The Deepwater Horizon Disaster: What Happened and Who Was to Blame

Case Summary 

The BP Deepwater Horizon disaster that occurred in April 2010 was an expression of unethical business practices. This disaster was a record oil spill that occurred in the United States water. When the disaster was ceased in July, almost 5 million oil barrels had been spilled into the Gulf of Mexico. Despite the evidence of oil spill, no company or entity admitted responsibility, and instead, blame was shifted between the three companies that were included in the Deepwater Horizon drilling (Ingersoll et al., 2012). The three companies that were involved in the disaster, Transocean, BP, and Halliburton, did not take steps to alleviate the situation but instead caused greater damages to the companies affected through great financial losses and reputational damages (Ingersoll et al., 2012). In this disaster, BP failed to manage this emergency, which adversely affected its reputation and business performance. 

Diagnosis 

During the evacuation, the emergency measures did not include sealing the rig, which resulted in the extensive spill of oil that had adverse environmental effects. Immediate plans were structured to stop the spill from the well and prevent the expansion of the leak. This need for measures to minimize the damage had an impact on the response efforts. The lack of well-organized measures extended the length needed for the right responses to be made. 

Key Issues 

An analysis of key issues involves the description of leading issues within BP and the Deepwater Horizon disaster. One of the key issues in the disaster was poor management and communication by the companies involved; there was no communication regarding the project’s safety. BP was also largely to blame as it was responsible for ensuring the project's general safety and failed to supervise roles for the detection of any safety risks (Ingersoll et al., 2012). Management and communication failures within these three companies resulted in considerable issues that resulted in the hazard. Each of the firms showed an inability to effectively complete its role, and the resulting negligence resulted in several safety risks that acted as a background for the disaster. 

Poor management was visible due to poor planning by the companies involved. The succession of accidents acted as an indicator of the low level of commitment preventing disasters and enforcing safety. Historical assessments of BP’s disaster had shown that the organization did not apply the proper protocol for disaster prevention. During the disaster, the organization did not have contingency plans for proper control of the existing risks. This lack of planning and maintenance resulted in the explosion that later resulted in the oil spill. 

Processes 

One of the process problems was the absence of coordination between the different organizations involved. The lack of coordination between these forms resulted in the extension of response periods. The companies involved did not share important information, which resulted in a failure in responses. For instance, in Houston, BP engineers were not made aware of everything that was going on in the rig, and the staff in the rig did not have any knowledge of concerns about the well (Ingersoll et al., 2012). BP's failure to educate all parties or share information to all those involved in the operations concerning the risks they faced also limited the ability of these organizations to structure proper responses. Transocean was also heavily criticized for alerting its employees on existing project risks. This delayed response to the disaster resulted in significant leakage of oil into the ocean. 

Poor decision making was a key issue that facilitated the disaster. The firm's managers made cost-cutting decisions that elevated the level of risk in a dangerous environment and the saving time. An example of this is when BP decided to use light seawater as opposed to heavy drilling mud within the riser piper to ensure that it was properly sealed. The replacement of these parts was to save costs (Ingersoll et al., 2012). Furthermore, the decisions by members of management to compensate members of staff that implemented cost-saving techniques, as opposed to safety improvement methods, held responsible for the safety risks that existed in the risk. Hence, the key issues that facilitated the disaster included management issues, poor coordination, and poor decision-making by the involved organizations. 

Redesign 

The following recommendations would be effective in preventing the disaster and increasing the efficiency of response; 

Contingency and Risk Management Plan 

BP should create a proper contingency and risk management plan that considers safety issues for its employees and the environment. A contingency plan is essential in minimizing the impacts of any risk, such as the oil spill (Mische & Wilkerson, 2016). This plan should involve appropriate measures and control systems to minimize the occurrence of hazards and their effects. 

Establishment of a Crisis Team 

Each organization should have a well-structured crisis team to enable better management of a crisis. This management includes effective communication with concerned parties. Having a professional team in place will ensure that crisis management runs smoothly to support inter-organizational collaboration. 

Training of Employees 

Employees should undergo proper training on handling hazards and including proper safety measures. This training will ensure that they have the knowledge and skills needed to establish safe operations (Gautam, 2018). The training should also involve information on the adverse effects that drilling activities have on the environment. 

Safety Organizational Culture 

As opposed to emphasizing the cutting of costs, NP's management should aim to establish a culture that focuses on safety. This culture can be structured through actions such as providing staff incentives for safety procedures. 

References 

Gautam, P. K. (2018). Training Culture and Employees Performance in Nepali Banking Industry.  International Research Journal of Management Science ,  3, 64-80. 

Ingersoll, C., Locke, R. M., & Reavis, C. (2012). BP and the Deepwater Horizon Disaster of 2010. MIT Sloan School of Management, Case Study . 

Mische, S., & Wilkerson, A. (2016). Disaster and Contingency Planning for Scientific Shared Resource Cores.  Journal of Biomolecular Techniques ,  27 (1), 4–17. https://doi.org/10.7171/jbt.16-2701-003