Islamic extremists groups, also referred to as Jihadists, have posed far-reaching security threats to security organizations across the world for about four decades preceding the formation of Al Qaeda in the 1980s. The severe ramifications of terrorist attacks have forced security agencies to device new counter-terrorism approaches. The terrorist strikes on the World Trade Center in New York in addition to the attacks on Virginia, the Pentagon, and Pennsylvania, were particularly gruesome and caused the demise of about 2,977 Americans. However, the subsequent revitalization of security interventions has made it impossible for terrorist syndicates to replicate the attack in Madrid and Bali (McCabe, 2010). The fatality of the attack of 9/11 propagated retaliation from the United States security agencies, which resulted in the killing of about a third of the Al Qaeda population.
Terrorist syndicates have strived to expand their influences from operating exclusively on Muslim land to having affiliate groups and terror cells across the world. The attempts to broaden their operations has made these Islamic Jihadist groups to demonstrate remarkable adaptability. Holistically, the groups have changed their primary objectives from striving to replicate the iconic events of 9/11 to numerous attacks on arguably soft targets. The ISIS, for instance, a group that has continuously denied its links to Al Qaeda, has settled for operations that are frequent and encompass less logistical burdens in terms of planning and execution. Moreover, these operations are relatively less technical to carry out (Al-Qaeda’s evolution since 9/11, 2017). The shift in operational principles has made Jihadist factions extremely difficult to exterminate and eradicate.
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After the tactical and proficiently executed military attack that resulted in the demise of Osama Bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri assumed the mandate to lead Al Qaeda. Even though al-Zahawiri was the second in command and was positioned to inherit the leadership of the syndicate, he was better placed as the strategist rather than being the face of Al Qaeda. Ultimately, replacing Osama was a massive uphill challenge for Zawahiri whose suitability for the position has been questioned by his subjects and organizations affiliated to the organization. Noticeably, Zawahiri is not as charismatic as his predecessors, and the fact that his preoccupation in Egypt- which is his native land- was toppled by military action has undermined his qualification for the position (McCabe, 2010). The new leadership stewarded by Zahawiri sought to present Osama as a concept rather than an ideology for the terrorist group. As a result, Zahawiri argues that Al Qaeda is on a mission propagating jihadist agenda rather than an organization.
Furthermore, the perception of the group’s leadership towards violence has extensively evolved. During the reign of Osama bin Laden, the group sought to legitimize the death of civilians as a justified Jihadist endeavor, allowing the organization to take pride in the events of 9/11 and the London bombing that occurred in 2005 (Holbrook, 2015). The perspective of the organization on violence has also shifted since the organization is currently not focused on the extreme violence that is being used by ISIS. Indeed, Al Qaeda has sought to present itself as a moderate alternative that does not advocate for extreme violence.
Conclusively, the intensification of security measures across the globe has made it extremely difficult for terrorist syndicates to replicate the gruesome events of 9/11. In this regard, Al Qaeda has been forced to adapt and evolve in a bid to remain relevant. Consequently, the group has transformed under the new leadership of Zawahiri into an organization that is focused on frequent but less technical operations with a relatively smaller number of casualties. Additionally, the leadership of Al Qaeda strives to present the syndicate as a moderate alternative to the violent approach adopted by other terrorist groups such as ISIS.
References
McCabe, T. R. (2010). The strategic failures of al Qaeda . Department of Defense Washington DC.
Holbrook, D. (2015). Al-Qaeda and the Rise of ISIS. Survival , 57 (2), 93-104.
(2017) Al-Qaeda’s evolution since 9/11, Strategic Comments, 23:8, vii-viii, DOI:10.1080/13567888.2017.1385982.
