewable by the Appeals Court. The US Environmental Protection Agency together with Army Corps of Engineers adopted a new rule that redefined everything including the ‘’waters of the United States’’ phrase. However, the National Association of Manufacturers postulated that the challenges to this particular rule fall outside the classes that have been stipulated in section 1369 (b) of the agency. This means that the agency is therefore not subject to review by the Court of Appeals. The defense department and the Environmental protection Agency have on the other hand argued should be interpreted more broadly and functionally to include the rule. The determination of this particular case will be an implication on judicial efficiency and concerns to do with thoroughness. 

Facts of the Case 

In June 2015, The Army Corps of Engineers and the EPA adopted a ‘’Waters of the United States’’ also referred to as the WOTUS rule as documented in the ‘’Clean Water Rule.’’ The rule sought to amend the regulatory definition of what entailed the ‘’waters of the United States’’ as defined in the Clean Water Act. The rule addressed itself on three categories of waters including those under the US jurisdiction, the ones that have never been under the US jurisdiction, and those that should be analyzed to determine whether they are under the US jurisdiction. The issuance of WOTUS rule was followed by many challenges to its validity as it was argued that expanding the definition to ‘’waters of the United States’’ expanded the jurisdiction of the federal government thereby disrupting the balance between the state and the federal governments. The petitioners filed motions for lack of jurisdiction on the federal district courts when they appeared before the Court of Appeal (National Association of Manufacturers v. Department of Defense). 

The United States’ laws assert that some specific lawsuits should begin directly in the Courts of Appeal thereby skipping other lower district courts. Therefore, the Supreme Court was supposed to determine whether the suits filed to challenge the action of EPA are among those that begin in the Court of Appeal. The Clean Water Act has seven actions that are subject to the appellate review. Among them include their actions in approving or making any liquid waste limitation or any other form of limitation and their actions issuing or denying a permit for the purpose of discharging the pollutants. With regards to the arguments, the motion movers wanted a narrowed interpretation of their provisions and that the provisions listed do not include indirect impact actions. The third argument that was made by the motion movers asserted that the law was not meant to include actions that have a direct impact. The government, on the other hand, wants broad interpretations of the provisions and that the definition of water impacts the specified EPA actions. The government also wants the intention of the law to include certain actions which would have an impact on specified actions. 

Case analysis 

The National Association of manufactures also referred to as ‘'NAM'' made arguments that the WOTUS Rule was not in tandem with the language as used in section 1369(b)(1). Therefore, the section cannot assume jurisdiction on the US Court of Appeals in this particular case. The NAM goes further ahead and argues that the section described above is only responsible for granting original jurisdiction to the appellate court for reviewing EPA actions. Also, the agency only acts to promulgate effluent limitations or any other form of limitation under the sections provided by the Clean Water Act which include 1311, 1312, 1316, or 1345. NAM, therefore, agrees that provisions of the WOTUS Rule are not an effluent limitation and can also not be regarded as ‘'other limitation.'' Further arguments were made that suppose the section 1369(b) (1) (E) is responsible for granting the original jurisdiction to the Courts of Appeal, as asserted by NAM, it must, therefore, be classified as an ‘'other limitation'' as provided under section 1311. However, NAM insisted that WOTUS Rule could never be regarded as an ‘'other limitation'' pursuant to section 1311becuase it does not make any attempt to make a limitation or a restriction. In furthering their argument, NAM added that the WOTUS Rule was not covered under section 1311 because first, the ‘'waters of the United States'' are nowhere in section 1311 but only appear in the Clean Water's Act's description section that is found under section 1362. 

On the other hand, the Department of Defense and the EPA submitted their own arguments with regards to the case. First, they argued that the WOTUS Rule was subject to review under the laws provided in the section 1369(b) (1) (E). It further asserted that due to the fact that it was reviewable under the named section, it fell under the jurisdiction of the US courts of Appeal in the named case. Both the two US departments held that the named section was responsible for covering all the actions of EPA that served to impose limitations found in section 1311. The Department of Justice and the EPA also made it clear that they disputed the contention made by NAM that the WOTUS rule was not a limitation. They reasoned out that the rule that sought to define the jurisdictional reach as defined in section 1311 limitations served to affect the regulated parties just as the other provided in section 1311 limitations. However, it is critical to note that the Department of Justice and the EPA appreciated the fact that the WOTUS Rule was responsible for imposing limitations on giving authorities permissions by requiring them to make applications pursuant to section 1311. The purpose of the limitations was to act in accordance with the ‘'waters of the United States'' which did not previously fall under the automatic jurisdiction provided in section 1311. Therefore, in their arguments, both the defense department and the EPA noted that the WOTUS Rule did not require to be self-executing so that to establish a limitation under the Clean Water Act. This is because the judicial review that has been provided under the section 1369 (b) (1) (E) were beyond the ‘'freestanding and direct'' limitations which included the so-called effluent limitations and other types of limitations. The continued making their defense by asserting that the definition of the WOTUS Rule does not in any particular way prevent it from classification as a limitation under section 1311, which therefore validates and makes section 1369 (b) (1) (E) applicable. 

In further analyzing the merits of each side's arguments, it is imperative to interrogate the provisions of section 1369 (B) (1) (F) as outlined in the Clean Water Act. NAM furthered arguments that the WOTUS Rule did not fall within the language outlined in section 1369 (B) (1) (F) and as such does not merit the jurisdiction of the appellate court. It further adds that the section 1369 (b) (1) (F) has the ability to grant the Court of Appeal the jurisdiction to make reviews on the EPA actions under the condition that the agency is making issuance or denials of permits as prescribed under the section 1342 ( National Association of Manufacturers v. Department of Defense). It is also vital to note that NAM is aware that both sides are in agreement that the WOTUS Rule does not make any issuance or denial with regards to the section 1342 permit which was unanimously agreed upon by the sixth circuit panel. Therefore, according to NAM, the above-named section, 139 (B) (1) (F) does not apply whatsoever and consequently, this is enough to end further analysis. They further responded to the assertions of both the Department of Justice and the EPA that the section above covered all the EPA actions that made significant impacts in either issuing or denying permits basing arguments on the decision of the Supreme Court with regards to the case Simpson v, Costle. The NAM was in further contention of applying the Supreme Court's decision in this regard. They argued that if the court used the premise of the decision of the case in making decisions, then it would be applying a narrow language referred to as functional similarity. Therefore, the actions of EPA as happened in the case of Simpson would be utterly inapplicable in this case and therefore would not give authority to section 1369 (B) (1) (F) to apply to any regulation that related to permits. The NAM further stressed that the Supreme Court decision on the case of Simpson could not be related to that of the WOTUS Rule because the rule does not in any way deny the NPDES any permits but only makes attempts to define the jurisdictional authority stipulated in the Clean Water Act. In addition, any attempt to expand the section 1369 (b) (1) (F) to cover any action by EPA that affected the process of permitting would act in violation of the jurisdictional rules regarding the Court of Appeal in matters Clean Water Act. 

The DOD and the EPA made retaliations with regards to the interpretation of the NAM with regards to section 1369 (B) (1) (F). They both held that the WOTUS Rule was subject to review pursuant to section 1369 (B) (1) (F), and thereby accepting the Court of Appeal had the full jurisdiction in this particular case. In a comparison of their case to the decisions of the Supreme Court on the Simpson case, which, according to them validates the fact the law is reviewable as prescribed by the section 1369 (B) (1) (F). According to the Department of Justice and the EPA, the Supreme Court followed what is referred to as the functionally similar actions hence according to the DOD and the EPA, failure to grant the appellate court the jurisdiction would be regarded as going against the principles of the crown case. 

Another consideration that is important in consideration of the case is to analyze the structure and purpose of a section in the Clean Water Act known as 1369 (B). NAM presented their arguments that the Congress was responsible for drafting seven defined bases under the section 1369 (b) (1) whereby the Court of Appeals succeeded in retaining its original jurisdiction and continued by saying that the WOTUS Rule fell in none of the seven bases defined under the act. NAM further asked the courts to interpret the section 1369(b) more narrowly because the Congress might have erred in their intent to offer the Court of Appeal their jurisdiction with regards to this particular case ( National Association of Manufacturers v. Department of Defense). The NAM drew similarities from a similar case that was experienced by Clean Air Act.NAM, therefore, argues that the Congress must have intended that the section 1369 (b) be interpreted narrowly. Therefore, it concluded by asserting that WOTUS Rule does not fall under the premises of section 1369 (b). However, both the DOD and EPA were fast to counteract the argument and assert that the narrow reading of the section 1369 (b) that was advocated by the NAM do not conform whatsoever with the purpose of the provisions. 

In conclusion, the case remains a tough one between NAM and the government agencies that include the DOD and EPA. The battle of the case will be won or lost at the various clauses found under the regulations of the Clean Water Act compared to the stipulations under the WOTUS Rule. Both sides have applied and stretched the law to various extents in determining the jurisdiction of the case and more awaits as the case is still proceeding. 

References 

National Association of Manufacturers v. Department of Defense. (n.d.). Oyez . Retrieved December 1, 2017, from https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-299 

National Association of Manufacturers v. Department of Defense (n.d.) Scotusblog. Retrieved from: http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/national-association-of-manufacturers-v-department-of-defense/