The Moral Status of Non-Human Animals

Introduction 

Philosopher throughout history have argued about the moral status of non-human animals, especially in regard to their freedom and its limits, and suffering that comes out of the need for humans to use them for food and doing other activities. Some have strongly argued that humans are moral beings because they have rational self-interest as agents while others have maintained that the basis of morality, and thus moral status, are logically different from self-interest but not from the dictates of reason (Lecture Notes, 2018). As such they offer different accounts of the moral status of non-human animals that humans raise or hunt for food and clothing, utilize as beasts of burden, train for entertainment, and use as models in biological experiments and other research studies. Imperatively, no philosopher has demonstrated conclusively, from a moral perspective, the justified limits on what humans may do to these animals and their moral status (Cavalieri, 2001). Using different theories, this essay discusses the moral status of non-human animals based on personal perspective and an appropriate ethical theory to support it. 

Dualist View 

Rene Descartes believed that animals are not conscious since they lack knowledge like humans. In modern day, there are those who believe that animals are Cartesian machines and do not possess a language that give them the ability to feel and be self-conscious (Singer, 2011). Consciousness affects the way we treat animals and if they have moral status. Imperatively, the criteria for animal consciousness include physical criterion, behavioral criterion, suffering, mirror self-recognition test, and morality (Cavalieri, 2001). Philosophers argue that for something to have moral status they must have interests and welfare among other things. Things with moral status are protected and animals are protected by humans. Since animals are not conscious and have no well-being or interests to be considered, Rene Descartes believed that they do not have moral status (Singer, 2011). Descartes based his perception on moral inferiority of non-human animals on the utilization of his dualist ontology to the Stoic principles which state that nature exists for the benefit of its rational components that include the gods and human beings (Rowlands, 2002). Descartes’ conception of animals as Cartesian machines with the fundamental conviction that human beings are rational souls and possess a moral imperative to be lords and possessors of nature is consistent with the anthropocentric spirit of Stoicism. 

Kant’s Deontology 

Immanuel Kant’s deontological perspective, especially categorical imperative, concerns the moral obligations that human beings have on non-human animals. Kant emphasizes rationality as the main feature of being humans and rejects cruelty to animals because of the dangerous effects that it can have on the treatment of other human beings (Cavalieri, 2001). Kant posited that those who are cruel to animals are also hard in their human dealings whereas “tender feelings towards animals without a language lead to humane feelings towards humankind. Kant is categorical that the common good in all humans is their existence as an “end in itself” (Lecture Notes, 2018). Kant’s deontology places humans and other rational autonomous beings in a special moral class that differentiates them, as persons from other existing things. Imperatively, Kant believes that natural order exists to serve human interest and animals exist as means to an end, and that end is man (Singer, 2011). Therefore, Kant posits that animals have no moral status but humans have a moral obligation to use them as they wish as long as they do not treat them cruelly. 

Utilitarianism 

Peter Singer offers a positive view about the consciousness and morality of non-human animals to demonstrate that we have a moral obligation to animals. Singer posits that human beings have no moral justification to think that animals are not salient beings since they also suffer in pain and feel pleasure (Singer, 2011). Imperatively, they require protection and are justified for moral consideration and moral rights. Animals possess sentience or consciousness and have a subjective good (Cavalieri, 2001). These non-human animals have moral standing or status which justifies certain inherent rights- to life and freedom, and the right not to be used as a means to the human well-being. The natural right to live should be expanded to include animals since they can suffer, experience pleasure and pain. Animals require a good life with minimal episodes of suffering and pain but quite pleasurable just like human beings. 

Stoic and Epicurean doctrines discuss the moral status of non-human animals and among these was Jeremy Bentham (Dardenne, 2010). The doctrines state that humans have moral obligations and owe it directly to animals not to cause any suffering or harm. Bentham is categorical that sentience as opposed to logical thinking and language is enough to demonstrate interest and thus should be considered in the moral evaluation of human actions and their consequences to the animals. Bentham posited that the inability of early thinkers to understand animal interests from a utilitarian perspective makes animals to belong to the class of “things” without any consciousness (Matheny, 2006). However, Bentham states that it is not if humans use animals, but how we treat them in using them that should draw ethical concern. As posited, Bentham believed that sentience is a means to an end and implies that animals have basic interest in both the quality and duration of their lives. 

It is evident from the ethical theories that utilitarianism is an approach that identifies the moral status of non-human animals and implores on us to understand that they exist and have interests in their self lives. We have an obligation to view the animals from a wider perspective and perhaps combine the existing theoretical approaches to get the best from each theory and use it for the greater and common benefit of majority. In this regard, I believe that utilitarianism and its approaches to non-human animals supports my views on the moral status of non-human animals (Matheny, 2006). As posited by utilitarian proponents like Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham, the possession of sentience and not rationality or autonomy and linguistic ability entitles animals to direct moral consideration. Sentience creates a direct duty in humans not to cause any suffering to non-human animals (Singer, 2011). Imperatively, utilitarianism dictates to us that we owe it to these animals not to humans that may be affected by the actions of the animals to ensure that we consider their pleasures and pains (Lecture Notes, 2018). These animals should not suffer without any good reason and we have a responsibility to ensure that they have a good life. As such, we need to advocate for abolition of bad agricultural and animal rearing practices like the use of battery cages and confinement of animals. However, others argue that such practices support good life of the animals since animals are protected, are cared for and have minimal chances of getting diseases. Further, they have higher chances of getting essential necessities. 

Conclusion 

It is imperative that animals have moral status irrespective of their inability to have logic, use language competence, and not being exceptional. The theoretical perspectives discussed in this essay demonstrate that no logical conclusion has been made about the moral status of non-human animals though these approaches support indirectly the need to establish the status and reduce unnecessary pain and suffering. These animals have sentience and because of this feature, we owe it unto them to protect and consider their interests. 

References 

Cavalieri, P. (2001). The Animal Question: Why Non-Human Animals Deserve Human Rights, tr. Catherine Woollard. New York: Oxford University Press. 

Dardenne, E. (2010) From Jeremy Bentham to Peter Singer; Retrieved from https://journals.openedition.org/etudes-benthamiennes/204 

Lecture Notes (PPT). Introduction to Philosophy. 

Matheny, G. (2006) “Utilitarianism and animals”, in Singer, P. (ed.) In defense of animals: The second wave , Malden: Blackwell, pp. 13-25; (2002) “Expected utility, contributory causation, and vegetarianism”, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 19, pp. 293-297. 

Rowlands, M. (2002). Animals Like Us. New York: Verso Books. 

Singer, P. (2011) Practical ethics , 3 rd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.