The Strategy of 73 Easting

The 73 Easting' battle is deemed as one of the mother fights in the Desert Storm. The primary distinction of this battle is determined by varying unit and individual experiences. The future military tactics are expected to considerably vary from those utilized in the Desert Storm. This tactical variation has been depicted in recent conflicts such as the invasion of Ukraine by Russia's military, the establishment of ISIS, Iran's the quest for long-range airborne missiles by Iran, the use of chemical weapons by Syria, as well as the evolving insurgency of Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Army forces should generally be ready to fight against extensively positioned enemies in sophisticated environments. However, there are general observations and lessons obtained from combat proficiencies applicable at the strategic level. The main essence is to reflect on strategies and experiences applied by the Eagle troop, Second Squadron, and Armored Calvary Regiment in the battle of 73 Easing (Kruse, 1991). It is a battle in which the U.S. military emerged successful due to the utilization of high-end strategies.

An overview of the Battle

The battle of 73 Easting began on Feb 23, 1991, when the Armored Cavalry Regiment entered Iraq and instigated an offensive military mission led by the VII Corps of Lieutenant General Franks. The primary objective of this mission was to enclose and overthrow the Guard of Republicans from the west. In this case, the Iraqi military was essentially oriented towards south. On the other hand, there was an in-depth positioning of the Republican Guard to the northern region with the aim of preserving their freedom of movement or maneuvering. As soon as the Iraqis noticed the efforts put forth by the U.S. military to envelop and exterminate their Kuwait-based Army using XVIII and VII Airborne Corps, the elements of Republican Guard were reoriented towards the west ( Biddle, 1996).

As an invasive covering force, a significant attack was led by Armored Cavalry Regiment aimed at easing forward maneuver of Corps, avoidance of untimely military deployment, as well as the defeat of enemy units within their aptitudes. The Eagle Troop was part and parcel of the Regimental operation. It is an operation that enhanced ultimate location of the periphery between the automated divisions and Iraqi Army’s Republican Guard. The U.S. military troops fought intelligently, as other Regimental activities provided the Corps commander with the most needed information before obligating a “fist” of 4 heavy divisions moving behind their Regiment.

The strategic move on the first day of invasion was well organized. The troops traveled an average of twenty miles into Iraqi territory and subsequently waited for the closure of their sub-divisions. Lieutenant Linzy's platoon led the regiment by enhancing rapid encounter and defeat of numerous infantry units of the enemy( Biddle, 1996). The first combat was actualized after four days when the military moved further northwards. The combat began at dusk and the troop was forced to halt when the enemy started pointing fire on them. The U.S. military opted to engage them with indirect fire using mortars, as well as the direct fire from Tanks and Bradleys. In the course of the battle, most of the enemies were forced to surrender to the F troop situated in the right flank ( Biddle, 1996). As the attack heightened, soldiers were essentially warned by their leaders to desist from their satisfactory coexistence because of the ease realized in their initial encounter with the rivals. The basic reason for such a strategic advice was based on the probable expectation of a stringent attack from more proficient Republican military units. After two days, the G Troop led by Captain Sartiano attacked and demolished the reconnaissance unit of the enemy encompassed with twelve MTLBs ( Biddle, 1996).  The G troop strategically fought and captured the enemy’s vehicles to squadron command post. There close examination weapons and maps made them realize that they possess brand new weapons. This fact made it clear that a vigorous fight was underway as soon as they enter the Republican Guard zone (Berry, 1991).

An order from the VII Corps was received early in the morning. The order entailed a strategic move that turned the troop's regiment from northeast to eastward axis. Lieutenant Franks informed the Cavalry Regiment Commander the probable perspective of passing through the 1ID (main Infantry Division) and further accorded him with an initial limit aimed at advancing the 60 Easting ( Scales, 1998). This was a cognitive strategy focused at the enhancement of fighting prowess and the prevailing attack options. It was meant to subdue the plans and territorial advantages capitalized on by the enemy.

The military troops were forced to re-strategize their plans after a heavy downpour that night. The heavy rains resulted into a thick fog early in the morning on the planned battle day. The fog greatly hindered the visual capabilities of the troops. They could hardly see past two hundred meters (Berry, 1991). As soon as the fog faded away after some few hours, the visibility range was further minimized by vigorous sandstorms that came by. In the process, the air cavalry squadron of the Regiment was stranded for several hours. The weather deterioration was a clear indication that 1ID would arrive later than anticipated. The Lieutenant made a critical effort of directing the troops to consequently move another ten kilometers towards the 70 Easting. Moreover, he advised them to anticipate forward line passages with 1ID at around 0200 ( Scales, 1998). During the afternoon hours, the three squadrons of the regiments were ordered to focus their attack towards the eastern region with the aim of identifying the enemy’s defensive positions. Regardless of limited detailed intelligence at that moment, the troops based their judgments on instincts. They felt that a fight will ensue anytime.

Another strategic move was realized when the troops were ordered to move out from the Squadron's southern periphery. The basic reason is that 63 Easting was framed as the troop's initial advancement limit. They opted to substitute the previous technique through the formation of a modified support security right. A scout platoon known as Lieutenant Mike led the troops with three sections endowed with two cavalry combat vehicles via a “vee” formation ( Scales, 1998). On the other section, Lieutenant Tim moved with his squad along the southern flank. They pointed their guns southwards to cover up the gap between the U.S troops and the third Squadron. Our mortar section followed the first platoon. Their tanks were essentially stirred behind the mortars within a nine-tank wedge. The main tank was situated amidst the First Lieutenant's Second Platoon and Lieutenant Jeff’s fourth platoon (International Security, 1997). This was to ensure a comprehensive cover from any form of attack instigated from any angle.

Lack of maps posed a greater predicament to the troops. They were left unaware of the next move and probable attack locations since they paralleled the road running from west to east alongside the third squadron boundary. They were rather forced by circumstances to utilize a generic scale of 1:100,000 to plot their progress along the flat and featureless desert. The worst scenario is that the troops were not conversant with the fact that they were moving into the old training ground for Iraqi soldiers. The ground was essentially occupied by Tawakalna Division's brigade, as well as the elements of the Tenth Armored Division ( Scales, 1998). Al these necessitated absolute and cautious strategic moves aimed at minimizing potential risks.

The primary disparity between the U.S. troops and the enemy's troops was based on the aspect of territorial conversancy. Being their territory, the enemies had a greater advantage since they were well-versed with the potential battleground. The enemy's unit had initially sought accommodation in this village as they undertook their training. General Mohammed, the then commander, considered this ground as their most ideal battle front. To their surprise, the strategic plans put forth by the U.S. troops superseded their expectations (Berry, 1991). Regardless of their projected territorial advantages, the enemies were found off-guard through the use of advanced mechanisms. They were essentially unaware of capabilities brought about by the brand-new universal positioning system. They had initially made assumptions that the troops will move alongside the road terrains to minimize the chances of getting lost along the flat and featureless desert. In the process, General Mohammed makes a great mistake by strategically organizing and positioning his troops alongside the road (International Security, 1997). He further fortified the entire village with various anti-aircraft guns, infantry, and machine guns that were to be used in the ground mode.

If it were not for the good strategic plans, sophisticated weapons, and ability to take risks, the U.S. government would have been outsmarted by Mohammed’s troops. The enemy was endowed with a fundamentally sound defense framework. They significantly took advantage of the unnoticeable upsurge of terrain that perpendicularly ran along the road and straight through the village (Berry, 1991). This enabled them to organize a vigorous reverse slope defense along the eastern segment of the ridge. In this case, the basic anticipation was based on the fact that upon subsequent encounter of his stronghold in the village, they would either bypass the rivals to the south or north.

Moreover, general Mohamed established two kill sacks or combat segments towards the eastern part of the ridge alongside a northern and southern segment of the village. They emplaced minefields with the aim of disrupting the opponent's forward movement, while at the same time digging in an average of sixteen BMPs and forty tanks within a range of one kilometer from the ridge. The ultimate plan was to enhance a well-calculated attack and termination of the U.S. troops as they moved past the crest. Numerous infantry were prompted to occupy trenches and bunkers between the armored vehicles. In addition, he purposely positioned a standby model comprised of eighteen T-72s ( Scales, 1998). His command post was placed along an elusive ridgeline about three kilometers further east. The overall experiences for the U.S. troops were characterized with longer maneuvering periods, preparations, and waiting that was interrupted by the short periods of violent activity. The experience proved to be consistent with the unit experiences put forth by the armored North African combat in WWW II.

The United States' troops managed to use the second ACR to destroy more than 85 Iraq tanks, over 30 Iraqi military vehicles, and an average of 40 carriages. They also succeeded to destroy numerous artilleries and anti-aircraft systems used by the Iraqis during the battle period. In general, a figure comparable to one Iraqi brigade was completely destroyed during this historical battle. It indeed became one of the historical defeat for Iraqis Republican since they were consequently defeated for the first time. As highlighted above, they were endowed with sophisticated military strategies with the great expertise of fighting from the ground. Within a day, numerous Iraqi brigades were totally destroyed. As a result, the battle affirmed the superiority and supremacy of the U.S. troops, as well as the desire of attaining their objectives and mission in their subsequent military practice.

Strategic Lessons that were learned from the Battle of 73 Easting

The extensive and historical battle between the U.S. and the Iraqi troops proved to be one of the most sophisticated and strategically aligned military operations. The complexity was enhanced by the prowess put forth and weapons that were utilized by both sides. Since the two sides were almost at par, success was essentially defined by the ability to outsmart the opponent using significant strategic moves. Based on this battle, there are various strategic lessons for enhancing future military operations that were learned.

The first lesson is inclined to the aspect of leading from the front. This was realized the moment the U.S lieutenants led their troops by showing great determination and forward-looking perspectives that enabled them to obtain a clear picture and adequate decision-making stance. For instance, as Sergeant Harris was engaged with a 25mm riffle, Lieutenant Gauthier made a forward move to assess and advance the prevailing situation ( Biddle, 1996). A tow missile that totally demolished the enemy's tanks was then fired by Gauthier. This was after Sergeant Craig fired another tank situated beside. The simultaneous explosives instigated by the Lieutenants led to the suppression of enemy position.

The second military strategy that was affirmed in this mission is that of being the first shooter. The U.S. troops emerged successful due to their capability of releasing their triggers earlier and faster than their rivals. In the process, the enemies found themselves caught up in the fix that was rather too late to recover. This is in line with the third lesson regarding the act of fighting through the fog. This strategic feature depicts that the military troops should be prepared to face any impending challenges in the battle field. For instance, the troops managed to maneuver through various challenges brought about by a thick fog and regular sandstorms that inhibited their sight. Failure to embrace persistence and to device other strategic mechanisms would have led to a subsequent defeat of the U.S troops.

The act of utilizing instincts also stands out as one of the lessons that were learned. Instincts play a very significant role in the battle front. It is hence essential for the military personnel to trust their instincts where appropriate. This was clearly experienced when the troops found themselves stranded and rather lost in the flat and unfeatured desert ( Biddle, 1996). Their instincts enhanced them with a feeling that the enemies had organized themselves accordingly and were rest assured of that they stick to the roads leading them to the village. To their surprise, the opposite happened. The fifth lessons are inclined to the aspect of fostering the overall initiative. Each and every trooper was conversant with the manner their troops and platoons conducted firing and maneuvering strategies. The tank driver specialist had a clear understanding that he was supposed to steer a cognitive path that allowed the tank platoons to point their guns to the target. He enhanced this framework by turning 45 degrees right while keeping the frontal armor to the enemy tanks. He also managed to drive through the minefield by taking great caution anti-tank mines.

The next strategy is that of being ready for degraded operations and misfires. A practical example was realized when Lieutenant Jeff's tank crew maneuvered into the village and demolished an enemy tank before the acquisition of the second tank within a close range. The strategic lesson was also upheld through excellent co-ordination between the platoons and the aspect of ensuring mutual support. The enemy's personnel carriers and burning tanks formed a thick smoke that further concealed the enemy towards the east. As the U.S. military tanks traversed the smoke, other armored vehicles of the enemy were seen from a distance, while numerous infantries ran back to their subsequent positions and trench lines. In the process, the troops swiftly destroyed the enemy's armored vehicles and shot the rival troops as they closed in. The solders showed greater discipline when they confiscated the soldiers who surrendered rather than killing them. The final lesson that was learned from this military operation was the aspect of taking risks. The U.S. military troops took greater risks when they entered a foreign battle field in a harsh desert. They greatly risked being enveloped by their enemies since they were conversant with the terrains and directions. Therefore, as much as risk is not often recommended, it plays a very significant some point.

Conclusion

The current and the future military operations sets basis on strategic lessons learned from previous operations. They enable the troopers to device appropriate ways of engaging in military operations through the act of making the most needed corrections on previous missions. Without appropriate strategies and resources, a military operation is doomed to fail. This is something that brings disparity between various military units. The battle of 73 Easting clearly depicts a practical experience that features critical military techniques that should be upheld. Their success enhanced greater superiority of the U.S. military.

References

Berry Jr, F. C. (1991). Re-creating history: The battle of 73 Easting (using advanced simulation technologies to fight past, present, and future battles). National Defense ,  76 (472), 6-9.

Biddle, S. (1996). Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War tells us about the future of conflict. International Security ,  21 (2), 139-179.

International Security, (1997). Lessons from Ground Combat in the Gulf: The Impact of Training and Technology. MIT Press .

Kruse M.D., (1991). The  Battle  of  73 Easting , 26 February 1991: A Historical Introduction to a Simulation. National Defense .

Scales, R. H. (1998).  Certain Victory: The US Army in the Gulf War . Potomac Books, Inc.