The Ethical Misconduct of the BP Oil Spill

Introduction

It all began with a chance to knock into a fresh, very moneymaking oil reservoir, which was named “Macondo.” The oil reservoir seemed to hold an enormous volume of oil, and BP was thrilled about the discovery. Nevertheless, the dull label of this reservoir was possibly a foreshadowing of what would transpire (Bishop et al., 2017). In order to tap the well, the BP company leased the oil rig from a company called Transocean, Ltd. Although by April the task was behindhand, BP was persuaded it will bring about success. Workers and officials onboard the Deepwater Horizon oil rig debated for hours on exactly how to go about abandoning the Macondo well. The site was being prepped for conclusion after the oil find. Officials with Transocean officials were alarmed about the processes being applied to momentarily exit the well. The oil rig was owned by Transocean. In the end, an officer with BP Exploration and Production, Inc. (commonly known as BP), who hired the rig to execute drilling activity, made a fixed decision to save both money and time by skipping procedures and replacing supplies utilized to seal the well. Then a tragedy hit when a blast shook the rig causing it to catch fire and submerged, murdering 11 workers in April 2010 (Hart, 2011). 

The state of affair speedily got worse. The oil well which was being dug, situated almost one mile underneath the surface, was destroyed during the explosion. Lots of gallons of unpolished oil were spouting to the Gulf of Mexico, rapidly producing an ecological disaster. BP directed marine automata down to the seabed in an effort to make active the switch-off regulator in the well. Soon, the whole procedure turned into an image management nightmare, with the company issuing contradictory messages. A BP corporation official told Fox News that the company had effectively stimulated a section of a miscarried puncture valve, which was decelerating the oil stream. Nonetheless, it shortly attested untrue. BP’s submerged automaton did indeed activate a gadget, however, the gadget failed to discontinue the stream of oil. 

BP instantaneously commenced drilling other holes hoping that they could lessen pressure on the ruined well. Nevertheless, the subsequent a couple of months unleashed a sequence of unsuccessful determinations by BP to halt the stream. Shortly about 2.5 million gallons of crude oil emptied into the Gulf of Mexico every day, producing huge quantities of destruction to aquatic life (Scheberle, 2018). Oil splashed on the coasts of Florida, Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, destroying-disaster on the source of revenue of fishermen and other persons who relied on the water for earnings (Malik, 2010). An endless current of finger-pointing took place amongst the public and the administration as every person attempted to judge who carried the greatest liability for the disaster. With every eye set on BP, the corporation’s actions were examined, and frequently condemned, all the way through the period of the calamity.

Eleven men out of a hundred and twenty-six employees aboard the rig perished as an instance consequence of the blast. BP’s engineers attempted zealously to discontinue the oil spouting out of the well for the subsequent 87 days (Bishop et al., 2017). No less than 5 efforts were made to seal the well off before a fresh cover assembly was fixed which ended the oil spillage on 15th July 2010. The resultant oil spillage is the country’s biggest unintentional, anthropogenic oil discharge into sea waters. The Exxon Valdez calamity of the year 1989 was the former point of reference for the U.S. oil leaks, which held the record at about 12.6 million gallons of oil leaked into waters. The Deepwater Horizon leak surpassed this record (Ramseur & Hagerty, 2013). Although oil discharges of this size are hard to measure, the final judgment was about 134 million gallons of oil discharged from the Macondo well. The case is important as the spill still holds the record for the biggest unintended non-natural discharge of oil into sea waters.

Public Policy and Public Administration refers to scientific exploration of the politics of institutions, organizations and structures. The exploration of public policy centers on the assessment and description of government plus non-government reactions to the public issue. On the other hand, public administration involves the organization, behavior, and activities of administrative officials and agencies in the behavior of the government. within the public segment, ethics pursue to tackle the critical issues pertaining to the public servants’ responsibility to serve as a “bailiff” for the public. Primarily, ethical considerations offer the principles of accountability which may be utilized to examine the civil servants’ work. Comprehensive public administration entails public trust. The general public anticipates civil servants to attend to the public interest, to manage public resources properly on a daily basis, and to make individual decisions fairly. The accountability, transparency, and integrity of public administrations are preconditions for, and strengthen, public trust, as a basis of decent governance.

Trust hinges on faith in the administrators’ integrity, who are anticipated to conduct themselves in a way which would bear the closest likely enquiry. This duty is not entirely satisfied only by performing within the rule. Trust also necessitates that administrators make decisions and recommendations simply with the eye of attending to the public interest. Then again, misconduct on the side of individuals who have been entrusted to safeguard the public resources and interest has consequences for public organizations, with regard to confidence and trust. Nothing eats away trust quicker than unethical behavior, mainly when that kind of conduct might be perceived as the consequence not solely of individual actions but also the result of a systemic letdown and as an indication of “feeble governance”. The case of BP oil spill in 2010 is a significant illustration for comprehending how ethical misconduct by persons who were entrusted to safeguard the public resources and interest eroded the trust and also tarnished the image of BP company. 

BP’s Ethical Misconduct in the BP Oil Spill

Ethics refer to the guidelines that shape moral conduct consistent with the belief of a particular group. Ethics offer answerability between the administration and the public. Abiding by the code of ethics makes sure that the laypeople obtain what they need fairly. The code of ethics forms professionalism standards which co-workers in the civic segment may expect from one another. With a robust code of ethics in public administration, the frontrunners possess the rules they require to execute their assignments and motivate their personnel and teams to apply rules in an equitable and professional way. Furthermore, desirable ethics in public administration brings about informative and timely communication with the community. Such transparency nurtures trust and minimizes or prevents the possible issues which may come up when evidence is disclosed from external sources. In case there is a thing of importance which the public should be informed about, it is better for it to originate straight from the administration and leaders. However, this was not the case in the BP oil spill.

There were important ethical questions raised concerning what situations justify a private corporation or government in limiting what fact is made accessible to the general public. A person would think that the American government would want to make sure that the scientists and press had access to the site so as to deliver public visibility of the impacts of the spillage and a spring of dependable empirical data regarding the rate of spill, however, quite the opposite happened. The press was denied access to the place and adjacent areas, and even a reporter was threatened with detention by the United States Coastguard for trying to get access to the spill site.  The American Government would have genuine reasons for limiting press access, nonetheless a person could hope that the government which claimed to cherish transparency could similarly be transparent regarding their motives for limiting the access. 

Following the calamity, the key question on every person’s thought’s was just how BP company might have ignored that kind of a hazard. Undeniably, the marine rig had safety systems in position, nonetheless, it was afterwards established that the safety systems weren’t as secure as they should have been (Kanter, 2010). For example, the rig lacked a remote-control shut-off button which could have been utilized as the fallback in a big oil leakage calamity—and which would have had an impact following the Deepwater Horizon outburst. Simultaneously, it should be understood that neither BP nor Transocean (the rig owner) were violating any rules by lacking one; this is because the Minerals Management Service, which is a federal organization in charge of oversight of the country’s offshore gas and oil industry, did not necessitate that kind of a device provided that the digging rig contained a standby control system which can switch off the well in event of a disaster (Lin-Hi & Blumberg, (2011). Some analysts infer that this signified a gap in controlling oversight on the part of the government.

Nonetheless, this can’t describe other gaps in the risk management strategy of BP. Some analysts claim that BP used the shortcut in risk management in order to save finances. Even though examinations into the issue are imminent, information suggests that safety alarms existed. For instance, evidence shows that approximately seventy-five percent of events that triggered federal examinations into security on marine drill rigs in the Gulf of Mexico belonged to Transocean (Winston, 2010). As Transocean’s major customer in the Gulf of Mexico, BP company had accountability to appropriately oversee that proper safety measures were taken so as to inhibit a calamity (Hart, 2011). Also, Transocean was blamed for apparent safety failures, counting a claim that the alarms of the rig had been deactivated prior to the explosion. 

Doubly alarming, a technician on the Deepwater Horizon oil rig accused BP of deliberate negligence. He asserts that BP was aware that the blowout preventer of the rig was spilling weeks prior to the blast but failed to stop production. This contradicted the declaration issued by Transocean following the blast, which asserted that engineers had not identified ant leakages hours prior to the occurrence of the explosion. Following the blast, it was established that the hydraulic system within the blowout valve was definitely spilling fluid, which stopped the system from closing the pipe (Bishop et al., 2017). Thus, it is evident that backup systems of BP were inadequate to tackle such a disaster. The company was undoubtedly deficient in risk management, resulting in a downhill spiral in the image of BP. 

The key happening that triggered the catastrophic blast is unidentified. Nevertheless, examinations have implied that activities that BP assumed made the reservoir more susceptible. According to some surveys, BP cut short processes and quality examination of the pipe—examinations which are intended to sense gas inside the well. Analysts postulate that the last action in fixing the pipe—that entailed bolstering the steel pipe in position—might have been a catalyst for the blast. Transocean, Halliburton (the cementing service provider tangled with the task), in addition to two employees blame BP of violating industry protocols in the installation of the pipe. 

Among the numerous condemnations razed against BP is the company’s choice to utilize a less pricey well design which several Congressional detectives have considered “unsafe.” Fitting of the well design is simpler and prices are lesser. Nevertheless, it as well offers an enhanced path for air to increase the outer of the pipe. Despite the fact that this did not trigger the blast, detectives consider it could have added to the vulnerability of the well (Kanter, 2010). Even though BP company did not violate any rules by utilizing that kind of design, it overlooked safer substitutes which could have stopped, or in any case, delayed the calamity.

Accountability and Responsibility of Stakeholders

Administrative evil

The general trait of administrative evil is that persons may take part in evil acts without knowing that they are doing something wrong whatsoever. Among the core morals of American culture is individualism, which functions as a hindrance to understanding and perceiving the organizational and team dynamics which bring about administrative evil. The U.S. citizens tend to assume that each person’s behaviors are independently and freely chosen. When one examines a person’s behavior individually or even aggregately, this supposition may be strengthened (Adam, 2011). Nonetheless, American culture’s stress on individualism blinds people to organizational and group dynamics which naturally play a great role in defining human conduct than could be supposed. Comprehending evil as originating from a person’s character—the default preference within a community that values very highly individualism—draws the cloak over organizational and social evil, rendering it unnoticed, like it was.

Companies are the locus of evil and wrongdoing. Truly, organizations are the home ground of administrative evil and may facilitate such actions both externally and internally. Internally, the deeds will be imposed on the organization’s members, whereas externally, citizens, clients, or customers in different groupings will be the sufferers. In addition, administrative evil might have an effect on folks inside the business and those outside it. Contemporary organizations are typified by the dissemination of info and the disintegration of responsibility. With scattered and diffuse info, nobody in the business can have a sufficiently whole picture to sufficiently understand the damaging activity to attempt to the inverse course. Persons who could have an adequate picture to distinguish that something is not well might presume that top management knows about the issue and has decided to do nothing regarding the issue (Adam, 2011). For instance, in the case of BP, an employee confessed his concerns about the problems of the oilrig and the supervisors decided to do nothing about it. Regarding responsibility, persons in operating units might notice an issue or a portion of a problem, nonetheless, tend to understate the problem with the intention of not wanting to bring undesirable news to supervisors. Not knowing might be substituted by the term “strategic ignorance,” where organizational players might decide that faking not to distinguish is the securer method.

The more time the evil action continues, the harder it gets to admit it. Every stride along the way wherein such action is not stopped becomes a further commitment to that course. Consequently, ending that kind of activity (for instance, revoking a product or sacking a contractor) necessitates a rather critical action. A person requires distinct and overwhelming proof to do so since a person can be sure that no appreciations would come forth. Letting usual processes (the existing state of affairs) to carry on necessitates no action whatsoever—momentum solely turns into a greatly influential social force.

In certain circumstances, a crossroads is approached, when organizational evil becomes evil, and persons actively contributing in turn into evildoers as well. At this moment, the cover is removed from organizational evil, once persons in the company discover or realize that the firm has been involved in activities damaging of humans—in the graver circumstances leading to the loss of innocent persons (Adam, 2011). Sometimes a person may find instances of companies where individuals have knowingly partaken in damaging actions. More habitually, the actions which create bad behavior are believed by several of the partakers to be benevolent or even advantageous. Nonetheless, at the crossroads, the sore actuality is realized. This perfectly relates to the BP oil spill case where the management thought that by passing through a short cut in sealing the well, they would save some money and time. However, they ended up using more money and time trying to stop the spill.

At this point, individual shame and guilt —as well as an administrative liability—are instantaneously present, since, in retrospection, a majority of sensible observers will claim that somebody ought to have recognized or should have done something concerning what was going on. As it is obvious that other persons tend to react as if individuals complicated ought to have recognized, pertinent players have a likelihood of feeling a level of shame and guilt proportionate to “knowingly” performing the evil. Sequentially, this turns into an influential psychological inducement to refute the evil. In case the evil originates from the administration, such refutation tends to be read by folks subordinate in the company as enough direction to conspire in a lie or cover-up. Worry about the likely loss of a person’s employment is usually enough incentive for conspiracy. There were several stakeholders in the BP oil spill case who conspired to hide the truth.

A BP Engineer was Charged 

Within the initial days following the blasts, BP engineers aground concentrated on discontinuing the leakage and to seal the well. So as to perform this, they needed to have the information on the speed of stream pouring from the damaged riser pipe, a practice that later became the topic of extreme inspection by the federal prosecuting attorney. The Drilling and Completions Project Engineer of BP delivered some of the initial oil stream rate figures during late April 2010. In a confession avowed by the FBI representative on April 2012, Kurt Mix was issued with a Legal Hold Warning about April 22, 2010, notifying him to his responsibility to preserve all proceedings relevant pertinent to the Macondo well event, counting text messages (Lin-Hi & Blumberg, (2011). In the subsequent two months, the FBI representative proclaims that Mix was issued with 5 more Legal Hold Notifications which encompassed highlighting on direct messages as well as text messages which required to be maintained. 

Throughout this period, Mix started to work on the “Top Kill” technique to seal off the Macondo well. This technique entails pumping thick drilling mud from boats at the surface down through a kill line joined with the blowout preventer to the wellbore. Oil stream amounts stated at this period were extensive and from numerous sources. His crew approximations were from 1,000 to 146,000 barrels of oil a day (Winston, 2010). Nevertheless, BP’s representatives on no occasion openly disproved the Vice-President’s openly proclaimed approximation of about 5,000 barrels of oil a day. After the Top Kill technique turned out unsuccessful, the engineer allegedly proclaimed in an email to his manager on 26th May that the current rate was excessively high for Top Kill technique to be successful and consequently, settled that the level must be more than 15,000 barrels of oil a day (Hart, 2011). On May 29th, the company abandoned the Top Kill attempt. The representative reported that around 22nd September 2010, Mix was informed that “entirely active electronic information” was on the point of being collected. Additionally, the proclamation states that on distinct instances, the engineer consequently erased threads of text messages that comprised more than three-hundred texts between himself and his boss, as well as between himself and a BP service provider before turning over the cellular telephone to the third-party document gathering merchant (Malik, 2010). The FBI representative confessed of her awareness of the situations relating to the crimes through, partially, pieces of evidence acquired in the course of the investigation. This confession caused the detention of Kurt Mix on April 24, 2012. He was accused of the hindrance of justice by erasing text messages from the cellular telephone without authorization from the corporation (Bishop et al., 2017). Kurt Mix and his lawyer have constantly confessed to unintentionally deleting several of the text messages (Kanter, 2010). On 6th November 2015, Kurt Mix pleaded guilty in return for no additional accusations being raised against him concerning the case. 

Doubts on BP Corporate Ethics 

Furthermore, the company itself was not very lucky. On 29th January 2013, BP pleaded guilty to illicit behavior prior to and following the calamity. BP was penalized to pay four billion USD in immoral penalties (Lin-Hi & Blumberg, (2011). In the year 2014, the company’s record of ecological obedience as the federal government service provider was questioned. The latest tendency of defilements of the Clean Water Act before and after to the Deepwater Horizon event resulted in bases for expulsion. Knowing this, the federal administration decided to inflict a 5-year ban on the corporation (Hart, 2011). The guilty illegal plea which the company took up forced an all-inclusive set of steps to enhance the corporation’s drilling processes, safety procedures, as well as corporate ethics. For instance, associates of the father corporation, BP plc., were compelled to generate a post for the “Ethics Monitor” whose duty is to assess universal matters of existing business codes of conduct as well as obedience in the set of corporations and to send the results to corporation agents along with the EPA (Bishop et al., 2017). The position is purposed inhibit future criminal and ethical violations when addressing controlling authorities. Also, every BP associate was obliged to preserve a communications strategy to improve consciousness of compliance and ethics issues, to perform Code of Conduct teaching, and to offer ethical leadership education. 

On 5th October 2015, the American Government together with the Gulf States of Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and Florida proclaimed a remarkable settlement to settle civil claims against BP company for natural resource destruction and economic harms produced by the company’s gross carelessness during the oil spillage (Issacharoff & Rave, 2013). Compensation was pursued harms under the Oil Pollution Law and the Clean Water Law. The payment of 20.8 billion USD, is the biggest payment with a solo organization in the history of the Department of Justice. Under the conditions of the state-federal agreement decree, part of the BP settlement fund was allotted to the Clean Water Law civil fine, with eighty percent allocated to the RESTORE Law (Hart, 2011). The act was established with the direct intention of having refurbishment projects alongside Gulf shorelines prioritized, sponsored, and effectively finalized. The 5.5 billion USD fine settled under the Clean Water Law by BP is the biggest civil fine in the ecological act history (Scheberle, 2018). Incidentally, federal tax acts don’t permit organizations to take tax cuts for civil fines. 

A Team Conspiracy Slipperier than Oil 

It is important to note that not entire blame was put on BP company or their personnel. Just like with all big operations or projects, there are numerous parties complicated. On 19th September 2013, Halliburton pleaded guilty to terminating proof relating to the calamity on the exact same day that an immoral investigation against a contractor’s boss was filed. Halliburton company was the service provider employed by BP to propose plans for the cementing procedure. On 14th February 2013, Transocean company pleaded guilty to noncompliance of the Clean Water Law and was penalized to settle huge amounts of money in criminal penalties for its behavior associated with the calamity. In an unconnected civil payment, the corporation settled a one billion USD Clean Water Act fine and was obliged to take major steps to enhance its performance so as to inhibit repeat of its behavior (Scheberle, 2018). 

Doubts about Ethics on the Federal Regulators’ Part 

The blowout preventers’ susceptibilities were broadly recognized for ages all over the gas and oil exploration business, counting vulnerabilities at the Minerals Management Service. It was not till 2003 that the Minerals Management Service embraced a rule necessitating firms to provide test statistics demonstrating that the blind shear rams can function on the precise drill pipe utilized, and under-measured pressures (Winston, 2010). Firms had to provide this data to get drilling licenses. The organization’s District Drilling Engineer in the New Orleans headquarters, called Frank Patton, had almost thirty years of functioning in the oil business. Patton attested in a mutual MMS and United States Coast Guard trial that the blind shear ram element of a blowout preventer was the greatest vital aspect in sustaining the safety of the rig, the well, as well as the workers directly over it (Malik, 2010). However, Patton permitted the license without demanding evidence and later stated at his trial that he was under no circumstances taught to seek such an inscribed criterion. Patton looked virtually unaware of the testing criterion applied years previously. Analysts term it as a deficiency in oversight. The question is whether this was a simple gap in the implementation of the rule, or a moral dilemma influenced by external pressure to permit the license. Government and industry histories agree that as of the Deepwater Horizon calamity, in the Gulf, approximately sixty-seven percent of the rigs still contained just a single-blind shear ram (Malik, 2010). Some claim that MMS had become rather excessively in consonance with the drilling firms (Hart, 2011). On 19th May 2010, MMS was restructured into 3 autonomous organizations. As of January 2013 petition settlement, the injunctive aid stated for BP necessitated 2 blind shear rams in addition to third-party authentication of blowout preventers.

Solutions/alternatives

Forming an ethical administrative culture necessitates an assessment of the dangers to different stakeholders. In the BP case, they did not allocate the precautions to safeguard workers, suppliers, local people, as well as the viability of numerous industries counting tourism, fishing, plus the offshore drilling industry sustainability. Risk assessments necessitate consideration to matters like worker safety, a matter BP did not address, along with the significance of safeguarding the surroundings. In order to prevent the disaster from even happening, after the Exxon-Valdez catastrophe, the stakeholders ought to have heightened consciousness of offshore drilling so as to comprehend that all precautions essential should be taken to safeguard the natural surroundings. The BP company should have not tried to take shortcuts or attempt to reduce costs and time in utilizing best practices for its manufacturing processes. In order to prevent the disaster from even happening Halliburton could have revoked the order of Transocean. Furthermore, Patton along with the people at Minerals Management Service should have inspected testing permits. And BP should have examined the blowout preventer. Without a doubt, if one of the many persons complicated spoke out, the disaster could have been prevented from even happening or minimized.

Conclusion

The case of BP oil spill in 2010 is a significant illustration for comprehending how ethical misconduct by persons who were entrusted to safeguard the public resources and interest eroded the trust and also tarnished the image of BP company. BP has witnessed a variety of ethical concerns, the most recognized originating from the corporation’s own misconduct and negligence. The corporation labored to overcome its damaging reputation via social responsibility and sustainability programs. Nevertheless, BP’s importance on ecological responsibility boomeranged after it was implicated in the worst oil calamity in the history of the United States. Nevertheless, the efforts of BP went wrong on April 20, 2010, after the outburst of the Deepwater Horizon oil rig produced among the extreme offshore oil tragedies historically. The tragedy hit when a blast shook the rig causing it to catch fire and submerged, murdering 11 workers. Lots of gallons of unpolished oil were spouting to the Gulf of Mexico, rapidly producing an ecological disaster. BP’s engineers attempted zealously to discontinue the oil spouting out of the well for the subsequent 87 days. The resultant oil spillage is the country’s biggest unintentional, anthropogenic oil discharge into sea waters.

Public Policy and Public Administration refers to scientific exploration of the politics of institutions, organizations and structures. The exploration of public policy centers on the assessment and description of government plus non-government reactions to the public issue. On the other hand, public administration involves the organization, behavior, and activities of administrative officials and agencies in the behavior of the government. Within the public segment, ethics pursue to tackle the critical issues pertaining to the public servants’ responsibility to serve as a “bailiff” for the public. Primarily, ethical considerations offer the principles of accountability which may be utilized to examine the civil servants’ work. The accountability, transparency, and integrity of public administrations are preconditions for, and strengthen, public trust, as a basis of decent governance. The case of BP oil spill in 2010 is a significant illustration for comprehending how ethical misconduct by persons who were entrusted to safeguard the public resources and interest eroded the trust and also tarnished the image of BP company. Following the disaster, numerous stakeholders have shouldered their liabilities. 

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