Operation Anaconda is one of the first assaults by the United States, which took place in Afghanistan between March 2, 2002, and March 16, 2002, lasting for 15 days (Hastert, 2005). In overall, the operation was viewed as an absolute and unqualified success in achieving its mission objectives. However, it is essential to take note of the fact that operation exposed a significant flaw in the original battle plan set by the United States military, which did not survive the initial contact during the battle. To help in examining Operation Anaconda further, this report seeks to utilize the Six Principles of Mission Command to explore the specific aspects associated with the operation.
Build Cohesive Teams Through Mutual Trust
Building mutual trust is seen as one of the critical steps to ensuring that team members can work together as a way of building cohesion within the teams. The cohesiveness of the groups involved in Operation Anaconda can be seen from the unity of command during the operation. According to Kugler (2007), all activities undertaken during the process were directed by the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), which helped in guiding a cohesive plan for the different teams involved in the assault. It is from this point of view that Operation Anaconda can be considered as having played a critical role in building cohesive teams that we're well-positioned to deliver on their set objectives.
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Create Shared Understanding
An analysis of the case study shows that Operation Anaconda created a shared understanding between the individual teams, which may have pushed for its long-term success. It is essential to take note of the fact that the U.S. military was working with pro-government Afghan militia in battling against al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters (Grau & Billingsley 2011). That highlighted the need for having to align the efforts by both the military and the militia as a way of ensuring that they all worked towards a common goal. That is considered as one of the critical factors that support the position that indeed, Operation Anaconda may have created a shared understanding for the teams involved.
Provide Clear Commander’s Intent
From the onset, it was clear that both the military and the militia had a clear understanding of the command’s intents and objectives as they relate to the achievement of success in Operation Anaconda. Kugler (2007) indicates that one of the key strategies used in highlighting the purposes of the operation was constant communications among widely dispersed units. The outcome is that the groups were able to focus their efforts based on the goals that have been laid out. Ultimately, this created a situation where the mission was viewed as a definite success in meeting the intents noted.
Exercise Disciplined Initiative
Operation Anaconda involved a wide array of assault activities, which include bombings and use of artilleries as part of ensuring that the operation would achieve its general objectives. The exercise of disciplined initiative, as it relates to the operation, can be seen from the fact that forced involved in the assault were able to make decisions based on the opportunities and threats that they were facing. Each of the units had a command that was involved in making decisions on some of the critical actions that the officers were expected to take as part of the operation. The decisions by the unit commands were viewed as being useful in ensuring that the operation would achieve its intended goals and objectives.
Use Mission Orders
The U.S. military developed a comprehensive battle plan that was specifically focused on the mission orders that the officers were expected to follow during the operation. The battle plan outlined some of the key strategies that the officers were expected to take up as part of engagement in Operation Anaconda (Hastert, 2005). Additionally, the battle plan also outlined key directives for operation command, which had been developed with the strategic goal of having to expand the achievements of Operation Anaconda. The battle plan was critical towards providing mission orders that the military and the pro-government militia were expected to use during their engagement in operation.
Accept Prudent Risk
Kugler (2007) indicates that the U.S. military had made an assessment of the fact that the engagement in the assault of the valley would portend several key risks but weighed the benefits of the assault, which would overshadow the risks. The decision to engage in operation is viewed as being driven by the expected benefits of the assault, which would help in dealing with some of the terrorist organizations in the valley. From this perspective, it is clear that the leadership within the U.S. military judged and accepted the prudent risk with the view being that this would have far-reaching benefits for both the United States and Afghanistan.
Conclusion
Operation Anaconda took place in Afghanistan between March 2, 2002, and March 16, 2002, lasting for 15 days. An analysis of the operation utilizing the Six Principles of Mission Command shows that the operation may have achieved its success based on the ability for the leadership to make use of the principles. The report suggests that the U.S. military, in collaboration with the pro-government militia, was able to capitalize on each of the six principles towards pushing for a much more effective framework for the achievement of set objectives. Ultimately, this meant that the military was well-positioned towards improving on its ability to deliver on its set goals and objectives as they relate to Operation Anaconda.
References
Grau, L. W., & Billingsley, D. (2011). Operation Anaconda: America's First Major Battle in Afghanistan . University Press of Kansas.
Hastert, P. L. (2005). Operation Anaconda: Perception meets reality in the hills of Afghanistan. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism , 28 (1), 11-20.
Kugler, R. L. (2007). Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan: A case study of adaptation in battle . Retrieved from https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a463075.pdf
