Much of the Second part of the 20 th Century was defined by the reorganization of African states following their independence from their colonial masters. The newfound freedom would, however, be quickly transformed into major conflicts and civil strife largely due to governmental inefficiencies, corruption, and poor political systems. The resulting effect would be a great deal of armed conflict spreading across the continent. It is within this space that anti-state groups such as the Lord’s Resistance Army arose, in northern Uganda in an effort to recapture power from the incumbent President Yoweri Museveni. The rebellious movement has since morphed into a full military group operating across four countries and leaving death and destruction in its wake.
1.0 Introduction
The Lords’ Resistance Army also known as the LRA, has been operational for nearly three decades leaving destruction, fear, murders, and suffering in its wake. Operating in four countries including Uganda, Central Africa Republic, Congo, and South Sudan, the LRA continues to create tremendous havoc and instability even as they main civilians, abduct women and children and torture many more on suspicions of collaborating with the authorities. The LRA has its roots in the Northern part of Uganda where its fifteen-year reign would result in the displacement of about two million people alongside the abduction of over 20,000 children.
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However, following tremendous pressure from military operations in the region the group would relocate to a new territory cutting across Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and South Sudan. This move would result in the displacement of over 2.5 million people with children abductions being estimated to range between 60000 to 100000 (Cline, 2013). While the group may have once been a force to reckon with, military operations alongside defections have helped eliminate its power. While the group continues to terrorize civilians across the four countries, it is clear that synergetic military and diplomatic efforts have helped minimize the organization’s power. The focus of this research, therefore, it so analyzes the operational dynamics of the organization.
2.0 Background
The LRA came about following a 1987 coup by Yoweri Museveni that saw him bring an end to the political monopoly that had been held by individuals in the north. For Joseph Kony who was in his twenties, this became a call to an arm which he would embark first as a spiritual leader before morphing into a full military commander. Kony’s initial strategy was to replace Alice Lakwena as spiritual leader before opting for to create the LRA which was initially an Acholi affair, drawing much of its support and facilitation from ethnic Acholis. However, non-supporters were targeted for various forms of violence alongside government officials while drawing much of its support from the government of Sudan. With the recruitment of the Acholis into the civilian defense, the LRA would go on to intensify its attacks, thereby creating a suitable environment for the deep-rooted mistrust between the northern communities and the government. It would take nearly two decades before the removal of the LRA from Uganda between 2005 and 2006 (Cakaj, 2010). Their expulsion from Uganda would see them emerge as a larger entity owing to the vast area of land in its area of operation.
Additionally, it is worth noting that with minimal government influence and few international humanitarian groups in the region, the LRA has managed to reinvent itself in terms of tactics and operations. The groups have from time to time engaged in political rhetoric through dubious demands, an element that can be traced back to the perceived political and economic disparities between the north and the south. Part of the LRA’s leverage has been achieved through the taking advantage of proxy wars between the Sudan and Uganda. Fundamentally, however, the LRA’s lacks a political agenda; an element that is evident from the group's preoccupation with wanton violence and self-preservation (Dubal, 2018). Having gained a cult-like status, the LRA has managed to convince and compel hundreds of individuals to remain loyal to the group, with Kony as the religious leader. Brutal killings and mutilations are the group’s primary tactics with abductions being used as a means of replenishing ranks.
3.0 Rationale
For a group that continues to terrorize and destabilize most parts of central and eastern Africa, the LRA presents a great political and economic threat across the entire regions. It is upon this basis that it becomes imperative to develop an in-depth understanding of the group’s operational dynamics. This information serves the purpose of producing insights that come in handy in developing strategies and approaches to responding in such contexts. More importantly, however, is that it is from this information that crucial lessons of dealing with non-state armed groups are drawn.
4.0 Research question
For an organization that has remained in existence for nearly three decades, understanding its operational dynamics will prove vital in expanding the scope of its movements, approaches, and strategies to survival. In this case, therefore, this research paper is guided by the question:
What are the operational dynamics of the LRA?
5.0 Literature review
This section delves in the analysis of various materials and sources covering the topic of LRA’s existence over the years. The LRA is largely synonymous with its power leader Joseph Kony who relies on the people of northern Uganda for his legitimacy, citing economic and political disparities as the primary course of the war. To keep the fighters loyal, the Kony primarily relies on torture, mutilations, and murders of defectors. Over the years, however, as pointed out by (Cakaj, 2010) the Ugandan rebels have continually declined with their numbers being replenished by individuals from the DRC, Sudan and the Central African Republic. In other words, by creating a situation characterized by fear, most rebels have found it impossible to leave the group with threats of death from with commanders in the inside, and the national government and civilians on the outside. Despite the weakening power of the groups, its propensity for violence remains catastrophic based on their approaches such a relying on few soldiers for wanton destruction among civilians.
Religion plays a crucial role in LRA’s survival, operations and sustenance. In other words, a combination of religious and traditional beliefs prove instrumental in fostering discipline and respect. It is from a religious pretext alongside Kony’s personal mysticism that the groups have found a basis for the justification of their mass atrocities directed at innocent people. In this case, therefore, activities such as violence, rape, and abductions are looked at cleansing efforts aimed at the sinful civilians. By cleverly manipulating the message of the Bible, for instance, Kony prevents fighters from sleeping with the wives of their fellow soldiers since it is a sin (Branch et al. 2010). Fundamentally, however, this move serves to maintain coherence across the military. Additionally, defections are painted as abominations that attract the wrath of the spirits. It is also within the religion-spirituality continuum that Kony has continually drawn his power cult-like personality. Leveraging his religious convictions and traditional beliefs, he has managed to create an image of a god-like individual with an omnipotent spirit.
In terms of composition and structure, it is estimated that the LRA has up to 400 fighters operating across the four countries. However, the number accounts for male fighters only, leaving out women and children alongside the abductees who serve the role of porting food and looted items. While Ugandan forces have been dwindling over the past decade, they remain the predominant group as is evident from the fact that they remain the exclusive members within senior ranks (Doom and Vlassenroot, 1999). Additionally, commanders tend to arm more Ugandans within their groups with guns as compared to the foreigners who predominantly rely on crude weapons such as machetes. It is also worth noting while child abductions are common within the group’s operations, children do not necessarily feature within the groups fighting forces, Besides escaping or being killed, most of the abductees are girls who are taken as ‘wives’ to the commanders.
A great deal of the LRA’s organizational structure leverages the Ugandan army hierarchy. At the lowest rank lies the Sergeant, followed by a second Lieutenant then Lieutenant, then the Captain and the Major who report to the Lieutenant Colonel. The highest ranks, therefore, include the Colonel, Brigadier and Major General. While the ranks are assigned by Kony, the basis of promotions is largely dependent upon bravery on the battlefield (Branch et al. 2010). During some instances, however, promotions are demotions are used as punishments and rewards as a mode of maintaining control over the force. Leadership ranks within the LRA are characterized by preferential treatment alongside high respect and strict adherence to the discipline.
It is also worth noting that as leaders and officers posit greater survival rates since they often avoid direct contact during battles. These rewards are used by the group as a means of encouraging lowly placed fighters to aspire for oppositions through their courage and responsibility. LRA has two levels composed of the high command and middle-level leadership. The high command is comprised of three Brigadiers and Kony as the Major General. With Okot Odhiambo, Ceasar Achellam, and Dominic Ongwen as the primary Brigadiers. The middle-level management is comprised of autonomous commanders serving in various parts of the central African region. An additional 80 officers also serve within the group’s leadership, though at the lowest level.
The survival of the LRA over the past two decades is indicative of its effective movement strategies and military strategy. While they result in tremendous death, destruction, and displacements, the movements have allowed it to thrive as rebel group. During its inception, the group primarily operated as a centralized and cohesive unit with Kony and his close allies as the core leaders. However, after learning from the numerous military operations that targeted the group, the group learned to operate as distinct and cohesive units working in various areas including Congo, the Central African Republic as well as Sudan.
The LRA relies on two major groups comprising of active and non-active soldiers. Active soldiers perform the fighting within the group. Their preparation entails basic training on battle formations, weapon handling, ambush and escape tactics. While combat and battlefield action can result in the loss of life, it is the active soldiers that experience faster promotions. For the non-active soldiers, on the other hand, their primary activities involve camp and abductee guarding. Non-active soldiers are predominantly known for their lack of courage in battle. From pretending to be sick to assuming unusual traits, the non-active fighters often have the easiest pathway to escaping from the group.
In terms of movement, the LRA largely relies on the cover of the huge tropical forests that cuts across DRC, CAR, and parts of Northern Uganda. The vastness of the forest and bush cover has been the fundamental strength exploited by the LRA over the years. With the Uganda People’s Defense Force, in perpetual pursuit of the LRA, the groups maintain constant movement. In essence, mobility is a vital aspect of the group’s success. In this case, therefore, military formation is preferred during treks with those lagging behind risking being killed (Doom and Vlassenroot, 1999). With years of experience in the forest, the many of the LRA commanders have learned to navigate using maps and compasses, however, in the recent past, there has been a tremendous increase in technological advancements characterized by the use of GPS devices.
Another tactic used by the group has been the use of feeder road and moving alongside rivers. In recent past, however, it has been established that the LRA leverage the paths created by nomadic cattle herders such as the Mbororo who operate between CAR, Congo, and Sudan. Their movement is also characterized by advanced and rear parties that ensure the abductees and middle parties are safeguarded from unprecedented ambushes. In the case of Kony, his movements largely rely on a cohort of trusted bodyguards who protect, shield and fight for their leader (Cline, 2013). In terms of attacking, the group is well versed with various tactics that allow to ambush and create tremendous havoc in the areas they target. Kidnappings and interrogation of locals, for instance, as used a pre-attack tactic that tries to help the LRA gain insight into the region or place they intend to attack.
Like other non-state militia groups, the LRA relies on vulnerabilities to launch its attacks. In essence, advance information forms a vital part of the groups planning and attacking activities. However, from time to time it is possible to for impromptu attacks, often under the command of Kony himself. Part of the group’s targets are often soldiers from Congo and Uganda with the primary goal of acquiring weapons, uniforms, and ammunition. With AK-47s at the predominant weapon the region, LRA soldiers often pose similar rifles with much of them being stolen from soldiers.
However, there have been indications that illegal mineral and tusk trades often provides finances for the acquisition of weapons and artillery. With communication as an instrumental aspect of any military operation, the LRA’s communication over the past decade is indicative of significant sophistication. From the use of maps, through to the adoption of satellite phones and mobile phone coverage as well as GPS systems, the LRA has continually remained in contact. Coded notebooks are also part of the group’s communication processes that facilitate movement preparations as well as navigation to various rendezvous points.
6.0 Methodology
Leveraging a thematic analysis, this paper focused on the review of relevant literature to establish the theme in question. This particular approach is founded upon the social constructionist theory which focuses on the examination of how shared assumptions of day-to-day reality are jointly constructed. In this regard, deductive reasoning came in handy in recognizing the underlying similarities across various sources. As a qualitative research approach, the research focused on secondary sources available on online databases. Platforms such as EBSCOhost, SAGE Journals, and Google Scholar came in handy providing peer-reviewed sources for the completion of the research. Official government websites also provided a great deal of information for the paper. As open source databases, most of the materials came at no extra cost.
6.1 Data Collection and Analysis
The gathering of materials for the paper focused primarily on scholarly covering the existence of the LRA and how it has managed to remain in existence to date. Special attention was placed on the oldest and most recent coverage of the group with the goal of helping establish the transitions that have transpired over the course of the group’s existence. In this regard, therefore, deductive reasoning came in handy in recognizing the underlying similarities across various sources.
6.2 Limitations
While numerous materials have been written with respect to LRA’s existence, the lack of readily available insider information means that little to no information exists regarding the actual tactics of the group. In this case, therefore, much of the available information is inadequate or outdated following tremendous changes within the group that go unreported.
6.3 Ethical considerations
By leveraging secondary sources as the main core of this research paper, the fundamental ethical issues relate to the inability to appropriately cite and acknowledge the ideas and information of various authors. To avoid plagiarism, therefore, this paper ensures that all materials included in the write-up had been properly referenced.
7.0 Results and Analysis
Having explored sources covering the operational dynamics of the Lord’s Resistance Army, several issues become absolutely clear. For starters, the CAR, DRC, and Sudan regions are highly unstable and element that is characterized by the numerous conflicts that exist within the regions. This environment has played a crucial role in facilitating the expansion and sustenance of the LRA. Secondly, it is clear that there is a lack of political within East and Central Africa. In other words, synergetic efforts across CAR, DRC, South Sudan, and Uganda would have gone a long way in extinguishing the group long ago. However, with diverse interests defining the region’s relation it remains impossible to conclusively address the problem. Another noticeable aspect of the group’s operational dynamics is that it relies on the civilian's attacks for the perpetuation of its reign. By causing fear and tension among the public and using human shields, it is evident that a military approach is not necessarily effective in handling the problem posed by the LRA.
Most interventions in the area have been characterized by military operations that are aimed at weakening the LRA, in retaliation, however, the LRA attack civilians thus compromising any progress achieved. For instance, the African Union-led Regional Task Force (RTF) military activities have been instrumental crippling, deterring and decreasing the LRA’s capacity to attack and commit atrocities. However, the downside of this approach is that it is a short-term approach since they focus on the immediate protection of civilians while ignoring the long-term challenges experienced at ground level. In essence, it is imperative to focus on the development of the sustainable efforts that allow for the reintegration of defectors as well as the strategies and aspects that help stabilize the lives of millions of people that have been affected by LRA’s activities. The main challenge, however, arises from the support and finances necessary for the actualization of such an approach. Economically intensive for the countries involved as has been exemplified through widespread withdrawal of troops.
8.0 Conclusion and Recommendations
The Lord Resistance Army remains a formidable force within the larger Eastern and Central African region, an element that is denoted by the number of internal refugees, massacres and mutilations that are continually linked to the region. With its operational dynamics clearly explore in this discussion it is imperative to initiate elimination measures based on the concrete information provided above. In light of this information, the following recommendations will prove vital in the elimination of the LRA. For starters, it is clear that one of the fundamental recommendations deducible from this discussion is that without effective and well-established incentives to encourage more defectors, it is highly likely for the group to persist.
This feat is achievable through quality information campaigns that will offer fair treatment for defectors from their respective countries. Another crucial recommendation is that with mid-level commanders characterized by their autonomy from Kony, they provide a credible avenue towards the elimination of LRA. Their willingness to defect will make it possible for the successful extermination of the LRA rebel group. Additionally, the fact that some officers are allowed to listen to the radio, it is imperative to establish and design media messages encouraging their defection.
References
Branch, A., Mwenda, A., Titeca, K., Finnström, S., Schomerus, M., Blattman, C. ... & Simonse, S. (2010). The Lord's Resistance Army: myth and reality . Zed Books Ltd..
Cakaj, L. (2010). The Lord's Resistance Army of Today.
Cline, L. E. (2013). The Lord's Resistance Army . ABC-CLIO.
Doom, R., & Vlassenroot, K. (1999). Kony's message: a new koine? The Lord's Resistance Army in Northern Uganda. African affairs , 98 (390), 5-36.
Dubal, S. (2018). Against humanity: lessons from the Lord's Resistance Army . Univ of California Press.
