This research process analyzes World War II through the perspective of the operational art and design concepts and terms from chapter IV, JP 5-0, and lessons from the J300 lesson. Throughout history, military leaders developed planned campaigns of operational art to approach war situations with high-efficiency levels. The study focuses on Eisenhower's invasion broad line approach to the Rhineland territory. It addresses the various aspects of operational art applied, including tempo, functional reach, military end state center of gravity (COG), decisive points, and culmination. The research shows challenges and solutions applied in integrating US forces with European allied powers. Finally, the study illustrates how military commanders can be competent in operational design and arrangement.
Introduction
Success for any military endeavor depends on the ability to apply the operation art of war to solve strategic, tactical, and operational problems. Operational art spans from the strategic decision-making process to the tactical application. Commanders must exhibit high levels of professionalism, training, and education to handle complex war operational processes (Vego, 2015, p. 60). More top ranks place more emphasis on the needs of meeting these requirements (Vego, 2015, p. 60). Competence at the operational level often decides the outcome of the war. Winston Churchill referred to the US Army performance in World War II as a prodigy of the organization (Lamb, 2017, p. 120). The US took a different approach from all European nations on its strategy in the war by accomplishing exceptional feats with a depleted army (Lynch, 2014, p. 1). In World War II, campaign planning was integral to aligning the tactical actions of joint and combined forces in Allied forces (Lynch, 2014 , p. 2). The ensuing discussion addresses Eisenhower's influence on the success of the allied power by analyzing the design and application of operational art, addressing challenges and solutions, military end state, operations arrangement, and operations design.
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Design and Application of Operational Art in World War II
Historians studying the art of war indicate the significant disparities that exist between the casualties that Russians suffered and those inflicted on the Germans (Lamb, 2017, p. 122). The United States remained critical to the operational art approach utilized by the Russians in World War II until 1980 when the US Army formally recognized the concept (Lamb, 2017, p. 122). The allied powers, friendly forces, combined to formulate joint operations against the axis powers, including Germany, Italy, and Japan (Lynch, 2014, p. 1). The modern world severely underrated US organizational impact in the joint operations of the allied forces (Vego, 2015, p. 61). Dwight Eisenhower gained prominence for his revolutionary planning during World War II. Eisenhower relied primarily on two concepts: operational design and development of a functional approach (Lynch, 2014, p. 4). According to the Joint Publication 3-0 (2017), the joint operation is the process of iterative understanding and problem-solving that allows commanders to apply operational art.
In May 1944, Eisenhower and his team of planners at the Supreme headquarters created the operational design of their invasion attack "aimed at the heart of Germany" (1) and "destruction of her armed forces" (2) (Lynch, 2014, p. 4). The allied powers understood that achieving both objectives was integral to overpowering the axis powers (Lynch, 2014). The JP 5-0 (2017) defines an operational approach as the ability of a commander to describe the broad actions that joint forces must take to achieve desired outcomes. In May 1944, the SHAEF planners gave Eisenhower three seemingly viable options of attack (Lynch, 2014, p. 6). Eisenhower chose to focus on two objectives that directly inhibited the German military means and dismissed the approach of attack through Berlin (Lynch, 2014, p. 6). He developed an invasion plan illustrated through three lines of operation (LOO) across the western edge of France to the Ruhr Valley (Lynch, 2014, p. 6). It became the area of interest (AOR) through which allied forces would invade Germany by the double envelopment of the Ruhr Valley.
Challenges Faced
The combined chiefs of staff directed Eisenhower to proceed into the continent of Europe and collaborate actively with other Allied nations in suppressing Germany and the axis powers (Lynch, 2014, p. 7). Eisenhower faced the challenge of taking command over the extensive allied forces and preventing German adversary forces from conducting further combat operations and starting another world war. Eisenhower understood that he was facing a fragile coalition unity (Lamb, 2017, p. 123). The British social operations executive (SOE) and the American office of strategic services (OSS) combined their approaches in 1943 after Italy begun falling away from the Axis forces (Lynch, 2014, p. 36). Having diverse multinational policy goals led to concerns of integrating efforts to a similar cause (JP 5-0, 2017, p. 45). The British-American completion manifested during the war, where each power aimed to assert itself as the higher entity. Americans opposed the rule of passing their OSS traffic over the SOE nets using SOE codes (Lynch, 2014, p. 36). Such issues inhibited functionality in the allied powers. The US faced the problem of working under a depleted military force with limited resources.
Solutions
Challenges required leaders with operational prowess and relentless urge to achieve. Eisenhower rose to the challenge by applying concepts of functional art (Lynch, 2014, p. 36). According to the Joint Publication 5-0 (2017), combatant command (CCMD) strategies relay the board statement of a commander's long-term plan. It bridges the national strategic guidance with the joint planning required to achieve national and command objectives (JP 5-0, 2017, p. 50). Eisenhower employed his mastery of operational art to understand and visualize the actions necessary to accomplish the allied military end state (Lynch, 2014, p. 5). He applied knowledge that he gained in his years at the Army War College (AWC) to embrace and solve the organizational challenges of integrating allied arms and branches (Lynch, 2014, p. 8). Eisenhower developed a broad front strategy, which was necessary for the current situation of the Allied forces. Eisenhower organized the front on three core aspects of operational art and design: tempo, risk, and functional reach (JP 3-0, 2017, p. 30). JP 5-0 identifies the operational range as the ability of critical units to deploy military capabilities (JP 5-0, 2017, p. 30). Eisenhower identified a broad line of approach as the best option due to the versatile range of tactical options in the joint allied forces (Lamb, 2017, p. 122). Managing the tempo of the allied forces allowed Eisenhower to fully utilize allied air superiority and strengthen logistical lines of communication between the SOE and OSS.
Termination Criteria/ Military End State
The allied powers completed the first phase of Eisenhower's pots-Normandy plan in March 1945 (Lamb, 2017, p. 122). It involved subduing the German adversary forces by forcing them west of the Rhine. Allied powers captured over 250000 Axis militants and destroyed more than 20 German divisions (Lynch, 2014, p. 40). Eisenhower's operational strategy in the first phase-maintained pressure along the western front by not overextending the line, thereby reducing the probability of a German counterattack (Lamb, 2017, p. 123). The JP 5-0 (2017) defines the military end state as the set of conditions required to determine the achievement of all military objectives (Lamb, 2017, p. 123). As an element of operational design, commanders have to identify targets, effects, COG, and decisive points (Vego, 2015, p. 63). For Eisenhower, the ensuing objective involved pressuring the depleted German forces to the end of operational paralysis (Lynch, 2014, p. 40). The effect was to force the Germans to redirect their efforts in different directions (Lamb, 2017, p. 40). The Rhine acted as the decisive point, from which the joint allied forces gained a marked advantage over the enemy (Lynch, 2014, p. 41). Destruction of Axis forces west of the Rhine led the allied forces towards strategic and military end state.
Operations Arrangement
The Rhineland campaign occurred in three phases (Lynch, 2014, p. 36). The Germans launched the first considerable offense against the allied forces through the Ardennes forest (Lynch, 2014, p. 36). Despite their success, the Germans lacked the necessary resources to advance with Hitler's plan of regaining control of the Western Front (Lynch, 2014, p. 36). Eisenhower applied the aspect of timing in operational art to anticipate the perfect time for an attack (Lamb, 2017, p. 36). Eisenhower designed a three-phase plan beginning with the Montgomery twenty-first army group. Allied powers targeted the Rhine due to its COG significance to the axis powers. Montgomery forces managed to clear out the west bank of the Rhine (Lynch, 2014, p. 37). In the second phase, a joint operation between the US III, V, and VII Corps launched three lines of activity (LOO) beyond the Rhine. JP 5-0 (2017) defines LOO as the exterior and interior alignment of friendly forces to the adversary compared to actions of decisive points. Through a direct and indirect approach to three LOOs, the twelfth Army group captured the bridgehead at the Rhine at Remagen (Lynch, 2014, p. 37). Phase three – based on the aspect of tempo in operational art – diverted operations to supporting attack across the Moselle, keeping German forces confined within the Siegfried lines (Lynch, 2014, p. 38).
Operations Design
Allied force's operational design aimed at defeating both forces and functions of the Axis powers. Eisenhower gained insight from Connor, commander of the 20 th infantry brigade, on the inevitability of another world war (Lynch, 2014, p. 11). Eisenhower analyzed axis powers for an extended period before taking command in the US Army to understand how Germany conducted its tactical actions (Lamb, 2017, p. 122). Germany's better strategies such as the Blitzkrieg, war of extermination, and a martially geared economy considerably strengthened Axis forces (Lynch, 2014, p. 18). Directives from the US government required the elimination of German military combat operations. Ultimately, the goal was to push German troops to a culmination point and prevent the occurrence of another world war (Lynch, 2014, p. 6). Eisenhower achieved these objectives by reducing the region controlled by German forces. The military end state crippled Germany's war-making capability (Lynch, 2014, p. 6). The performance of the Army has depends on the tactical, operational and strategic approaches. Because of World War 2, it appears that the casualties absorbed by the Russians impress historians, and the damage inflicted on the Germans (Lamb, 2017, p. 123). Notably, the United States contributed materials that made a considerable contribution to Russian success (Lamb, 2017, p. 123). Indeed, Eisenhower's operational strategy contributed to the strategic advantages seen in the US army. However, Eisenhower's operational strategy appears as timid, primarily due to the manner it placed continuous pressure on the Western front. Eisenhower is a tactician when it comes to war. His approach in 1944 was timely and significant. He orders the 'fortress Europe' attacks following a break due to stormy weather. Although the Canadians and the British appear lethal in their design, the United States seems deadly.
Conclusion
Since the end of World War II, historians and military researchers have embarked on analyzing Eisenhower's influence on allied powers. Eisenhower achieved unprecedented results through the design and application of operational art, analyzing challenges, developing solutions, executing military end state, operations arrangement, and operations plan. In a high-intensity war such as World War II, success relies on the quality and skills of commanders to design competent operational strategies. Operational thinking is a continuous process of learning, where commanders acquire necessary expertise through exposure to different military contexts. The US joined the war with a depleted army operating under low wages and reduced resources. Despite such limitations, Eisenhower's operational art knowledge in arranging operations delivered desirable military end state for all allied forces.
References
Department of Defense. (2017, June 16). Joint Publication 5-0. Department of Defense. Joint Chiefs of Staff , 1-360. Retrieved from https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp5_0_20171606.pdf
Department of Defense. (2017, January 17). Joint Publication 3-0. Joint Chiefs of Staff , 1-217. Retrieved from https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_0ch1.pdf?ver=2018-11-27-160457-910
Lamb, C. (2017). Leadership and Operational Art in World War II: The Case for General Lesley J. McNair . Joint Force Quarterly 84 , 120-126. Retrieved from https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/1038851/leadership-and-operational-art-in-world-war-ii-the-case-for-general-lesley-j-mc/
Lynch, T. (2014). The Supreme Allied Commander's Operational Approach. School of Advanced Military Studies , 1-58. Retrieved from https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a612011.pdf
Vego, M. (2015). On Operational Leadership. Joint Force Quarterly 77 , 60-69. Retrieved from https://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFQ/Joint-Force-Quarterly-77/Article/581882/on-operational-leadership/
