The book Neptune’s Inferno: The U.S. Navy at Guadalcanal by James D. Hornfischer expounds on the challenges that the United States Navy experienced when combating Japanese forces at the coast of the Southern Pacific Ocean. In the book, Hornfischer (2011) shares critical mistakes committed by key personnel in Operation Watchtower and led by Taskforce 46’s military leaders such as Admiral Ernest J. King, the United States’ commander in chief of the U.S. Fleet in 1942, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, and Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher. The book has 44 chapters, which elucidate the problems that resulted in the deaths of 1,592 United States’ Marine soldiers, 5000 Americans by the time the operation was ending, and 20,800 Japanese soldiers (Hornfischer, 2011). Additionally, the United States lost 436 aircrafts while Japan experienced a loss of 440 airplanes from Operation Watchtower. Hornfischer highlights the unpreparedness of the U.S. Marine soldiers, an unexpected encounter with hostile Japan’s forces, lack of communication that deterred the operation, mistrust amongst the operation’s leaders, and unfamiliar terrain of the Guadalcanal, which propelled a horrific human massacre that would ordinarily be avoided through teamwork and proper communication protocols from the United States military personnel.
Hornfischer starts Neptune’s Inferno by providing a prologue of the events that occurred at Guadalcanal and statistics of the casualties that the United States and Japan sustained, which makes Operation Watchtower the most criticized and near-failure project that the U.S. military has undertaken to date. Executed in August 1942, the operation lasted for several months, which were termed “bloody”, horrifying”, and “unnecessary human sacrifice” which would be averted ordinarily, except that its leaders practiced enmity within themselves, thwarting it significantly (Hornfischer, 2011). In the prologue, Hornfischer indicates that the Guadalcanal operation was conducted through joint efforts of 82 battleships, sixteen thousand United States Marines, and 40,000 sailors. The Marine had undergone a grueling 100 days’ training to learn critical elements of fighting on the sea, such as identification of shells from the enemy, the criticality of swiftness over strength, and the need to alert everyone after spotting enemy vessels. Even though Hornfischer argues that the Japanese were defeated in mid-November and fled in February, Operation Watchtower was a disaster promoted by selfish Navy commanders and a complacent Marine team encouraged by their leaders.
Delegate your assignment to our experts and they will do the rest.
In Chapter one, Hornfischer introduces Martin Clemens, an intelligence civilian whose primary work at Guadalcanal was to warn the American army of any sightings of enemy troops. Clemens spots a Japanese workforce constructing an airstrip at the Southern Pacific shore and immediately alerts his bosses, which prompts Admiral Ernst J. King to plan an invasion of the Guadalcanal, an area of high interest to the United States for its strategic position. Admiral King requests President Roosevelt for permission to attack the Japanese workers and is granted provided he liaises with Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher and Admiral Chester W. Nimitz. However, the enmity between King and Fletcher is evident through the statement “During the Battle of the Coral Sea in May, he took a dim view of Fletcher’s refusal to release his destroyers to pursue the retreating Japanese carrier force” (Hornfischer, 2011). Of Nimitz, King was said to utter “If only I could keep him tight on what he’s supposed to do. Somebody gets ahold of him and I have to straighten him out.” (Hornfischer, 2011). The misunderstandings that would deter Operation Watchtower significantly are embodied by King, a clear violation of the United States’ military code of conduct. In chapter two, Hornfischer indicates the issues that the U.S. battleships had, which were major players in the near-loss that the Marine almost suffered. For instance, even though the warship Atlanta had sophisticated features, such as acetylene hoses, electric cables, and a “forest of barrels”, Hornfischer writes “…the Atlanta’s SC radar transmitter couldn’t send signals powerful enough to survive transmission through the foremast’s eighty-foot run of coaxial cable, bounce off a target, and return through the receiver and the long cable to the radar room and produce a usable echo”. Chapter 3 then discusses the experiences of the Marine at Guadalcanal on their first day of arrival, which was riddled with more problems. For instance, Admiral Ghormley, selected by King to serve under Nimitz, and solely lead the Marine during Operation Watchtower’s execution is said to have been unfamiliar with Guadalcanal’s terrain because he had never led a team on the Pacific Ocean. Additionally, the Enterprise, a warship, is said to have been late, an error that was supposedly inconsequential but reveals the poor coordination that the Marine commanders had, which jeopardized Operation Watchtower. Hornfischer further details the challenges experienced by the Marine, such as the unexpected training terrain at the Koro Islands where the team had intended to stay while preparing for battle. Hornfischer also writes of a critical impromptu meeting on the Saratoga that Ghormley missed, yet he was the lead admiral of the Guadalcanal attack, an event that also propelled the problems experienced by the Marine during the battle. Hornfischer also writes that during the meeting, navigators found “…charts of the Solomons… the documents had last been updated more than a generation ago, and were …useless in operational planning…” Further, Hornfischer mentions an incidence of hostility between Fletcher and Admiral Kelly Turner, which was a significant contributor to the poor execution of Operation Watchtower.
Further, the Navy fleet that had been dispatched to Guadalcanal also had other challenges, such as a limited fuel capacity, as Hornfischer (2011) writes, “…some of our problems. The big one right now is fuel.” In chapter 4, the author introduces the Japanese military forces and their reasons for attacking the Marine. According to Hornfischer, Japan’s Admiral Yamamoto convinced Emperor Hirohito to approve of an attack on the American Navy, because their seizure of Guadalcanal was a critical indicator that the shoreline was important, and could instead benefit Japan. On August 8th, 1942, Japan’s Admiral Mikawa procured battleships and aircraft and headed for Guadalcanal to counter the U.S. Marine’s invasion of the shoreline, which was an unexpected move that propelled the former’s near-victory (Hornfischer, 2011). Chapters 5 then introduced Major Howard D. Bode, who manned the Chicago , a U.S. Marine battleship that experienced the first attack from the Japanese Navy forces. Hornfischer observes Bode’s lack of preparedness and attentiveness to a possible enemy attack that cost the lives of two crew members of the Chicago in chapter 6, through the statement “the Chicago ranked lowest for engineering performance...” In chapter 7, Hornfischer reports attacks on more Marine battleships, such as Astori a, Vincennes , and Quincy by the Japanese, moves that were unplanned for by the United States Navy. Hornfischer writes, “The air was filled with shrapnel that was clanging against the bulkheads, and the well deck …was strewn with bodies of fallen men.” (Hornfischer, 2011). The Navy’s laxity had propelled the deaths of Australian friendly forces. In chapter 8, the author highlights the sentiments of Admiral Mikawa, who notes that the American Marine were brave fighters even though they were unprepared. Between chapters 9 and 40, the author explains in detail the events of the war, giving descriptions of the loss moments experienced by Japan and the United States’ Marine soldiers. According to Hornfischer, the Guadalcanal battle was a “kill or be killed” fight that culminated into a bloody scenario, with both sides sustaining heavy losses from pride, hostility within Marine members, and the underestimation of the United States’ resilience by Japan.
In chapter 41, Hornfischer starts to conclude the book by providing events of Operation Watchtower’s aftermath and the disbandment of Taskforce 46, which had failed miserably and embarrassed the nation, despite its victory at the end. Hornfischer (2011) notes, “...one would say the victory at Guadalcanal led nowhere”, as if to imply that the battle was unnecessarily long, poorly executed, and only served the selfish interests of the United States’ Admirals who managed it. The author also reports that Atlanta was sunk by Japanese forces, although its commander, Robert Gaff, survived. Further, Hornfischer reports that Gaff underwent severe psychological torture after witnessing his crew members being massacred by the Japanese, and had to be hospitalized until he recovered. Hornfischer indicates that Quincy’s survivors were also not spared of the emotional turmoil after the warship was attacked unexpectedly. According to Leonard A. Joslin, a survivor on the aforementioned battleship, “Years later I’d have nightmares, and dreams at night…” (Hornfischer, 2011 ). The events of Operation Watchtower scarred its survivors, possibly for a lifetime. Hornfischer also highlights the trauma that the deceased soldiers’ family members exhibited, indicating that the Guadalcanal battle hurt even non-participants. For instance, in one of the military ceremonies conducted after the war, the author reports that Dan Callaghan’s widowed wife and orphaned children refused to attend the event because “…They didn’t think they could stand it,” (Hornfischer, 2011). The United States’ citizens also expressed displeasure at how the Guadalcanal battle ended on a wrong footing, with thousands of Marine soldiers dead or wounded, during a forced matching parade that survivors were subjected to. According to Hornfischer, “It was the quietest parade…There were some cheering and applauding, but it didn’t stick. For the most part, the thousands on the streets stared as they would at a sacred procession. Some of the marchers proceeded with canes and crutches, wearing hospital robes.” (Hornfischer, 2011). Operation Watchtower was an epic fail that humiliated the United States in the face of its enemies and hurt the families of Marine soldiers.
Chapter 42 also expounds on the horrors of the Guadalcanal war, with survivors of the Atlanta such as Robert Chute having nothing else but “…usual horror stories and equally scathing remarks…” (Hornfischer, 2011). According to Hornfischer, the Atlanta had remained a sad memory, as evinced in a note written by Betsy Perkins, the wife of a deceased Marine soldier who had fought in the Guadalcanal war. Betsy noted that in the end, battleships are “…just floating offices and as warm as a dead fish…” (Hornfischer, 2011). In chapter 43, Hornfischer notes continues to criticize the Guadalcanal battle, terming it as “academic in nature”, with the involved Admirals blaming each other for the failed outcome of the war. For instance, Admiral Turner laments “Nobody reported an ‘approaching force’ to me. They reported a force which could and did approach, but they reported that another kind of force headed another kind of way. It was a masterful failure of air reconnaissance and my fellow aviators”, yet Bode had warned him when the Chicago was first attacked by the Japanese forces (Hornfischer, 2011). Further, Turner admits, “…we took a beating.... The operation was undoubtedly hastily...planned, and poorly executed, and there was no small amount of stupidity…” Generally, chapter 43 and 44 has a lot of blames, with each party blaming the other for the failed execution of Operation Watchtower.
Hornfischer concludes the book with photographs of Operation Watchtower and primary participants such as Admiral Ernest J. King, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, and Admiral Robert L. Ghormley. Other photographs include those of Admiral Kelly Turner, Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, and the aircraft and battleships that were used by the Navy during the operation, such as an F4F Wildcat, the Astoria , Quincy , Patterson, and SBD Dauntless. Hornfischer skillfully articulates the happenings of the Guadalcanal battle from chapter to chapter in Neptune’s Inferno , evoking sadness, anger, humiliation, and relief when the war ends in a reader. The book has an adequate military vocabulary that distinguishes it from other authors and is captivating, eye-catching, and thrilling. In my opinion, Neptune’s Inferno is one of the best books ever that is unbiased and objective, providing in-depth military operations that allow the outside world privy information on the internal dealings of the United States Navy.
References
Rose, L. A. (2011). Neptune's inferno: The U.S. Navy at Guadalcanal. Global War Studies , 8 (2), 104-106. https://doi.org/10.5893/19498489.08.02.13
