The revolution marked the turning point to be celebrated where the country's future was to be decided by the Egyptian citizens. Further, other than internal interest, the international community which includes the Middle East region had an interest in a democratic, stable, and prosperous Egypt. Although this country had reverted to an authoritarian regime, it also experienced a democratic transition from new institutionalism. This thesis attempts to explain and analyze the pivotal role of the democratic institution before and after the revolution (Boudreau, 2016) . For a better understanding of the new institution approach, it is important to focus and relate to the explanations of the structural transition approach.
Democratic Institution before Revolution
During this era, the democratic institution included military and political interest groups. The Egyptian state apparatus and the military worked together as they were not autonomous. On this view, the Strategic Alliance was the most common democratic revolution institution in Egypt. The alliance was formed by the Egyptian military and the Muslim Brotherhood. It is said that the Brotherhood group leader initiated a "strategy of cooperation" with the military. However, this fusion between the two groups was indeed short-term as it was believed to set a "misleading" precedent for the civil-military relations in future. Contrary to most of the young democracy advocates in this era, the senior Islamist directed support for democracy unopenly (Bou Nassif, 2017). However, they maintained their dominant role in the revolution process. For instance, the Brotherhood acquiesced when the military cracked down the protestors who were against “constitutional declaration” by the military. Further, this group remained silent when more than ten thousand Protestants were tried in military courts while the detained women were being tested for virginity. It is the conspiracy of such institutions that legitimized the military's interference in writing constitution. Though, it is a fact that regardless of the democratic principles of the Brotherhood, they choose to cooperate with the military and avoid confrontation.
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Democratic Institution after Revolution
After the 2011 revolution or in the modern democracy of Egypt, the democratic institutions involved non-governmental institutions such as independent media and civic associations which include religious groups. Regardless of the form taken by these institutions, they aimed at fighting for the political authority of a diverse group and individuals. It is undeniable, these institutions constitute an essential part of the Egyptian democracy. While applying this analysis of revolution with the aim of forming a democratic government, it is important to overlook and identify the associated difficulties. After Egypt gain of power, the provisional government failed to address questions of building its own institution. Since there are multiple democratic styles to pursue such as centralized, federal, presidential, direct, and representative, all reflect democracy ideal. For instance, on June 30, 2013, millions of citizens protested on the streets demanding the step down of the first democratically elected president Mohamed Morsi. This president was among the former members of the Strategic Alliance of the pre-democratic institution. After three days of continuous protest, the Minister of Defense announced the president’s ouster under the pressure of most senior leaders of the secular political institutions in Egypt (Chandler, 2018). These leaders were Salafist leaders, the heads of Al-Azhar (the highest Islamic authority) and the Coptic Church. This sparked for different reactions around the country as the Brotherhood supporters started sit-ins as a call for the restoration of the “legitimate” president. On August 14, 2013, the military reacted to clear the sit-ins formed by the Brotherhood supporters. A crackdown that left hundreds being killed. Apparently, the angry Brotherhood supporters responded by attacking other political institutions such as Coptic churches, government offices, and Christians schools.
Comparison of the Democratic Institution before and after Revolution
On this view, considering the institution differences before and after the 2011 revolution, all the political actors made mistakes and thus, the current situation in Egypt. These institutions from both eras fought for a common course but using diverse tactics. For instance, before the revolution, the Brotherhood brothers had chosen to cooperate with the military by forming the Strategic Alliance. After the 2011 revolution, the Brotherhood continued to push for democracy but this time, they have learned on using "peoples' power." This strategy was also used against Mubarak although, in the era of Morsi, it seems to be severe (Volpi and Stein, 2015). This shows that although the hope of democracy seemed to be slowly fading before 2011, it was not yet “dead.” However, there is a slight difference in that most of the post-revolution democratic institutions are religious groups. Further, it is at the late era of democratic struggle that there are violent clashes between antagonism, Muslim Brotherhood, and other Egyptian political pillars. Also, the second version of revolution sheds the light that Egyptian was excited by the democratization. However, it is this political excitement that turned into a bitter disappointment as the Brotherhoods’ rule lacked the economic and political inclusivity.
In conclusion of the democratic institutionalism analysis, all the existed political groups fought for a common course, revolution. Further, there existed some differences between these groups but on the structural approaches ( Thyen and Gerschewski, 2018). Also, these differences do not characterize the capacity of any democratic institution in terms of power. Every institution before and after the 2011 revolution undertook a great risk to topple the authoritarian rule. The Egyptians struggle regardless of the interest democratic institutions were fueled by the democratic ideals such as political representations, free elections, human rights, and the rule of law. The acute institutional instability and political violent showed how political legitimacy mattered to every Egyptian.
References
Bou Nassif, H. (2017). Coups and nascent democracies: the military and Egypt's failed consolidation. Democratization , 24 (1), 157-174.
Boudreau, V. (2016). Regime Transitions, Antidictatorship Struggles, and the Future of Protest in Democratizing Settings. Popular Contention, Regime, and Transition: The Arab Revolts in Comparative Global Perspective , 203.
Chandler, M. J. (2018). Civil Resistance Mechanisms and Disrupted Democratization: The Ambiguous Outcomes of Unarmed Insurrections in Egypt, 2011–2015. Peace & Change , 43 (1), 90-116.
Thyen, K., & Gerschewski, J. (2018). Legitimacy and protest under authoritarianism: explaining student mobilization in Egypt and Morocco during the Arab uprisings. Democratization , 25 (1), 38-57.
Volpi, F., & Stein, E. (2015). Islamism and the state after the Arab uprisings: Between people power and state power. Democratization , 22 (2), 276-293.
