This essay analyzes Kugler's case study titled "Operation Anaconda," which was the most significant reposted ground action in the Afghan battle. This paper presents an in-depth analysis of how mission command recovered from a failed mission plan to success in Shahikot Valley. The paper presents the background of the operation and follows with the success factors and a conclusion
Background information
The operation took place between March 2 and March 18, 2002, after the US Army decided to attack the valley after intelligence reports showed that enemy forces had gathered there. Shahikot valley is located in Paktia province on the Pakistan border. The American special forces foresaw the operation as a joint effort with the Afghan friendly forces to control the valley. The AFO (Advanced Force Operations), basically constituted the USG advisors and the US Army special operation forces, and Lieutenant Colonel Pete Blaber commanded the AFO in January 2002. The Army's original plan fell through on the first day of action after the Afghan friendlies abandoned the US army. Reliance on inaccurate intelligence during the planning stage contributed significantly to the mission's failure right from the onset. The intelligence was wrong on the number of Al Qaeda numbers, their equipment, and defense positions in the valley. However, the flexibility of the US Army ensured success in the end.
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Mission Command
Detailed command and mission command are the two primary ideas of command that were applied in operation. It is notable that the mission command is preferable and has been used for decades, beginning in the 1980s. Mission command refers to the military commander's exercise of direction and authority via mission orders that emphasize the disciplined initiative ( Kugler Baranick, & Binnendijk, 2009 ). For a mission to be successful, the Army's mission command approach constitutes uniting command and the war-fighting function to be successful and effective in the specific operation. In the initial stages of the operation, there was no joint commander in Afghanistan, and all operations were overseen by Central Command, which greatly affected operations on the ground due to the lack of a cohesive singular center of authority and command.
As a critical part of the military operation, mission command comprises six principles that guide decision-making and orders from the military commander. The mission command six principles include building a cohesive team via mutual trust, giving a concise commander's intentions, developing a shared understanding, adopting mission orders, practicing disciplined initiative, and accepting prudent risk. The mission command depends on the decentralization of decision-making powers while at the same time empowering the troop and its supporting commander the freedom to take action. The Central Command gave General Hagenbeck authority over the mission, and his office was called Coalition and Joint Task Force. He provided a central command for all the ground units and coordinated support from the air force. Failure to bring the Afghan friendly forces bunder his command presented a critical weakness in the operation.
Developing a cohesive team via mutual trust is perceived as critical in mission command because the military commanders build their teams through leadership when performing unified operations. The teams worked as one unit and built their cohesiveness and togetherness ( Kugler, 2007 ). Operation Anaconda is seen as successful since the enemy's resistance was crushed, and the Shahikot valley's control was in the US army.
Having a shared understanding amongst the members is also very important for team building. A proper understanding of the mission goals and objectives gives the team a reason to and a purpose that promotes the unit's effort. The mission underwent a series of problems because of a lack of a shared understanding amongst the team leaders. However, the Taskforce Mountain's commitment to the mission goals who refused to abandon the mission provided a turning point in the operation ( Kugler Baranick, & Binnendijk, 2009 ). The taskforce adjusted the original battle plan to focus on additional and concentrated air support to dislodge enemy combatants from their positions and proved to the critical decision that changed the battle's tide.
Operation Commander adhered to the commander principles by giving a clear intent, and this was a significant contributing factor to its success. The plan needs to provide the operation's primary focus to the troops on the field and help the commanders accomplish the mission. The orders were given to the AFO team, and a clear command was also communicated to the group ( Vego, 2015 ). Their main job was to deny or confirm whether the enemy was present, ensuring that the helicopter landing zones were safe and destroyed enemy positions.
The Juliet team was to take on the high regions in the East to the North of the valley. The Indian team, on the other hand, was instructed to move to the southern side of the ridge. Within a couple of hours, the two groups had occupied the commanded regions, indicating a successful implementation of the mission command's principles. The speed and swiftness with which the two teams executed these commands demonstrated the high levels of skills, experience, coordination, and scheming. The team leaders on the ground were able to properly coordinate with the soldiers to execute the commands as instructed by the superiors and decision-makers.
Exercising a disciplined initiative within the commander's intention in the absence of orders is very useful in avoiding the mission's failure. The supporting commander must assess the situation to make a quick decision and take the appropriate actions regarding the commander's intent statement's expected results. There were reported issues of lost contacts and breakdowns in communication. However, the exhibited leadership and the numerous supporting aircraft are adequately documented. The communication between the Blaber, AFO, and the different Tactical Operations Centers still allowed the primary direction to keep some awareness of the situation. Several intelligence and reporting techniques shaped the actions that were taken by the friendly forces during the war. However, the leaders enjoyed the battleground's flexibility to make a quick decision and practice disciplined initiative where there were no vital orders in avoiding the mission's failure.
The commanders focused more on developing new opportunities instead of preventing defeat to accept the prudent risk. The process of obtaining a prudent risk in Operation Anaconda began with gathering intelligence from the enemy. However, the team commanders experienced significant challenges in gathering the required intelligence because they did not conform to the information-age wars ( Vego, 2015 ). There is no certainty whether the commanders used risk management or risk assessment methods to determine whether the potential risks to be used in operation and how to control them.
Operation Anaconda remains one of the most significant operations in Operating Enduring Freedom. Operation Anaconda has given a substantial vision for the military commanders and the team members. The entire process has taught the involved parties on how to conduct a joint operation effectively. The procedure was founded on performing a joint military operation against the enemies. The mission command, as discussed, was based on six principles, which have been very important in the success of Operation Anaconda. The success of Operation Anaconda was attributed to the flexibility of the US army. The redrafted battle plans were executed to perfection. The mission success could also be attributed to the commanders' freedom to make quick decisions at the height of battle confusion. Teamwork was critical to the mission's success, the ability to coordinate effectively, work as a unit, communicate effectiveness, and cohesively. The lessons learned by the US army from the operation have been employed in other battle plans and also presented an opportunity for changes in the command structure.
References
Kugler, R. L. (2007). Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan: A case study of adaptation in battle . National defense univ Washington dc center for technology and national security policy.
Kugler, R. L., Baranick, M., & Binnendijk, H. (2009). Operation Anaconda. Lessons for Joint Operations . National defense univ Washington dc center for technology and national security policy.
Vego, M. (2015). Operational Leadership. Joint Forces Quarterly , 77 (2).
