Background
The 737 Max airplane model was first revealed in 2011 by Boeing, a multibillion airplane manufacturer with a massive global presence. In 2017, the airplane was launched with promises of fuel-efficiency from its modified wing structure (Palmer, 2020, p. 1). The 737 Max planes resembled other Boeing airplanes, and hence, their firm reassured pilots that they would not require recertification to handle them. Boeing also avoided certification checks that were essential to prove the authenticity and efficiency of their product by claiming that the 737 Max operated similarly as other planes that airlines had acquired. However, the airplane company had included the Maneuvering Characteristic Augmentation System (MCAS) software on Max 737 planes which corrected the position of an aircraft when sensors failed in transit (Palmers, 2020, p. 2). Boeing refused to inform airlines of the inbuilt technology which resulted in fatalities that caused losses worth billions of dollars for the firm and stakeholders. The company attempted to salvage the situation after the casualties by apologizing, but the public questioned their apology timeliness and motive.
On October 29, 2018, at 6:20 a.m., the Lions Airflight 610 took off from Jakarta, Indonesia. Previously, a pilot who had flown the 737 Max airplane model had realized that false altitude readings and flawed speeds had faultily triggered the plane’s MCAS (Palmer, 2020, p. 2). Consequently, the pilot diagnosed the issue by disabling the MCAS. In the subsequent flight, the pilot on duty realized that the aircraft appeared to be stalling immediately after take-off. The plane also seemed to experience an uncontrollable downward nose pull. Twelve minutes later, the airplane crashed, and all the 189 passengers on board died. Investigations proved that the aircraft’s software was faulty, and Boeing reacted by issuing instructional manuals on how to handle the 737 Max’s MCAS (Palmer, 2020). Pilots and airlines were shocked because they were unaware of the software before. The company proceeded to manufacture more 737 Max planes without conducting proper investigations on how to prevent future fatalities. On March 10, 2019, flight 302 took off from Ethiopian Airlines, with 157 passengers on board. Two minutes later, the MCAS faultily activated, but the pilot salvaged the situation. However, the problem reoccurred, and six minutes past take off, the plane crashed, and all the 157 passengers were declared dead.
Delegate your assignment to our experts and they will do the rest.
PR was important in this case because the company wanted to clear their name and absolve themselves from all responsibility. They only apologized out of necessity and not because they cared for the families of their victims. Also, they wanted to protect their brand name and maintain current clients by saying their planes were well designed and the Ethiopian pilot didn’t know how to react in emergency time. The PR concepts applicable in this scenario include press publicity theory and public relations model.
Response
Boeing’s chief executive officer, Denis Muilenberg, apologized via video 26 days after the second 737 Max crash from Ethiopian Airlines. According to independent analysts, communication, and aviation specialists, Muilenberg’s message was ambiguous and insincere. He used the press publicity theory, where organizations salvage their publicly tarnished images by issuing half-truths, manipulation, and poor communication. In an article in the New York Times Bake (2017) said that Muilenberg stated that Boeing was remorseful for the airplane crashes that had successively occurred and that the firm would update their existing MCAS software to prevent future fatalities, through the statement “We own it…a software update meant similar accidents would…never happen again” (para. 5). However, Boeing later attempted to manipulate the public by defending the design of the 737 Max vehemently, as stated by Baker (2017) “there was not a technical slip or gap…” (Para. 24). Initially, the company had acknowledged its faulty software. Baker (2017) also asserts that the airplane producer further proceeded to claim that the Ethiopian pilot who crashed while piloting Boeing’s planes “…did not completely follow the manufacturer’s emergency procedures” (para. 27). Baker (2017) further shared Helio Fred Garcia’s sentiments, an economist who specializes in crisis management and tutors at New York University that had termed the apology as indifferent and lacking compassion, through his words that “Trust didn’t fall because two of its planes crashed. Trust fell because they were seen to be indifferent” (para. 10). The fact that Boeing responded after 26 days meant that the firm only apologized because of public pressure and not because the company cared for the families that had been affected by the 737 Max accidents.
Muilenberg also employed the public relations model in his apology. Here, information is strictly one-way, besides having an in-house individual conveying the message. Often, the press release lacks sufficient research and avoids answering sensitive questions from receivers. According to Baker (2017), “It was a good video, but limited only to social media…it would be more effective if it was in front of humans, with some ability to take questions” (para. 15). Muilenberg was aware that a video apology prevented essential stakeholders and the public from forcing him to publicly acknowledge Boeing’s mistakes through a face to face conversation.
Boeing used social media, media placement, and influencer tactics to advance their regret statement. The firm’s CEO recorded and released the firm’s stand concerning the recent airplane crashed through a video that was first encountered by the public on social media. The firm was aware that social media platforms have massive users, and hence, Boeing’s message would reach a broad audience. Boeing also employed the media placement strategy because the firm was aware that media houses would air the video apology. After all, the public had anticipated a statement from the organization. Finally, the organization indirectly relied on influencers to post and comment on the video in a bid to reach a massive audience. The three strategies were successful because they evoked a public outcry, albeit negatively.
Critical Analysis
A critical analysis of the public relations (PR) tactics that Boeing used reveals several factors. First, the strategies were adequate because the public responded accordingly. Muilenberg’s video graced all social media platforms within minutes of its release. Second, influencers discussed his apology with their followers, as Boeing had hoped. Third, media houses aired the video contents, besides analyzing the genuineness of Muilenberg’s message. Hence, the PR schemes were useful in that a broad audience was reached as predicted by Boeing. Muilenberg may also have been right to release video footage of Boeing’s official apology for the mistakes that their planes had caused because a face-to-face public press may have potentially resulted in dire consequences. For instance, people were angry at Boeing for failing to recall the 737 Maxs that were operational after the first accident. The company was aware that a general system upgrade was mandatory for the planes in operation. Possibly, an emotionally unstable individual or terrorist group may have sought to revenge the deaths of their loved ones by murdering Muilenberg as he released a press speech in public. Hence, the firm protected its employee through a video apology.
However, Muilenberg’s apology had several flaws. First, the organization should have responded immediately after the first and second airplane crashes to evade the public outcry that had ensued. Immediate response on Boeing’s stand on recent fatalities by the firm’s 737 Max airplanes may have fostered trust from bereaved individuals and the society. Additionally, the social media strategy was wrong because Boeing was portrayed as a malicious company that only had selfish interests. A face to face conversation with the press would have sufficed to prove that Boeing was remorseful for their actions. Moreover, the organization was wrong for contradicting their statements when they began defending their airplane designs even though Boeing had admitted liability for the airplane crashes. Hence, Boeing erred by apologizing for their airplanes’ failures late, through the wrong platforms, and with contradictions.
I recommend that Boeing incorporate the two-way symmetrical and asymmetrical models of public relations in their future public communications. The firm should attempt to influence the outcomes of their messages by providing well-researched data that fosters understanding and trust in its stakeholders and the public. Boeing should also capitalize on two-way communication to solve ensuing conflicts to enhance mutual respect, knowledge, and trust in the society. Boeing should also implement different public relations strategies to communicate with the public in the future. For instance, the firm should conduct press releases in face to face, well-protected environment. The organization should train their executives on how to handle difficult and controversial questions that media journalists may raise during a press release. Second, Boeing may allow several technicians and executives to attend media interviews with local and international television and radio stations to salvage and explain their action plans when faced with a scandal. The organization should also dissuade from defending themselves after accepting responsibilities for their actions. Hence, Boeing may employ different PR strategies and theories to handle company issues that affect its stakeholders in the future.
Conclusively, Boeing released the 737 Max model in 2017 with the promise that the airplane model was more fuel-efficient in comparison with preceding models. The company included MCAS software in all their airplanes that corrected single-sensor failures without the pilot’s knowledge. Nevertheless, two 737 Max airplane fatalities occurred in 2018 and 2019 that resulted in the deaths of over 300 individuals. Boeing accepted responsibility for their airplanes’ failures through a video apology that culminated in a public outcry.
References
Baker, S. (2019, May 19). Boeing’s Response to the 737 Max Crisis Confused and Frightened People, Making It Hard to Believe Its Apologies, Experts Say. https://static2.businessinsider.com/boeing-737-max-crisis-response-confusing-hard-to-trust-experts-2019-5
Palmer, C. (2020). The Boeing 737 Max Saga: Automating Failure. Engineering , 6 (1), 2-3.
