Max Weber states that power is the chance that one participant existing in a social relationship has the ability and position to execute their own will regardless of the resistance faced despite the conditions and situations at hand for both participants (Uphoff, 1989) . For Weber, dominance differs from power in such a way that, dominance denotes the probability that an order with a particular message will be respected and acted upon. The idea of Max Weber is that power cannot fully cover the definition of dominance but only partially (Parsons, 1986)
Max Weber describes power in a three tier formation comprising of three different kinds of dominance. According to Uphoff, the three types of power distinguished by Max Weber include charismatic authority, legal-rational and traditional examples of power for which each works in tandem with the kind of leadership followed by a country or a society (1989). These three sorts of power according to Weber work in particular to the correspondence of existing situations and experiences of a country’s people of society. Power and dominance form the backbone of any functional political setup depending on prevailing conditions and the consensus reached by the people.
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Charismatic authority goes back to the fact that it depends on the character, personality and the traits an individual possesses that makes them a unique and likable leader. This particular kind of power rallies people to follow the leaders’ thoughts and gather enough faith from the people just enough for the leader to exercise their authority. Charismatic leadership can be disadvantageous since it gives the leader a messianic status quo that requires them to salvage the people from existing situation (Uphoff, 1989) . However, a charismatic leader unites the society in the face of adversity and divisions towards a specific goal.
The second kind of power according to Weber is the traditional authority which portrays a picture of dominant power with a similar kind of personality (Uphoff, 1989) . This kind of power solely depends on the existing rules and traditions for it to work and the society gives the leader the mandate to exercise their authority with routine and usual order. A traditional leader may find and scheme ways of exploiting the society based on the existing traditions due to lack of control standards.
Weber defines legal rational authority with precise defined laws such that the adherence of people to the laws is not completely dependent on the capacity of the leader but on the competency that the process of law offers to the leadership. Unlike the traditional dominance, in this case, the exercising of power by the leaders is controlled by laws and protocols of procedure. In such power dominance, the leader is not held in a supernatural post or seen as the savior but rather their actions are monitored closely by existing laws of the society (Uphoff, 1989) .
The ability for acting with the wellbeing of the society in mind is power (Arendt, 1970) . Arendt adds that power should be differentiated not only be distinguished from strength and force but also violence (1970). Power is not owned by individual like Weber claims in the charismatic and traditional dominance but is in the hands of the plurality of society with a common goal. Hannah Arendt describes power as the complete flipside of violence adding that power is the collective ability of society to achieve similar objectives. For Arendt, power may appear or go away in context with the general idea that it functions as the entrustment of people with the political system to protect and help achieve the common objectives. Demolition of power is described as the violence on which the society cannot exist in but rather succeeds on the presence of power (Arendt, 1970). Arendt’s disagrees with Weber’s definition of power and dominance with by laying out the fact that both are vaguely described and thus just give a superficial meaning to authority (1970). She adds that the experience witnessed from institutions, firms, communities and societies have proved that the idea of Weber on power is farfetched in a way that Weber only offers description but has no conception of the power itself.
The legitimacy of power is obtained from the gathering of people in essence from the original agreement of people on the basis that lays down a political community that is strengthened and reaffirmed when the people act according to the method of speech and persuasion. Arendt maintains that the existence of power needs no justification by the fact that it is inherent with the political community but what power does is right and legitimate (1970). Power comes up whenever people gather and perform their activities together. However, power derives its legitimacy from the first step that people got together but not the action that is to be followed as argued by Weber.
Both Havel and Arendt are immensely involved psychologically by events whereby the nonpolitical society entity formed a public arena that led to unforeseen forms of power. Vaclav Havel borrows a lot from Arendt’s “The Human Condition and Eichmann in Jerusalem” which enabled him to reflect much on the concept of power (Havel & Wilson, 1985) . Both express the concern on the execution of power on people and further raise concerns on the survival of people in the action of totalitarianism and the pressure of yielding to the power. Arendt supports the role played by the artist in politics through nonviolent means in repressive power which is in line with Havel’s goal of having ideal human action that puts in mind the welfare of others and self.
The impact that totalitarianism power has on an individual and society is one of the similar concerns on Havel and Arendt in which they both put forth their suggestions that the repressive tactics easily escalate from bureaucracy to totalitarianism. The Havel’s issues on the lies and empty promises echo Arendt’s issues addressed in the trial of Adolf in her book. Arendt describes in her book the use of language rules as the basic code of deception that gives energy to a totalitarian power to keep people in the dark on what the power is doing. Havel adds that this is an abuse of language by the power to mask the realities at hand which drives the people to become the powers accomplices ignorantly.
Havel society of totalitarian power coincides with Weber’s traditional dominance and power (Havel & Wilson, 1985) . Much like the traditional dominance, the totalitarian power is similar in that it is linear in nature with a dictator subject relationship. It is further reinforced by existing rules and traditions that are unregulated. For Havel, the power of dictatorship is nurtured by the strength of the military and police to intensify control on the subject. In this case Weber’s analysis of dominance is not far from the ideas laid out by Havel on totalitarianism.
Havel agrees with Weber that traditional power does not have historical strength and can be differentiated by the majority through a temporary basis. For the non-traditional power described by Havel, it is one that is flexible and touches the wellbeing of people at every juncture which accepts flexible ideology that bends and binds the people depending on the situation. The latter can be compared with Weber’s legal dominance that allows changes and regulations on the people exercising authority on the citizens. Havel states that the use of power eventually leads to a ritual that is not evasive which engulfs the people blinding them from their enemy. A charismatic type of dominance given by Weber is the kind of power that gives a messianic sensation to its people believing that their leader will shield and provide a solution to the problems of the people.
References
Arendt, H. (1970). On Violence. New York: Harvest.
Havel, V., & Wilson, P. (1985). The power of the powerless. International Journal of Politics , 15 (3/4), 23-96.
Parsons, T. (1986). Power and the social system. Power , 94-143.
(Uphoff, N.1989). Distinguishing power, authority & legitimacy: Taking Max Weber at his word
by using resources-exchange analysis. Polity , 22 (2), 295-322.
