The Department of Defense (DoD) defines acquisition as the act of contracting and assuming ownership of a particular set of equipment for military use only. The acquisition may include procuring military combat equipment, or just normal equipment of conveniences such as passenger vehicles and waste management, or office supplies (Cochrane, 2010). If the procurement process involves military-grade machinery and technology, the acquisition must include a test and evaluation to ascertain that the program or the technology in question meets the required standards. One such program was the Air Force F-22 Raptor Program. This essay discusses the F-22 Raptor Program that ran as part of the U.S. Air Force aerial combat machine from the early 2000s until production ceased in 2012. The essay will give a brief overview of the F-22 Raptor, then evaluate the acquisition process and then give a brief overview of the major challenges that faced the procurement and acquisition process as well as analyze the role of the program manager. The F-22 program was engaged in military service from 2005. It was manufactured until 2012 as part of the tactical air-power fighter for the U.S. defense force and achieved success as well as facing various challenges during its run.
The F-22 Raptor
The F-22 Raptor, during its inception, was and still remains the best air-to-air combat machine. This is because it was upgraded to offer air-to-ground attack capabilities (DAU, 2004). One of the features that it shares is the advanced anti-radar detection, which can ensure that it moves stealthily with supercruise. It also has advanced integrated avionics that allows it to maneuver with ease. It was built as a replacement for the highly capable F-15 (DAU, 2004). Its superior capabilities on air-to-ground and air-to-air combat, as well as its convenience, and advanced technologies, made it a top priority secret for the U.S. As such, the DoD did not allow the manufacture and sale of its technologies (DAU, 2004). The advancement in the military capabilities of such technology places the U.S. at a favorable position in advancing its defense technologies and superiority in the military.
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The Acquisition Process
The acquisition process begins with “design, engineering, test and evaluation, production, operations and support of defense systems” (Cochrane, 2010, p. 12). The acquisition life cycle, as it is referred, is a complex cycle that is separated into phases and milestones. Phases are the periods, while milestones are the decision points (Cochrane, 2010). The Milestone decision authorities review the acquisition programs before proceeding with the identification of the needs, identifying any gaps, and making the necessary recommendations for improvement. In general, the acquisition process follows the basic bureaucratic management system for securing technologies and military support systems that are necessary to achieve security for the country.
The DoD’s objective is to ensure that the country is well protected and that the process of acquisition is done transparently and at a fair price. The acquisition process follows three decision-making processes for the full acquisition process. This includes strategic planning, programming, budgeting, and acquisition (PPBE), assessing the capabilities of the system through a joint program and development system, and, finally, the management process as part of the defense acquisition process (DAU, 2004). In general, the acquisition system comprises three components: a systemic component, acquisition component, and the management component. The systemic components address the technical hardware and software issues. The management system plans to organize and control the acquisition process while the acquisition process tests, improves, and approves or disproves the necessity of a system (DAU, 2004). The intervention of a program manager leads the whole system.
The joint program management is a system that the DoD uses to form the evaluation criteria for acquisition purposes. It is managed by the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), which serves the military equipment needs for the military. The rationale for the JCID is that there is a need to reduce redundancies in the system that frustrate the process of passing the required debates to ascertain military needs (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction, 2005). Therefore, they improve interoperability and minimize duplication of procedures. They also provide a ‘joint warfighting capability’ due to the involvement of multiple departments in the decision-making processes. Similarly, there are relatively reduced logistical needs (Cochrane, 2010). They are also in charge of the life-cycle management and determine the sustenance of a project, as well as giving it direction and determining time for termination.
Program managers spearhead the acquisition process. The DoD states that the role of the program manager is to “direct the development, production, and initial deployment of a new defense system” (Cochrane, 2010; p. 24). PMs work with the executive bodies which are interested in advancing the security facets of the nation. The scope of PM’s duties includes task management, understanding the environmental, organizational, and basic technical requirements as well as motivating the human resource to impact the program positively. The PMs must work to ensure that the military needs of the DoD are met, as well as take into account the budgetary constraints of the production process, which are determined by the managers at Pentagon.
Program managers are essential during the acquisition process. The DAU (2004) states: “the PM is the major force for directing the system through its evolution, including design, development, production, deployment, operations and support, and disposal.” (p. 16). This means that the PM has total control over the internal environment, including the technical aspects of any program in question. As the manager, they are expected to be accountable and responsible for all issues involving the production processes.
Procurement of the F-22 Raptor
The procurement process involves the integration of the legislative and the executive branches, which approve the needs and budgets of this equipment. The Department of Defense thence follows by placing their specifications concerning the technological and information technological advancements present at the time. The procurement of the F-22 Raptor began in 2005 when the Congress submitted the budget for the FY 2006. Following the submission, the DoD placed as the order of 187 F-22 Raptors and later updated to 195 (CRS Report, 2020). These included 177 production aircraft, one test aircraft, two EMD (engineering manufacturing development) aircraft, and fifteen PRTV (production representative test vehicles).
In 2008, the Congress agreed to order the production of 187 Raptors to supplement the U.S. Air Force requirements for the machine. The process was rigorous due to the technicalities involved with the production, as well as the advanced technologies that characterized its manufacturing. According to CRS Report (2020), the process suffered delays and difficulties that increased the cost of production tremendously. Despite these challenges, the production process progressed, and by May 2012, over 195 F-22 Raptors had been manufactured. The program was officially shut down in 2012 but was left with a possibility of production relaunch as mandated by the DoD requirements for continuous development.
The Cost and Funding
Congress limits the expenditure on military programs. The cost and funding of the production of F-22 were confirmed by the DoD to be $67.3 billion. The acquisition cost includes the total monies required for research and development, as well as other procurement expenses and military construction requirements (MilCon) (CRS Report, 2020). By 2010, the F-22 Raptors had recorded a Program Acquisition Unit Cost, the quotient of total acquisition cost and the number of acquired aircraft- 179, of $369.5 million.
The sustainment for the Raptor program was important to reflect the commitment of the DoD in improving the security measures of the country. An unsustainable project is equivalent to a ‘white elephant,’ and the defense system was cautious about expenditures coupled by the Congress regulations. It was determined that the post-production costs were relatively high, and over two-thirds of the expenditure on maintaining a life cycle of the F-22 were necessary. For instance, it was determined that an investment of $79 billion on purchasing the F-22 would require about $160 billion for subsequent sustenance and over $100 million in retrofitting (CRS Report, 2020). However, the Air Force (AF) opted to find better ways of minimizing the costs of production by seeking automated computer systems for sustenance practices.
The Challenges F-22 faced in its Procurement Processes
The major challenge that the F-22 faced in the procurement process was the issue of reliability and maintenance (sustenance) issues. Congress determined that the F-22 were too expensive to maintain, as explained hitherto. For instance, CRS Report (2020) states: “the Air Force is spending about $803.4 million to modify and sustain the Raptor.” (p. 17) The expenditures were relatively high, and it caused a significant strain on the budget. The Air Force, in 2009, noted that the measure of maintainability and reliability was over 60%, which was above the expected standards of the AF. In this case, the AF termed it as a ‘growing pain’ (CRS Report, 2020). Furthermore, the high rates of corrosion of the F-22 aluminum chassis increased the cost of maintenance, and in 2016, the DoD spent about $228 million to fix these panels. The AF began changing the chases of the remaining flights and limited their exposure to corrosive substances, especially during stealth missions.
Another major issue about procurement is the safety of the equipment. The F-22 Raptor was a major project with billions of dollars invested in it, but it was not immune to unprecedented errors that made its investment unsafe. There were a few reported cases of accidents. The first fatal case was reported in March 2009. During a test flight, an EMD F-22 crashed and killed David Cooley, the pilot (CRS Report, 2020). The fault was on Cooley as he failed to eject in time and suffered blunt-force trauma. Similarly, in November 2010, there was a reported crash in Alaska that killed a pilot, Jeffrey Haney. According to the official report, there was an interruption of oxygen flow to the pilot, and this might have led to hypoxia. The overheating of the engine reportedly disrupted the environmental control systems (CRS Report, 2020). The pilot failed to engage the emergency oxygen system, which led to his death. However, the models were later refitted with redesigned oxygen systems, and the issue was settled. Further cases of crashes were reported in November 2012 due to the failure of control systems. In May 2020, another case of negligence was reported and led to a crash of an F-22 at the Eglin Air Force Base (CRS Report, 2020). Cost was therefore an issue of concern to the Congress and the DoD.
Termination of the Program
The termination of the production of F-22 came as a welcome move, and the JCIDS determined that the costs of sustenance were relatively high and above the standards of operation. As a strategic move based on the analysis of the financial burdens, the JCIDS decided that the DoD had not shown a real need for investment in the crafts and decided to terminate its production (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction, 2005). Furthermore, it was agreed that its efficiency was high but was not of relevance in the periods of irregular warfare. The vast amount of research and financial resources were thus determined to be invested in an unnecessary program. However, despite the termination, the USAF projected optimism in restarting the program if there was a need. Furthermore, significant upgrades were made to the software and hardware, including the installation of the joint direct attack munition, which turns unguided bombs into precision-guided munitions (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction, 2005). The flights are, however, still operational, with major upgrades made to increase their flight hours and, therefore, their lifespan.
Conclusion
In summary, the F-22 program was engaged in military service from the early 2000s. It was manufactured until 2012 as part of the tactical air-power fighter for the U.S. defense force and achieved success as well as facing various challenges during its run. The PM and the JCIDS played an essential role in determining the direction that the F-22 series took. The PM acted as the primary manager and the foreseer of the operations of the project. However, the Raptor project faced a huge setback due to the high demands on investment, and the huge costs of maintenance. Furthermore, the relevance of the project was questioned due to the scarcity of military combats in modern warfare since the Cold War. A few accidents were reported, and through swift action, they were resolved. Eventually, it was decided that the program was a high maintenance project and was terminated due to unsustainability.
References
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (2005). Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System. November 13. Accessed August 17, 2020. https://web.archive.org/web/20070204073933/http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/3170_01.pdf.
Cochrane. (2010). Introduction to defense acquisition management . United States, United States: United States Government Printing Office.
CSRS Report. (2020). Air Force F-22 Fighter Program. August 17. Accessed August 2020, 2020. https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL31673.html#_Toc361319982.
DAU. (2004). Joint program management handbook . Defense Acquisition University.
