The objective of the Anaconda mission was to kill or capture the al Qaeda and Taliban forces that plied in the Shahi-Kot valley. Most importantly to note, the mission succeeded in this particular goal as the joint coalition decimated up to 800 al Qaeda. However, in the process, 8 American lives were lost (Kugler, Baranick, & Binnendijk, 2009). All the success experienced during the operation came after a series of initial mistakes that marred the joint functions. The difficult stages experienced at the onset of the war provided the United States with insights regarding the best way to train, organize, and equip forces in a mission that requires joint expeditionary operations. The joint functions refer to all the related activities and capabilities put together to assist the joint force commanders in the synchronization, integration, and direction of the joint operations. The joint functions existed in six different groups including intelligence, C2, movement and maneuver, fires, protection, and lastly, sustainment. A significant reason why the operations failed at the initial stages was due to flawed planning and inefficiencies that rocked various components of the joint functions.
Poor Intelligence
One of the most significant implications leveled against the joint functions was their inability to leverage the air and space intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) tools. At the time that the battle began in 2002, it was apparent that the air and spaceborne sensors had immense characteristics such as the penetration of darkness, working in adverse weather, determination of the location of an object within feet. It, therefore, remains critical to note that the use of air and spaceborne sensors at the initial level could have provided a better way to assess the enemy without their knowledge (Joint Operations, Joint Publications 3-0 ). Furthermore, it could have enabled the joint functions to evaluate the strengths held by their enemies in their base at Shahi-Kot and also located any other important factors such as the availability of caves and any concealed weapons. The sensors, coupled with cyber and human intelligence could have provided the joint functions with an opportunity to determine the adversary’s course of action in the event they are attacked.
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Therefore, since the joint functions lacked the much-needed sensors, their intelligence primarily relied on human knowledge mostly provided by the locals in Afghanistan. Before the battle began, the intelligence made estimates that the number of Taliban and al Qaeda forces present in the Shahi-Kot region amounted to 1000 (Joint Operations, Joint Publications 3-0 ). The number was subsequently lowered up to around 200 and 300 individuals. It is critically important to note that wrong estimations by the joint force intelligence almost cost them the war. Earlier reports underestimated the enemies in terms of their numerical strength and ability. It, therefore, meant that the forces entered the war with a massive lack of preparation hence getting caught off guard. It was only until the forces understood their enemy well that the war started moving towards the path of success. It also showed the importance of having a fully functional intelligence system to portray the enemies and their tactics properly.
Problems with the C2
One of the most discussed mistakes performed in the initial stages of the war involved the command and control structure (C2). The design of C2 in any operation because “it is the principal means by which a theater commander sequences and synchronizes joint force activities” (Fleri, Howard, Hukill, & Searle, 2003). Some of the basic characteristics of the C2 included unity of command, the unity of effort, interoperability, and simplicity among others. However, during the Anaconda operations, it became apparently clear that some of these goals were not achieved. With the incorporation of the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), 25 different units reported to the C2 commander known as General Mikolashek. It, therefore, meant that the general did not have clear visibility to oversee his commands. It, thus, caused staff members to occasionally issue orders and make critical decisions primarily reserved for the component commander. Another significant problem came when General Hagenbeck assumed the position of the Joint Force Commander without any legitimate authorization. The lack of command authority or the unity of command meant that General Hagenbeck experienced immense difficulties in providing operational control because he had to seek permission from Admiral Calland (Kugler, Baranick, & Binnendijk, 2009). The C2 structure, therefore, failed to inspire simplicity and the officers working in the joint functions felt increasingly uneasy.
The Call for Additional Support
The call for additional support became increasingly necessary for various reasons. First, the poor intelligence exhibited by the joint function meant that the forces had underestimated the number and strength of the enemies. As a result, the US forces joint the war with a sense of overconfidence. Other than this, more errors continued to happen thereby exposing the weaknesses expected in any joint operation. For instance, a considerable number of allied ground force stepped aside on the first day of the conflict hence exposing the US-based ground forces to attack. Another primary error revolved around the fact that Anaconda was first conceived as a ground operation which prompted the air forces to provide limited strikes against the adversaries. It is also critical to understand that out of the 400 American Army soldiers scheduled to operate on the first day; only a paltry 200 were deployed (Kugler, Baranick, & Binnendijk, 2009). It was, therefore, noted that support was necessary for the joint function to mount a serious war against their enemies. In this regard, the supply of air and ground forces increased including the friendly Afghan forces.
Negligence of Airpower
Out of the elements that created the joint function, airpower was given little consideration. Researchers in military science have opined that the inclusion of the air planners and leaders from the state would have given the war a different trajectory. The airpower, which was utilized much later, provided the joint forces with an impetus to fight in the war. Some of the advantages that came with the use of aircraft included the mapping of the enemy territory and the discovery of potential targets. Most fundamentally, Geibel (2002) asserted that airpower could have provided the operation with the ability to conduct intelligence properly. Therefore, failure to incorporate airpower form the start was one of the reasons that the forces experienced a spirited fight from their enemies. Lastly, the inclusion of the airpower in the plan was an opportunity by the troops to improve the air-ground coordination that would later prove essential in capturing and killing the enemies without necessarily suffering casualties as witnessed in the aftermath of the war.
In conclusion, Anaconda was able to attain its primary goal of clearing out the al-Qaeda and Taliban forces based on Shahi-Kot valley. However, the process of planning and execution was marred with many errors valuable for as a lesson for future endeavors. The joint function was an essential entity in intelligence and ensuring coordination and movement during the war. However, the lack of efficiency in the intelligence process meant that poor preparation primarily due to the underestimation of the enemy. The structure of the C2 became ineffective due to the extensive bureaucratization which made the flow of command within the joint functions a difficult thing to achieve. Failure to incorporate the airpower as part of the joint function priorities was also detrimental at the beginning of the battle. Lastly, the forces learned the importance of adequate deployment of soldiers especially in this type of war that was fought in a difficult environment.
References
Fleri, E., Howard, E., Hukill, J., & Searle, T. R. (2003). Operation Anaconda case study . College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education.
Geibel, A. (2002). Operation Anaconda, Shahi-Khot Valley, Afghanistan, 2-10 March 2002. Military Review, 82(3), 72.
Joint Operations, Joint Publications 3-0. From: www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_0_20170117.pdf
Kugler, R. L., Baranick, M., & Binnendijk, H. (2009). Operation Anaconda: Lessons for Joint Operations. National Defense Univ Washington Dc Center for Technology and National Security Policy.
