The occurrence of unprecedented events in military combat is one of the greatest fears of soldiers. Even with the best artillery and tactical advantage, what may unravel in the battlefield remains a nightmare for most soldiers. Due to this unpredictability of combat, it is crucial for soldiers to have a great sense of adaptability. For minimum casualties and eventual success, soldiers have to conform quickly to tactical changes and battlefield plans. Despite the intricacies of combat dynamics, the mission is one of the aspects that remain constant on most occasions. The US military has been combating insurgents in the Middle East for ages. In early March 2002, the US military went to war with the Taliban and Al Qaeda forces at the valley of Shahikot on Operation Anaconda , which is an ideal case study of how mission command principles and spontaneous adaptability are crucial in the battlefield.
The first principle of mission command is to build cohesive teams through mutual trust. To achieve this objective, a commander needs to have intelligence on the estimated number of enemies anticipated (Brooks et al., 2018). During Operation Anaconda , intelligence was gathered as early as late January 2002. Additionally, two main teams were formed during the operation; the US military and the Afghan troops that were friendly to the cause. Under the leadership of General Franks, the US military operations in Afghanistan were directed by Central Command (CENTCOM). The US military worked under two main teams, Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC) and Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC). Working with the friendlies was the Task Force Dagger of the Fifth Special Operations Group led by Colonel John Mulholland. Their primary objective was to work with the friendlies for both intelligence and strategy.
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Creating a shared understanding between the various teams was crucial during Operation Anaconda . This second mission command involved developing a consensus through the statement of the mission. Elementarily, the mission was to root out all the Taliban and Al Qaeda militants who had gathered at the Shahikot Valley. Under the authority of the various commanders, the CFACC team, the CFLCC team, and the Afghan friendly troops were briefed and made aware of the task ahead. Notably, other troops were involved in making the whole exercise fruitful. For instance, the operations of gathering intelligence were conducted by Special Operation Forces (SOF) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Through the collaborative efforts of all these agencies and teams, a central point of convergence was created. Consequently, the teams were able to have an understanding of the operation including all the pertinent information and details about the mission.
After finding common ground, clear intents of the commanders, which is the third mission, should be provided. Three principal commanders were involved in Operation Anaconda. CFLCC was under the command of LTG Paul Mikolashek of the Army while CFACC was led by Lieutenant General Michael Moseley of the Air Force. Colonel John Mulholland of the Army coordinated the friendlies. Each of the commanders had their intent, which was primarily defined by their role in the operation. Leading the ground team, LTG Paul Mikolashek intent was to orchestrate a land-based attack on the militants. They worked together with Colonel John Mulholland to coordinate the US Army team and the troop of friendlies. Based on the initial plan and strategy of the operation, the ground teams had the greatest responsibility (Wright, 2013). Particularly, Lieutenant General Michael Moseley was in charge of coordinating strategic airstrikes to give the ground teams’ tactical advantage.
Discipline is one of the most fundamental virtues that every military officer has to adopt since it is highly credited to the success of most missions. Exercising a disciplined initiative was the fourth mission command. In this regard, the first aspect of a disciplined initiative was sticking to the plan under the leadership of commanders. As such, the ground teams were to attack the Shahikot Valley from different directions; something they accomplished. Interestingly, some friendlies did not turn up during the day of the combat. Even though this despises the constructs of military discipline, it can be argued that it was more of a ‘voluntary’ exercise for them (Skaggs, 2016). The Air Force also displayed discipline by liaising with the ground teams in the execution of their orders. The most outstanding act of exercising a disciplined initiative was when the strategy changed, and all the soldiers readjusted accordingly to conform to the new commands.
The process of gathering intelligence, strategizing, and building team blocks are founded on the need to have a successful operation. Indeed, every operation has its mission, each defined by its orders (Shamir, 2011). General Franks oversaw operation Anaconda, as he was in charge of giving mission commands to the various team commanders. The initial mission commands were that the ground teams would attack the militants and undertake their tasks according to the agreed plan. Additionally, the air team was to stay at the peripheral as the ground teams orchestrated the attacks. However, the mission orders changed after the intelligence on the number of militants in the Shahikot Valley turned out to be an underestimate. Thus, the new mission orders restructured the entire strategy and operation. As such, the CFACC team had to undertake the greatest task of the mission meaning that the ground teams had to lay back as the air teams conducted a series of strikes.
Every military personnel understands the risks that come with serving their country. Being a soldier implies an individual has to put his or her life on the line of duty for the sake of the nation. Indeed, in most jurisdictions, military service is considered as the epitome of patriotism. To this end, the sixth mission command is accepting the prudent risk that one’s life can be lost while in service. Also, this risk is intertwined with the desertion offense. During Operation Anaconda , every military officer and soldier understood the prudent risk. While going to attack some of the most dangerous terrorist bases in the world, every soldier has to acknowledge that the predicament of injury or even death is not far off. It is due to the recognition of this risk that the ground troops did not retreat once the militants portrayed signs of overpowering them. There were more than fifty-eight (eight killed and more than fifty injured) casualties during Operation Anaconda, a constant reminder that the troops knew and accepted the prudent risk.
According to Commander General Tommy Franks, Operation Anaconda will go down in history as one of the most ‘absolute and unqualified’ successful operations (Kugler, 2007). The dynamicity of events on the battlefield was astounding. Despite the faulty intelligence, the mission was tightly planned and executed. However, the troops’ diligence and skills were tested when mission commands changed suddenly, and every soldier had to adapt. Despite the individual and group prowess displayed during the operation, it is important to state that the successful implementation of the six principles (mission commands) played an important role in the overall success. If the principles were not applied and executed successfully, then Operation Anaconda might have turned out disastrously.
References
Brooks, M., Amble, J., Cavanaugh, M. L. & Gates, J. (2018). Strategy Strikes Back : How Star Wars Explains Modern Military Conflict. University of Nebraska Press.
Kugler, R. (2007). Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan : A Case Study of Adaptation in Battle. Center for Technology and National Security Policy.
Shamir, E. (2011). Transforming Command : The Pursuit of Mission Command in the U.S., British, and Israeli Armies. Stanford University Press.
Skaggs, R. D. (2016). Increasing Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Operational Agility Through Mission Command . US Army Command and General Staff College.
Wright, D. P. (2013). 16 Cases of Mission Command . Combat Studies Institute Press, US Army Combined Arms Center.
