The Chicago teachers strike took place on 11th September 2012 when about 25,000 members were affected since they went on strike by holding rallies and marches across the city. Schools and students were also adversely affected as no constructive learning activities were going on. They were demanding for a tentative deal, which included the pay increases over five years. As a result, this had a significant economic impact since more time was lost, and many schools were forced to stop teaching sessions in addition to disrupting the surrounding business activities ( Kaplan, 2013). The strike was motivated by the 2008 economic crash that resulted in most teachers having their salaries slashed by a significant percentage, and they never received any salary increment over the five years. As a result, they could only air their issues through strikes and marches. On the other hand, the UAW strike took place on 16th September 2019, whereby the United Auto Workers (UAW) went on a 40-day strike against the General Motors, thereby affecting about 48,000 members of the Union ( Herod, 2019). The motivation for the UAW strike included the demands for increased job security, retaining healthcare benefits, a gateway for the temporary workers in becoming permanent, as well as better pay. The strike had an adverse economic impact on the GM organization as it cost the Company about $3.8 billion to $4 billion for that particular year as well as $1 billion for the third quarter. However, no significant political impacts did the UAW strike have as compared to Chicago’s teachers’ strike, which had a substantial impact on the government.
While comparing the two strikes, I feel that the UAW strike was more damaging as compared to Chicago’s teachers’ strike. It is because the UAW strike affected about 48,000 workers as compared to only 25,000 workers affected by the Chicago teachers’ strike. Besides, billions of dollars were lost as a result of the UAW strike, which also affected the economy of the country besides negatively impacting the GM organization as it had to suffer significant losses both internally and externally. Besides, there was an adverse economic impact caused by the UAW strike as it shaved off almost $2.9 billion in profit from the 2019 GM earnings, which included $700 million in the after-tax costs or even 52 percent per share, for the third quarter only ( Herod, 2019). However, as compared to the UAW strike, the teachers’ strike demanded more than what could be provided by the United States government. For example, they demanded more affordable housing within the city for both the teachers and students, which is something that had never been requested by teachers within recent contract negotiations.
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In conclusion, each of these strikes had its own outcomes. For example, the teachers became the winners of the Chicago teachers’ strike since it forced the state lawmakers in raising the pay for teachers and spending more on schools. Besides, the teachers were also capable of making substantial improvements concerning the educational justice within Chicago ( Kaplan, 2013) . On the other hand, the GM Company was the major loser in the UAW strike as the impact was far-reaching. It is because the move resulted in the GM plants in Mexico and Canada to temporarily shutter as a result of lacking significant parts of manufacturing vehicles in addition to adversely impacting the GM suppliers, of which most of them confirmed undisclosed financial losses and temporary layoffs. It is also crucial to understand that there were mixed reactions from the public concerning these strikes. For example, half of the public supported these strikes while half did not support them.
References
Herod, A. (2019). Implications of just-in-time production for union strategy: Lessons from the General Motors-United Auto Workers dispute. Annals of the Association of American Geographers , 90 (3), 521-547.
Kaplan, D. (2013). The Chicago Teachers' Strike and Beyond: Strategic Considerations. Monthly Review , 65 (2), 33.
