The legislative function of the President of the United States, originally intended as a secondary function and possibly an impulse, has evolved into a decisive function. The President and Head of Government as the "chief legislator" at the federal level is rightly right, although, in form, the legislative function remains the exclusive prerogative of the Congress, formed by the House of Representatives and the Senate. It is the use of a large number of messages such as The State of the Union Message , the Economic Report , the Budget Message, and a bold use of the veto, or the threat of recourse, to concretely insert the President into the legislative process. The main coadjutor of presidential activity in this role is the White House Office , in which stands the Office of Management and Budget . It carries out control, coordination and information on the drafting of presidential initiatives and to prepare accompanying messages to the draft laws to which the presidential veto has been placed (Wilfred, 1956). A specialized staff, the Office of Congressional Relations , is in charge of managing ongoing negotiations with the Congress. Inside, the Office of Legislative Liaison has the precise intention of facilitating the legislative process of presidential proposals.
After the parliamentary plenary, a whole text was launched, the bill was sent to the White House for promulgation. At first, however, the text is examined by the Office of Legislative Relations and, unless there are particular objections, is submitted to the President's signature. Upon receipt of the text, the President may sign it, and the law will be immediately effective unless the legislature has established a peremptory and subsequent date for the entry into force. It may be the signature, or by writing its reservations or its interpretation of some rules that will guide the offices that will have to put it into practice. If the Congress is in session, the law will still be in force, if it has suspended the activities, the law declines. Failure to sign or motivate the gesture may postpone the text to the Congress within ten days of receipt.
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Chambers may then pass the veto with a new vote for which a majority of two-thirds of the members in each Chamber are required: in which case the President cannot deny the promulgation (Pfiffner, 1988). This procedure is called override of a veto . However, it may happen that the President is unable to send the text with a message to the Congress because the latter has suspended the work or because the parliamentary session has ended. In this event, the President has an absolute veto (cd pocket veto ) affects the whole text of the law: this has transformed it into an excellent weapon of political threat (Kesavan & Sidak, 2002). In order to reduce the opportunity for the Chief of the executive to ‘conceal the law’ or to put it to a standstill before its entry into force, both at the House of Representatives and the Senate, the constitution has established an office or a constant presence on the spot of the elect, so that they always have the ability to receive and record the President's motivated messages.
The two chambers of the US Congress successfully voted to reject President Obama's veto against the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, which aims to allow US victims of international terrorism since September 11, 2001, to continue in US courts the foreign states that would be responsible. Saudi Arabia is not cited at any time in the text of the law, but it is the first one aimed at. This post could have been called the weight of public opinion in US foreign policy. More specifically, the purpose of this Act is to amend an earlier law, FSIA for Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, which codified the immunity of foreign states in US courts, a relatively traditional provision which the United States in turn. Theoretically, therefore, the families of the victims of 11 September 2001 can now pursue Saudi Arabia in US courts. The fear, and the reason for Obama's veto, which he explained in a three-page letter to Congress, is that the United States can also be prosecuted in retaliation and that this put, in particular, their military- in danger. It was the first time under Obama that a presidential veto is rejected by Congress.
Recall that according to the principle of separation and balance of powers, the American president can veto a law voted by Congress, which can then be rejected by a two-thirds vote in each chamber of Congress. However, it is particularly rare that Congress rejects a presidential veto in foreign policy (on the role of the Congress in foreign policy, see here and here for example). The last time was in 1986 when Congress voted and then revoked against the veto of President Reagan a sanctions law against the apartheid regime in South Africa. It also nearly happened in 1995 about Bosnia, when both chambers voted with sufficient margins to lift the arms embargo for Bosnians (Clinton vetoed and then reinvested the United States in the resolution of the conflict, partly because of this Congress vote). It was difficult to vote against the impression of voting against the victims of terrorism in the current, presidential and parliamentary electoral context and Obama himself pointed it out (Spannaus, 2017). It should be noted that a few minutes after the vote, almost a third of the Senate signed a letter referring to the need to correct the law by amendments, in order to avoid retaliatory measures. These amendments that were considered after the elections, during the lame-duck session of the Congress, before the newly elected representatives of the White House and the Congress were installed in January 2017; a step less risky electorally failing to be courageous.
For some Republican politicians, it was above all to vote one last time against Obama, a constant of the Republican parliamentary action since the election of Obama. But the vote is undeniably the sign of the rise of an anti-Saudi sentiment in Congress, a reflection of the same phenomenon in the population, which has already expressed itself recently on the war in Yemen and the American support to Saudi Arabia, including via arms sales. The sling led by Connecticut Democratic Senator Chris Murphy, in partnership with the Republican and former Rand Paul's primary candidate, has certainly failed but has merit to open a public debate on this issue as not everyone can say it much.
It should be noted that Obama is not completely alien to the phenomenon, although sales of American arms to the Saudis have broken records under his presidency; but it is particularly ironic to see Obama finding himself a defender of an ally he has often criticized, as I recalled here. It is noteworthy that Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump have spoken out for the law, and thus against Obama's veto, which should not reassure the Saudis who were not very enthusiastic about the two main candidates for the presidential election. Saudi Arabia had not said its last word. Congress expected that the law would be amended and even void of any substance. But this last episode confirmed that the US-Saudi relationship had entered a zone of turbulence, or even a transition period.
References
Kesavan, V., & Sidak, J. G. (2002, October). The Legislator-in-Chief. William and Mary Law Review , 44 (1), 1+. Retrieved from http://db24.linccweb.org/login?url=http://go.galegroup.com.db24.linccweb.org/ps/i.do?p=AONE&sw=w&u=lincclin_spjc&v=2.1&it=r&id=GALE%7CA94511781&asid=9aea6293a6ee506cd7b34c344396e0d8
Pfiffner, J. (1988). The President's Legislative Agenda. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 499 , 22-35. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org.db24.linccweb.org/stable/1045815
Spannaus, A. (2017, October). Congress vs. the president; what Trump can learn from Obama. Washington Report on Middle East Affairs , 36 (6), OV-2(3). Retrieved from http://db24.linccweb.org/login?url=http://go.galegroup.com.db24.linccweb.org/ps/i.do?p=AONE&sw=w&u=lincclin_spjc&v=2.1&it=r&id=GALE%7CA506950316&asid=3595fba2e2416a0e60811b6eb90c3a59
Wilfred E. Binkley. (1956). The President As Chief Legislator. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 307 , 92-105. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org.db24.linccweb.org/stable/1031337
