On the Oakland fire report, some fire codes never received an inspection. Firstly, there were fire hazards in the Warehouse that did help in the spread of the fire. One of the fire hazards was the statue that occupied a large area; it acted as an impediment to movement. Also, the wooden staircase availability that led to the east and north walls acted as a catalyst for the spread of fire. Furthermore, electrical cables hung low in the building despite them containing electric current; they probably helped the roof in tapping the fire that was burning the items on the ground floor. Secondly, matters affiliated with how the building was constructed and the lack of alarm systems were the fire's causative agents in the Warehouse. The availability of the alarm systems in the building was never checked. The lack of alarm systems in the building did help in the spread of the fire. Suppose there were automatic fire alarm systems, the firefighters would have been notified early in advance, and minimal destruction could have been done by the fire ( Mahmoud & Chulahwat, 2020) . The way the Warehouse was constructed is quite pathetic. The Warehouse had no subdivision whereby the goods could be stored based on their flammability. Everything was arranged in a large with a deficit of such a format. The subdivisions would probably be insulated with fire-resistant materials. Thirdly, the Warehouse was not proactive in the mechanisms of dealing with fire outbreaks. The report did not unveil how the Warehouse was prepared to deal with any fire outbreak. Lack of preparation is what led to the massive destruction of the Warehouse. The Warehouse had no fire extinguishers, and it didn't train its employees on how to deal with the fire. Fourthly, the fire investigators did not observe the onsite fire protection. The Warehouse did not observe the onsite fire protection ( Gonzalez et al., 2019) . For large assemblies, it is a requirement to protect the Warehouse in case of a fire break up. The Warehouse failed to have an installation of an automatic sprinkler system; the equipment would have extinguished the fire before everything turned worse. Also, the Warehouse did not have fire extinguishers that could easily be carried by the occupants. Due to this deficiency, the Warehouse occupants could not be able to put the fire off. The building was rightly used for its objectives because it was used to store the goods, though it had a considerable number of tenants than what could have been recommended ( Vangelova, 2017) . The death of the 36 occupants was because the occupants had not enough knowledge on how to protect themselves. It is required for large buildings to observe rules regarding the exit. The Warehouse had limited ways of exit. It is possible that if the ground floor had a reasonable number of exits, the death toll would have been very minimal. The thirty-six cases of death probably lacked the avenues for them to escape. The exits that were available in the Warehouse lacked words such as "Ext Here" such indications would have helped the occupants to escape. For a large building like this Warehouse, it was supposed to have designed emergency exits that the occupants could have capitalized on to escape. It is unexpected to discover that the Warehouse was fully loaded with goods; this close arrangement of the goods helped in the quick spread of the fire. Also, the Warehouse, due to its vast size failed to have emergency lighting. Emergency lighting helps to indicate to the occupants that there is an outbreak of fire. The occupants of the Warehouse discovered the outbreak of the fire when it was too late.
References
Gonzalez, N., Lacoe, J., Yanez, A., Demers, A., Crissey, S., & Larkin, N. (2019). Oakland Unite 2017–2018 Strategy Evaluation.
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Mahmoud, H., & Chulahwat, A. (2020). Assessing wildland-urban interface fire risk. Royal Society Open Science , 7 (8), 201183.
Vangelova, L. (2017). Fire Protection Engineer. The Science Teacher , 84 (3), 76.
