Military Retaliation
Military retaliation can be an effective means of combating terrorism, provided it is swift, occurs soon after a terrorist attack, and the attack is properly focused. Military retaliation significantly affects terrorist organizations since it set them back financially. Degrading their assets degrades and undermines what terrorist organizations can achieve. The destruction of bases and camps forces terrorists to repair or replace them, which takes money and effort. Additionally, assassinating senior leaders in terrorist organizations forces internal reorganization, which requires groups to readjust. Readjusting also takes significant time. Assassinating an expert bomb-maker disrupts bomb attacks. When a government identifies a terrorist who is a ticking bomb, it is their responsibility to prevent it by eliminating the said terrorist (Silke, 2003). However, military retaliations must abide by the customary standards of proportionality and necessity. The amount of force used in self-defense should mirror that used in the initial terrorist attack. Moreover, military retaliation should be taken as a last resort (Ruys, 2007).
According to Silke (2003), military retaliations do not mitigate terrorism attacks. Instead, terrorist attacks remain constant or increase substantially soon after retaliation then gradually return to former levels months or years later. For example, the US bombing of Libya caused a temporary surge in terrorist bombings and assassinations against the US and UK while hoax attacks increased sixfold. Contrary to the expectations, retaliation increased Libya’s commitment to terrorism. Consequently, Libya sponsored more events (Silke, 2003). Moreover, there is a direct correlation between foreign interventions and terrorist attacks. For example, US military interventions in the Middle East motivated anti-American terrorism (Piazza & Choi, 2018).
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Deterrence
On the other hand, deterrence leads to temporary relief from terrorist attacks but is less effective than military retaliation in combating terrorism in the long run since terrorists resort to other activities. For example, fortification of US embassies mitigated terrorist attacks but led to a surge in other terrorism activities, such as assassinations. Moreover, increasing funding for embassy security did not affect terrorism. Introducing metal detectors at airports proved to have a more significant and long-lasting effect in combating terrorism than retaliation. Metal detectors reduced skyjackings and threats. However, terrorists resorted to other terrorist activities, such as assassinations and kidnapping, and developed new technologies to outsmart metal detectors (Silke, 2003). Therefore, deterrence is ineffective in the long run.
In the case of the Northern Ireland Prison Service, where prisoners managed to terrorize communities from their cells, deterrence as a measure to combat terrorism failed. In an attempt to stop community violence and rioting, prisoners who committed politically motivated offenses were assigned a special status category and separated by paramilitary and political factions. However, the policy proved ineffective after a confrontation between prisoners and authorities that disrupted other prisons and the community. When the government scrapped the special category status, protests ensued followed by paramilitary attacks on staff and their families (Bates-Gaston, 2003). In this case, deterrence to combat terrorism proved ineffective. Another policy adopted by the African Union (AU) that criminalized all forms of terrorist attacks was also ineffective. Additionally, creating conducive conditions for sound economic development to empower citizens proved ineffective in curbing terrorism (Mpe et al., 2020). Therefore, military retaliation is more effective in combating terrorism than deterrence.
Coping with Terrorism
Deterrence, such as the use of metal detectors, is more successful in helping societies cope with terrorist attacks since it gives people a sense of safety and leads to an immediate reduction in terrorist attacks. Military retaliation fulfills the human desire for vengeance. Groups in conflict become extremely polarized. The characteristics of in-group members are appreciated while out-group members are denigrated. Moreover, out-group members are dehumanized and regarded as animals or monsters. Consequently, tolerating and supporting the inhumane treatment of out-group members becomes easier. In-group and out-group stereotyping makes both sides oblivious to the fact that they are equally vulnerable to the psychology of revenge (Silke, 2003). Therefore, military retaliation less successful in helping societies cope with terrorist attacks.
References
Bates-Gaston, J. (2003). Terrorism and imprisonment in Northern Ireland: A psychological perspective. In A. Silke (Eds.), Terrorists, victims and society: Psychological perspectives on terrorism and its consequences (pp. 215-232). Wiley. https://redshelf.com
Mpe, L. V., Shai, K. B., & Ogunnubi, O. (2020). Counter-terrorism measures in the West African community: An “Afri-sensed” assessment. Gender & Behaviour , 18 (3), 16198–16207. https://search-ebscohost-com.proxy-library.ashford.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=147761833&site=eds-live&scope=site
Piazza, J. A., & Choi, S.-W. (2018). International military interventions and transnational terrorist backlash. International Studies Quarterly , 62 (3), 686–695. https://doi-org.proxy-library.ashford.edu/10.1093/isq/sqy026
Ruys, T. (2007). Crossing the thin blue line: An inquiry into Israel’s recourse to self-defense against Hezbollah. Stanford Journal of International Law , 43 (2), 265–294. https://search-ebscohost-com.proxy-library.ashford.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=25964097&site=eds-live&scope=site
Silke, A. (2003). Retaliating against terrorism. In A. Silke (Eds.), Terrorists, victims and society: Psychological perspectives on terrorism and its consequences (pp. 215-232). Wiley. https://redshelf.com
