North Korea’s Nuclear Programs

ISSUE : How to address North Korea’s nuclear program 

BACKGROUND 

Scholars, warfare experts, political, and other responsible stakeholders have and continue to engage in serious and acrimonious debates about what might be the technical capacities, as well as strategic intentions of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), North Korea. Some analysts firmly believe North Korea’s decision to withdraw from the infamous Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) means that the country has since pursued and achieved the much-needed nuclear program and capability. In this sense, they remain convinced that North Korea, under the country’s supreme leader, Kim Jong-Un, possesses one of the world’s sophisticated nuclear arsenal. The claims of these analysts remain supported by the fact that the DRPK is the only country outside the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) (Haymans, 2008). The country continues to violate the already established international norm, which requires countries from across the globe to not conduct nuclear tests: North Korea did not only conduct tests in 2006 and 2009 but also in 2016 and 2017. 

According to North Korea, the sixth nuclear test conducted in September 2017 was made from a thermonuclear device. Briefly speaking, this claim has added to the already existing speculations people hold regarding North Korea‘s nuclear capacity. Referring to a recent report by United Nation (UN) watchdog, The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the country continues to develop nuclear, biological, and associated weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In response, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in collaboration of world powers, including the United States (U.S.) have since passed a broad range of resolutions, which not only condemn North Korea’s nuclear activities but also seek to stop the production of WMD ( Bishop, 2005 ). One of the strategies adopted by the UNSC involves imposing harsh sanctions and associated measures on the country’s economy, as well as military and its operation. 

Apart from sanctions, international efforts tasked with the responsibility of negotiating an end to the DPRK’s nuclear program has since been rekindled in 2018 after it stalled with the failure of the Six-Party Talks in late 2009. In particular, the world witnessed a diplomatic move on the already volatile Korean Peninsula following direct talks between Moon Jae-in and Kim on 27 April 2018 (Choi, 2018). At the same time, the diplomatic thaw further led to the historic summit in Singapore between Kim and President Trump. Before the summit, both leaders held hard stances, with Trump threatening Kim of dire consequences should he conduct another nuclear test. Although the summits have played a central role in reducing tension in the Korean Peninsula in addition to seeing Kim’s commitment to the whole process of denuclearization, there is little tangible progress since a variety of factors remain unaddressed. 

ASSUMPTIONS 

Recent research and intelligence on the North Korean nuclear program remain characterized by a variety of assumptions. In his study to assess both North Korea’s nuclear capacities and intentions, Hymans (2015) argue that a theory-driven approach to analyzing and making conclusions about North Korea is not only incomplete but also misleading in its own right. Referring to the incidences witnessed in Libya and Iraq regarding WMD, the researcher contends with other liberal-minded scholars that there is a need to develop a comprehensive framework when it comes to making conclusions about country’s reasons for investing the production of nuclear weapons. Concisely, the following list comprises some of the widely held assumptions about North Korea’s nuclear program. 

The DPRK leadership’s primary nuclear intentions serve as a measured and calculated response to the already volatile and unpredictable external environment. In essence, North Korea is only building its nuclear arsenal with the sole purpose of protecting herself from potential aggressors; given the unpredictable nature of her neighbors and poor relationship with western powers, such as the U.S. 

Another assumption is that North Korea has since developed the much-needed technical ability, giving her the capacity to not only go nuclear within its borders but also beyond the Korean Peninsula. Recent studies have judged or concluded that Kim Jong-un is unlikely to give up his treasured sword, the hard-won missile, as well as nuclear capabilities. 

Some people have doubted North Korea’s capacity, claiming that a country’s ability to develop sophisticated or high-tech nuclear weapon depends a great deal on its nuclear technologies, as well as levels of industrialization and state organizational acumen, which firmly believe the country lacks. 

On the other hand, most analysts believe that North Korea’s threats directed to the U.S. and its neighbors, including Japan and South Korea is real and a possibility. Given these countries have advocated regime change, Kim Jong-un, who has sworn to ensure the survival of his family dynasty, is ready to do what it takes to acquire and maintain personal and military power. 

Some countries, including the U.S., have claimed as long as China remains supportive to Pyongyang when it comes to the provision of capital and energy, North Korea’s nuclear program will continue to develop. Most importantly, the country has given absolute economic priority to its nuclear power and the military. 

North Korea’s nuclear program serves the purpose of winning economic benefits since, without this nuclear capability, the country lacks an appropriate negotiation tool when confronted with powerful countries. Most scholars contend that North Korea’s military programs play a vital role as bargaining chips tasked with the responsibility of winning far-reaching economic favors, including technology transfer from developed economies, foreign investment, as well as World Bank Assistance. 

Selected North Korean analysts, who have in the recent past held discussions with their Western counterparts have insisted that the country’s military buildup and nuclear arsenal was and remain the much-needed precursor to negotiations. According to these scholars, only when their country was well positioned to give a credible threat to the U.S., would the world take its position seriously. 

Korean analysts have claimed that distrust of China remains part of individual North Koreans and leadership, and the country’s nuclear program is a strategic tool to reconcile with their sister country, South Korea, and the U.S. According to Kim, Philipp, and Chung (2017), recent information leaks have revealed that North Korean officials continue to resent or regret their strategic, as well as economic dependence on China, and the only way to either eliminate or reduce this is reconciliation with America and between the Koreas. 

Kim Jong-un is more likely to face a great deal of opposition from the country’s military and Party officials should he oversee wholesale dismantling, as well as the destruction of the country’s nuclear program. The regime cannot envision any player destroying the program, which traces its roots back to the early 1950s. 

The international community led by the UNSC has increasingly become concerned that Kim Jong-un has developed an illicit nuclear program characterized by highly enriched uranium (HEU). U.S. intelligence has also reported that they discovered elements of HEU technology transfer involving the movement of materials from North Korea to Pakistan, which provides the country with ballistic and associated technologies. 

The nuclear crisis in North Korea continues to escalate because the international community and responsible bodies have failed to reach a unanimous agreement on what actions should best serve the interests of Koreans and the world. Failure to speak with the much-needed one voice results from the fact that every country tends to have particular strategic calculations, perceptions on what constitutes threats from North Korea, and national interests. 

OBJECTIVES 

The general objective of this paper involves identifying the various ways through which responsible stakeholders from across the globe can address North Korea’s nuclear program. In this regard, the paper’s three specific objectives, arranged in priority order, include the following: 

To determine the capacity of diplomacy to ensure North Korea abandons its nuclear activities in the long run. 

To examine whether economic sanctions are an effective option for ensuring the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula 

To investigate whether military action is the best possible alternative when it comes to dealing with North Korea to stop its nuclear program. 

OPTION 1 : Military Action 

Different players in North Korea’s have suggested military action against the country as one of the strategic options, with this alternative receiving opposition from many other stakeholders from across the globe. The primary aspect of this option revolves around the idea of shooting down North Korea’s long-range missile launches. Using precision munitions, which can be launched from aircraft, the U.S., its allies, like-minded individuals have suggested this can destroy the missiles just before launch. At the same time, they can proceed to shoot them down in flight through the use of a missile defense system. Additionally, just as Israel utilized preemptive attacks in 2007 to destroy Syrian nuclear reactors, the U.S. in collaboration with South Korea and Japan could aim at North Korea’s nuclear facilities and associated infrastructure with stealthy attack aircraft (Choi, 2018). Besides destroying the missiles, another means or statecraft instrument involves blockade of the various North Korean ports. 

PROS : Military action, especially shooting down missiles would play a central role in preventing North Korea from perfecting intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) technology and undertaking long-range missile tests. In addition to the destruction of missiles, nuclear reactors under construction can be destroyed without necessarily dispersing the highly radioactive material, such as uranium centrifuge complex (Bishop, 2005). On the same note, a military blockade, which, by standard, is part of the international law, would go a long way ensuring that North Korea does not enjoy material exchange and missile development technology transfer from sympathizing and friendly countries, such as Russia, China, and Pakistan (Choi, 2018). Equally important, the blockade would complement other options, such as economic restrictions by ensuring each of the sanctions are not only implemented but also respected. 

CONS : although military action has since served the purpose of deterring many aristocratic nations from threatening others and destroying innocent civilians, as seen in the case of Syria following the use of chemical weapons, it remains characterized by far-reaching adverse effects on peace and stability. In particular, empirical assessments on the potential impacts of military action against North Korea have revealed that any overly aggressive actions directed to the country by South Korea, Japan, or the U.S. would attract large-scale offensive or retaliation against the South (Bishop, 2005). In this case, the international community would have failed a great deal to meet the objective of ensuring peaceful and long-term denuclearization of the Peninsula. 

In addition to retaliation from North Korea, the previous testing has shown that shooting down its long-range missiles might have approximately 75 or 25 percent success rate. Once the decision to shoot the missiles fails, the North Korean authorities are more likely to accelerate the development of more of its solid-fueled ICBMs. Broadly speaking, a solid-fueled missile is not only difficult to detect but also has stealthy characteristics, meaning the probability of shooting it down in war and peacetime is almost zero. At the same time, a military blockade has been perceived as a major act of war. In this respect, enforcing it remains risk-laden, meaning the forces involved must establish lethal ordinance against each of the North Korean ships, as well as those that refuse inspection. Given the war-like nature of a military blockade, North Korea would shoot at any ships and officers tasked with the responsibility of targeting its vessels. As a result, the enforcers of the blockade are more likely to risk casualties. 

Apart from escalating tension in the region and leading to an outbreak of large-scale war, military action, especially preemptive or preventive strikes lack the much-needed capacity to eliminate the hidden uranium enrichment facilities in the country. According to experts, either the U.S. intelligence or other parties to the issue does not know where second North Korea’s uranium site is located. For this reason, it remains humanely impossible to destroy every country’s operational research reactors, which were established in 1950 (Choi, 2018). Attacking nuclear sites would play a leading role in creating a miniature Fukushima-like incident and outcome by spreading lethal and highly radioactive reactor wastes. Most importantly, such an attack cannot target all of the several warheads owned by North Korea, as the UNSC, U.S., and other players have not located where they are stored. 

OPTION 2 : Diplomacy 

Diplomatic approach revolves around the premise that the world cannot tolerate North Korea’ weapons, and individual bodies and countries tasked with the responsibility of addressing the nuclear crisis should consider resolving the problem by peaceful means. After the Six-Part Talks, which marked the start of significant negotiations between North Korea and key actors, such as Russia, China, and the U.S., the country extended genuine invitations not only to IAEA officials but also embraced suggestions by the participants. In particular, North Korea started walking the talk by shutting down its main nuclear infrastructures and facilities at Yongbyon-kun (Kwom, 2018). The IAEA supervised the sealing of the facility, which presented the parties with the best possible opportunity to adopt another strategy, the Second Action Plan (SAP), which could see North Korea assume a leading role in disabling other nuclear facilities and submitting comprehensive reports and a declaration of the country’s decision to stop nuclear weapons production. 

PROS : Although North Korea’s weapons have since been seen by many as the reason for the strong and widespread U.S. military in the Korean Peninsula and other parts of Asia, diplomacy is less risky. Diplomatic engagements play a pivotal role in reducing miscalculations in addition to preventing and eliminating escalation, which could otherwise make North Korea see war with the South and the U.S. as the best possible alternative and a rational act. 

CONS : The major disadvantage of diplomacy involves its previous failures due to mistrust. For instance, the U.S. once resolved to never participate in any bilateral talk since North Korea has often violated the already established agreements. In 2002, for example, North Korea breached the Agreed Framework by communicating its plans to develop and test highly enriched uranium missiles. 

OPTION 3 : Economic Sanctions 

The rationale for economic sanctions as one of the strategic options when it comes to dealing with North Korea’s nuclear activities is that it would seek to ensure that the regime sustains a great deal of pressure in addition to becoming unstable. For instance, the UNSC Resolution 1718 identified and imposed harsh sanctions on the country, which compelled North Korean leadership to seek an audience with key players, including the U.S., Russia, China, Japan, and South Korea (Kwom, 2018). The Six-Party Talks saw significant progress as far as negotiations are concerned. With the life-threatening and crippling sanctions, North Korea appeared to give in to the demands by the six parties, including the abandonment of existing nuclear programs and return to the IAEA, as well as NPT. Given the economic pressure, the U.S., China, and other players in the talks started supporting North Korea through the provision of incentives, such as energy. Applying the same procedure, but with effective implementation mechanisms, the international community should resolve that North Korea’s nuclear program is unsustainable and unacceptable (Choi, 2018; Haymans, 2008). With this resolution, the UNSC can improve its policy to include cutting off the various dual-use chains connecting the country to other friendly countries. 

PROS : The progress witnessed in North Korea’s WMD is not only newsworthy but also remain a disturbing development, which should attract more attention from countries worldwide. In this respect, any peace-loving nation should heed continuous calls to isolate the country with the sole purpose of bringing sense to its leadership that their activities disturb world peace. International cooperation through sanctions would go a long way in freezing and rolling back the country’s nuclear programs since the regime would lack the much-needed support to remain productive (Whang, Lammbrau, & Joo, 2017; Whitty, Kim, & Crick, 2006). Moreover, sanctions and strategic isolation would play a fundamental role in preventing the development of any loopholes for the proliferation or spread of biological, nuclear, as well as chemical weapons and technology. 

CONS : As stated in the introductory section, it is evident that economic sanctions are set to fail from their inception since key players in issue at hand tend to hold and perpetuate conflicting views. For instance, China, Russia, and other like-minded countries do not support the option of making North Korea unsustainable through sanctions. In their views, they strongly believe that such economic measures would not hurt the leadership, but rather innocent civilians, who would face starvation and hunger (Choi, 2018). On the same note, piling pressure on North Korea would make Kim Jong-un more skeptical of its neighbors and world powers, meaning he would not abandon the country’s hard-won missile, as well as nuclear capabilities no matter the prevailing economic conditions (Whitty, Kim, & Crick, 2006). Most importantly, the international community’s failure to speak with one voice weakens economic sanctions on North Korea from the word go since each country tend to seek to accomplish its self-interests and holds different views on what constitutes nuclear weapons. 

DISCUSSION 

The adoption of the military as an option in addressing North Korea’s nuclear weapons and associated programs remains a bad alternative; given it would only offer short term solution to the crisis. In particular, shooting down North Korean ICBMs and blockading its ports both pose the risk of escalation and eruption of war in the Peninsula, which, in turn, would have an adverse effect on peaceful neighbors and the world as a whole. For example, North Korea would be expected to attack South Korea, which would result in casualties and a massive inflow of refugees into China. Concerning economic sanctions, the UNSC in collaboration with other key players, such as the U.S. has failed in the past and is more likely to experience the same failure if it imposes more sanctions on North Korea. First, countries that would have ensured the implementation of these sanctions, such as China and Russia have shown no commitment, as they seek to pursue their national interests in North Korea. Second, Kim Jong-un can never destroy the country’s nuclear facilities have channeled a lot of resources to ensure their success. Third, sanctions would only harm innocent North Koreans since the country’s leadership have enough resources for support during isolation and possible starvation. 

Apart from stringent sanctions and military action, diplomacy would allow responsible parties to the North Korean nuclear crisis to engage in direct talks and find amicable solutions to their differences. As a result, the problem would be addressed peacefully. Any diplomatic engagements with North Korea seem to create a win-win situation characterized by rationality and a great deal of benefit for each party. Therefore, diplomacy serves as the best possible option when addressing North Korea’s nuclear program: its advantages overrides the various short term benefits associated with military intervention and sanctions. Ultimately, diplomacy allows for reconciliation and continued cooperation, as it removes mistrusts and skepticism. 

References 

Bishop, C. (2005). Dismantling North Korea’s nuclear weapons program . Retrieved Mar. 14, 2018 from https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/PUB599.pdf 

Choi, J. (2018). How to stop North Korea’s nuclear ambition: Failed diplomacy and future options. Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies, 7 (1), 1-15. 

Hymans, J. (2008). Assessing North Korean nuclear intentions and capacities: A new approach. Journal of East Asian Studies, 8 (2), 259-292. 

Kim, H., Philipp, E., & Chung, H. (2017). North Korea’s biological weapons program: The known and unknown . Retrieved Mar. 14, 2018 from https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/2017-10/North%20Korea%20Biological%20Weapons%20Program.pdf 

Kwom, E. (2018). Policies of last resort for dealing with North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. Asian Affairs, 48 (3), 402-432. 

Whang, T., Lammbrau, M., & Joo, H. (2017). Talking to whom? Changing audiences of North Korean nuclear tests . Retrieved Mar. 14, 2018 from http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/HKU2017-s/Archive/798bb761-a878-490b-91c3-59597aa8db65.pdf 

Whitty, M., Kim, S., & Crick, T. (2006). The effectiveness of economic sanctions: The case of North Korea. North Korean Review, 2 (1), 50-65.