Democracy remains a work in progress as evidenced by the arguments among constitutional and political scholars on the appropriate democratization approach for Africa. Both Andrew Reynolds and Joel Barkan present compelling arguments in their articles, The Case for Proportionality and Elections in Agrarian Societies respectively around majoritarian (SMD) and proportionality-based (PR) systems and their overall effects. However, Reynolds is more compelling due his articulation of the longer-term benefits of a proportionality-based system, which include improved representation of minorities, better quality of representation for the voter and increases the likelihood of opposition parties validly deposing incumbents from government.
Summary of “Elections in Agrarian Societies”
Barkans (1995) arguments highlight weaknesses associated with the proportionality-based systems, stating that for example “...individual MPs do not identify with, nor can they be held accountable to, the residents of a specific geographic constituency” (p.1.). He argues that pure PR systems allow for the allocation of legislative seats exclusively based on party proportion of national vote which hinders the geographic specific representation needed among agrarian communities. Specifically, he cites the importance of this type of representation among rural agrarian societies stating that, “they focus on the basic needs of their local community and surrounding region,” through addressing matters such as, “whether they have adequate water, schools, and healthcare facilities, whether there is a farm-to-market road, whether the producer price for the agricultural grown in the area yields a fair return to local farmers, and so on,” (Barkan 1995, p.1-2.) Therefore, both parties and candidates are evaluated solely on their ability to serve, proven or otherwise. Critically, Barkan (1995) observes that the PR system doubly disadvantages mentioned societies. First, such societies are arbitrary receivers of an MP who is neither accountable to nor readily identifies with their needs as a constituency. Secondly, such MPs remain beholden to their party leadership for the political survival, a situation which further limits effective representation. Here, he infers from the theoretical working model of a pure PR system and findings of interviews he conducted (Barkan, 1995).
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Similarly, Barkan (1995) notes that PR limits democratic consolidation in agrarian societies. This outcome is associated with the PR system’s failure to meet conditions mandatory for democratic consolidation. For example, the kind of dialogue and accountability occasioned when citizens chose their leaders. Moreover, democratization depends on the ability of rival political elites to practice tolerance, compromise and bargaining in their dealings with one another. Barkan notes that summarizes his arguments as such, “It is clear, then, that PR has both advantages and disadvantages. While it can facilitate transitions to democracies in plural societies, when these societies are also agrarian it impedes consolidation by failing to sustain democracy’s vertical component” (p.2.). Indeed, he uses both the PR system in independent Namibia and the mentioned interviews to highlight its shortcoming in representation.
Furthermore, PR systems in Southern Africa fail to ensure effective minority representation, Barkan states that, “…Namibia’s ethnic and racial minorities who supported the DTA and the UDF, would be no worse off and possibly better off under an electoral system based on SMDs” (p.3.). This means that a PR system weakens minority’s protection against adverse constitutional changes nor does it guarantee minority representation in the executive. Here, Barkan cites successive electoral results of independent Namibia (Barkan, 1995). He observes that the South Western African People’s Organization (SWAPO) secured more than the two-thirds National Assembly majority needed to make mentioned constitutional changes and exclude the minority from the executive. That the Nujoma administration observed self-restraint and commitment to national reconciliation enough to accommodate the minority in the executive highlights mentioned PR limitations (Barkan, 1995).
Through a majoritarian formula, Barkan notes a similarity in the distribution of elective seats under both systems. He observes that a majoritarian system creates better minority representation (key PR-system proponents objective) by its ability to marginally depress the majority party’s seat numbers (Barkan, 1995). To this end, he used a table prepared by Reynolds to highlight the substantial similarity in the distribution of seats under both systems and claims that majoritarian systems provide better quality representation while also admitting to its inherent disproportionality (Barkan, 1995). Moreover, he suggests having equal sized districts as a necessary modification to remedy the systems associated disproportionality between votes and seats. Critically, Barkan (1995) cites the disproportionality parameters that make a majoritarian formula superior in agrarian societies.
Summary of “The Case for Proportionality”
In his defense of proportionality, Reynolds (1995) acknowledges the legitimacy and accountability concerns raised by Barkan, noting that, “… he criticizes PR for weakening (even severing) the link between individual MPs and their constituents. This hinders the development vertical dimension of democracy (that is, representative relationship between elites and non-elites with a common political interest) greatly reducing the prospects for the consolidation of democratic rule” (p.1.). He offers comparative examples that underscore the interpretational difference in the Index of Disproportionality (ID) noting the conditions under which a majoritarian formula can produce a near perfect proportional outcome (Reynolds, 1995). Moreover, he provides proportional results comparison with both systems are on actual election results. Specifically, he cites both Malawian and Zimbabwean near perfect proportional electoral outcomes as obtained under the majoritarian formula. He contrasts that with majoritarian extrapolations using results from both the South African and Namibian elections, which produces significantly higher outcomes respectively (Reynolds, 1995). His hypothetical outcome proved that a majoritarian system in South Africa would produce a majority capable of changing the constitution.
Reynolds notes that the unique nature of the proportionality outcomes in both the Malawian and Zimbabwean elections are inconsistent with global expectations of majoritarian system stating that, “Yet the results from Malawi and Zimbabwe have not been mirrored in established democracies, in Africa as a whole, or within southern Africa itself. At the end of the day, these are atypical cases, and we must take care not to be blinded by them” (p.2.). Accordingly, Reynolds offers a table to support his assertions. This provides a key turning point in comparing their articles as it underscores both the difference in scope and the authors understanding of the subject.
Majoritarian elections across Africa have failed to create proportional electoral outcomes, even among agrarian communities with their geographically concentrated voting patterns. He notes that, “Even if plurality elections in fledgling democracies produced reasonably proportional results across the board, there would still be worrying threats to democratic consolidation” (Reynolds, 1995, p.2.). He further adds that, “… the experience of South Africa illustrates the inclusion within parliament of small parties can play a crucial stabilizing role in the early years of democratization of a divided society” (p.2.). Together, these statements position PR systems as more inclusive and therefore more democratic.
PR systems offer better longer-term prospects of eliminating regional voting and improving the quality of representation (Reynolds, 1995). However, to achieve the same requires increased class and economic mobility to create neighborhoods diverse enough to reduce political emphasis on primitive relations and reduce geographically concentrated voting patterns.
Reynolds observes that, “... the use of plurality in southern Africa freezes the party system to such a degree that the alteration of parties in government and opposition is not perceived as a likely or natural occurrence” (p.3.). This contrasts the Westminster government system where governments are established by the party with most of the marginal seats. He further notes that, “…southern Africa plurality elections described in Table 2 reveal the classic elements of a defacto one-party state, in which governing parties are insulated from change” (Reynolds, 1995, p. 4.). Reynolds further observes that majoritarian representation discourages losing parties from forming the opposition, which he cites as the greatest threat to Africa’s democratization. Generally, Reynolds highlights imperfections of African majoritarian systems by contrasting them with existing PR systems.
Comparative analysis of arguments
Comparatively speaking, both Barkan and Reynolds present compelling arguments. However, Reynolds makes a more compelling case simply by the way he addresses Barkans challenges. Reynolds articulates a sense of thoughtfulness in his responses as he preempts readers objections. For example, Barkan limits his scope to the negative effects of the proportionality-based systems on agrarian societies. Indeed, he offers compelling statistics generated by Reynolds, theoretical models as well findings from interviews he conducted to support the need for majoritarian systems in agrarian societies (Barkan, 1995). On the other hand, Reynolds adopts a broader scope which results in a more inclusive tone and approach to his arguments. In other words, the specificity of Barkans article limits his relevance as both election systems and democratization can have adverse effects on the entire African continent, agrarian societies included.
That is not to say that Barkan’s (1995) article lacked compelling points. For example, his articulation of the emergent legitimacy and accountability concerns was compellingly portrayed (Barkan, 1995). In fact, Reynolds readily conceded the same (Reynolds, 1995). However, Reynolds (1995) article is more convincing as it applies to the solving the mentioned challenges which is not readily evident in Barkan’s article and engineering a functional democracy. While Barkan (1995) made some suggestions aimed at correcting disproportionality, his proposed modifications do not address conclusively the challenge of geographical vote concentration or highlight their impact on creating a functional democracy like his counterpart. Moreover, though representation is vital in democratic configurations, Barkan fails to bring out the underlying complications while Reynolds demonstrates a nuanced understanding not only of African, but global democratic systems. Importantly, Reynolds (1995) argues convincingly for the viability of the proportionality-based system. First, he observes that the winner takes all aspect of the majoritarian system endangers democratization as it discourages losing parties from taking their positions in opposition benches. Secondly, he observes that African states are de facto one-party states, not the Westminster styled governments of developed democracies capable of amicably handling both representational abnormalities and true battleground seats (Reynolds, 1995).
Conclusion
The resonance Reynolds’ article attains is due to the involved and thoughtful approach of his arguments. Importantly, his article adopts comparatively a more integrated approach to democratization than Barkan. Specifically, he uses international data, incorporates data from sources other than himself and bases his arguments on data sets within extended time frames. Indeed, both authors note each has compelling points and that they seek a common outcome and both provide insights into the layered complexities entailed in the democratization of Africa. In the end, it comes down to scopes and modification alternatives. Under this approach, it is evident that Reynolds arguments present more compelling and nuanced solutions looking ahead. For as Barkan rightly notes, democratic consolidation is a long-term project during which democratic practice is gradually institutionalized. However, he fails to articulate the nuanced understanding evidenced by Reynolds. Importantly, Reynolds demonstrates that proportionality-based systems offer better long term democratic gains.
References
Barkan, D. J (1995). Elections in Agrarian Societies. Journal of Democracy, 6.
Reynolds, A. (1995). The Case for Proportionality. Journal of Democracy,6.
